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The major thrust of refugee protection worldwide is directed towards providing assistance to 
refugees in emergency situations. In South Africa, a large number of refugees have moved 
beyond this initial emergency phase such that the extended nature of their refugee status has 
left them in a state of continuous vulnerability. Their prolonged exile has led to violations of 
various rights recognised by international law and South Africa’s own constitutional and 
refugee law. Faced with restricted access to rights, refugees in South Africa live in poverty, 
are  frustrated, and do not  realise their full potential, to say nothing about the overt and brutal 
attacks they constantly face as victims of xenophobia. Their continued status as refugees 
deprives them of opportunities and subjects them to constant fear of harassment and 
exploitation. Even though neither the UNHCR nor the South African government has 
classified refugees living in South Africa as being in a protracted situation, many refugees 
have been in South Africa for five years or longer, with no durable solution in sight. This 
thesis highlights the plight of refugees in protracted refugee situation in South Africa and 
recommends suitable solutions to the problems this situation raises.  
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When attempting to answer the question, who is a refugee, Shacknove wrote:  
 
The term refugee conjures up a mélange of bleak images: a teaming boat adrift on the South China 
Sea, a bloated child in Bangladesh, a shanty town reduced to rubble in Beirut. Determining 
conceptually who is, and who is not, a refugee would appear to be a relatively simple matter. A 
refugee we might say is a person fleeing life-threatening conditions. In daily parlance and for 
journalistic purposes this is roughly the meaning of refugee hood.1 
 
In my experience as a human rights lawyer in South Africa,2 Shacknove’s description 
unfortunately applies to most refugees I have encountered. Refugees do ‘conjure up a 
mélange of bleak images’, the terrifying blank stares from women raped multiple times and 
the shocking child-like ways of a former child soldier and the unbearable melancholy of 
refugee claimants who fled a war situation in which they had no hand or interest but whose 
loss has been unimaginably great. In most cases, it is not only a material loss they experience 
but also loss of a family, home and everything known and familiar. The thought that they 
may never be able to return home, or that the home as they knew it has been lost forever, is 
all too overwhelming. All of them, you might say, are people having fled ‘life-threatening 
conditions’.3  
                                                          
1 A Shacknove ‘Who is a Refugee’ (1985) 95 Ethics at 277. 
2 I am an admitted attorney of the High Court of South Africa and currently practicing at the UCT Refugee 
Rights Clinic. The Refugee Rights Clinic operates as an implementing partner for the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  
3 Shacknove op cit note 1 at 277. 
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These descriptions are, however, of refugees whose misery is too obvious for all to see. 
Unfortunately, the media and aid agencies stop paying attention when the ‘mélange of bleak 
images’ are no longer visible and the refugee situation becomes prolonged.4  
Immigrant or refugee communities have often been described by sociologists as resilient 
and exceptionally hardworking.5 In my experience, with many of my refugee clients, this is 
indeed the case. One young man comes to mind. Whilst practising as a lawyer at the 
University of Cape Town’s Refugee Rights Clinic, I was approached for assistance by a 14 
year-old boy who was acting on behalf of his family, seemingly mature beyond his years, and 
clearly bearing the burden of the entire family. Undocumented and vulnerable to arrest and 
deportation, visibly terrified and bewildered, he spoke passionately on behalf of his family 
despite his limited command of the English language. However, 12 years later, he became a 
doctoral student at a university in South Africa. He is, unfortunately, still a refugee. This 
refugee family, 16 years into their stay in South Africa, is still struggling to find proper 
accommodation and is struggling to pay university fees. Although they have managed to find 
a place in the lower echelons of the South African labour market, they remain victims of 
xenophobia, not because they are perceived as ‘less than’, but simply because they are not 
citizens. On the one hand, they cannot fully participate in all aspects of South African life 
because of their prolonged refugee status. On the other hand, they cannot return to their 
country of origin due to the continuing conflict there. According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), just because this family has a range of rights they can 
access to integrate into the host society; resettlement to a third country is not an option.6  
                                                          
4 Shacknove op cit note 1. 
5 J Hein ‘Refugees, Immigrants, and the State’ (1993) 19 Annual Review of Sociology at 43-59; M Hlatshwayo 
& S Vally ‘Violence, Resilience and Solidarity: The Right to Education for Child Migrants in South Africa’ 
(2014) 35 School Psychology International at 266-279.  
6 P Rulashe ‘UNHCR Mulls Solutions for Refugees Affected by Xenophobia’, available at  
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In comparison to most refugees in South Africa, this family has benefited from the 
generous rights afforded to refugees. Even though they have enjoyed internal freedom of 
movement, access to education and health care, access to the labour market and are 
documented, their stay in South Africa has been marred because of their continued status as 
refugees.7 They remain on the margins of society even though they have demonstrated a 
willingness to integrate into the South African society. 
While many refugees in South Africa are able to access various rights, they have generally 
been denied an opportunity to become permanent residents. This means that they will 
continue to remain as refugees in South Africa. The South African Refugees Act 130 of 1998 
requires refugees to prove that they will remain as refugees indefinitely before being granted 
a more durable form of residence, such as permanent residence8 and, after a further five years 
of continuous stay in South Africa, naturalisation.9 Naturalisation as an end to refugee status 
is not unique to South Africa; it is also foreseen by the 1951 United Nations Refugee 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN Refugee Convention),10 whose Article 34 
requires States to give consideration in good faith to the ‘assimilation and naturalisation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
www.unhcr.org/news/.../5/.../unhcr-mulls-solutions-refugees-affected-xenophobia.html, accessed 23 January 
2017; SABC ‘No Resettlement for Isipingo Refugees’, available at 
http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/ba7f128048434fec9c1bff4d1170398b/No-resettlement-for-Isipingo-refugees:-
UNHCR, accessed 24 January 2017. 
7 J Handmaker ‘Who Determines Policy? Promoting the Right of Asylum in South Africa’ (1999) 11 (2) 
International Journal of Refugee Law at 290-309; C Johnson ‘Failed Asylum Seekers in South Africa: Policy 
and Practice’ (2015) African Human Mobility Review, available at  www.sihma.org.za, accessed 3 January 
2017; D Dass F Khan  & K Ramjathan ‘Socio-Economic Rights of Refugees and Asylum Seekers’ in F Khan & 
T Schreier (eds)  Refugee law in South Africa (2014) Juta & Co. Ltd: Cape Town at 220–233.  
8 Section 27 of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998. 
9 See Chapter 5 of this thesis for a more detailed analysis. 
10 189 UNTS 150 was adopted on 25 July 1951 in Geneva and entered into force on 22 April 1954.  
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refugees’.11 It is evident that for as long as refugees remain refugees the only protection they 
are entitled to is a ‘surrogate protection’.12 It is only when they are fully enfranchised as 
citizens that the need for a substitute or surrogate protection no longer exists.13  
The scenario sketched above clearly raises a number of questions. How long can a refugee 
remain a refugee? Is it humane to expect a person to remain a refugee indefinitely? What are 
the human rights implications of protracted refugee situations?  How can the negative human 
rights implications to such situations be prevented or addressed?   
 
2. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
The major thrust of refugee protection systems worldwide are directed toward providing 
assistance to refugees in emergency situations.14 In South Africa, a large number of refugees 
have moved beyond this initial emergency phase and the extended nature of their refugee 
status has left them in a state of continuous vulnerability. Their prolonged exile has led to the 
violation of a number of rights contained in the UN Refugee Convention, international human 
                                                          
11 UN Refugee Convention at Article 34.  
12 The term ‘surrogate protection’ was first coined by Professor Hathaway in  J C Hathaway & M Foster The 
Law of Refugee Status 2 ed (2014): Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 495. 
13 Ibid. 
14 G Loescher & J Milner et al (eds) Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security 
Implications (2008) United Nations University Press: Tokyo at 3; J Konyndyk ‘Towards a New Model for Post-
Emergency Refugee Assistance’, available at http://odihpn.org/magazine/towards-a-new-model-for-post-
emergency-refugee-assistance/, accessed 5 June 2016; M Smith ‘Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a 
Waste of Humanity’ World Refugee Survey 2004, available at http://www.refugees.org/data/wrs/04/pdf/38-
56.pdf, accessed 11 June 2016.  
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rights laws applicable to refugees, and South Africa’s constitutional15 and domestic refugee 
laws.16 Faced with restricted access to rights, refugees in South Africa live in poverty, are  
frustrated, and do not  realise their full potential, to say nothing about the overt and brutal 
attacks they constantly face as victims of xenophobia. Their continued status as refugees 
deprives them of opportunities and subjects them to constant fear of harassment and 
exploitation. 
Of the 112 000 recognised refugees in South Africa, the largest number are of Somali and 
Congolese origin,17 both of whom have been the targets of xenophobia for a number of years. 
It has become clear that it is their ‘otherness’ that makes them the target. Somalis have been 
seeking asylum in South Africa since 1994. It can thus be deduced that the first Somali 
refugees to arrive in South Africa have been holding refugee status for more than 20 years.18 
Similarly, Rwandan and Burundian refugees fled to South Africa in the aftermath of the 
genocide in those countries in the early 1990s.19 Congolese refugees have also been in South 
Africa since the overthrow of the Mobutu regime towards the end of the 1990s.20 They have 
clearly been living in South Africa since their initial displacement and are finding themselves 
in seemingly unending exile.  
                                                          
15 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
16 Refugees Act. 
17 UNHCR ‘The UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks’, available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02afce6.html, 






This is precisely the type of refugee situation that the UNHCR refers to as a ‘protracted 
refugee situation’.21 Somalis, in particular, are unable to return to Somalia where conflict and 
persecution persists.22 These refugees cannot go home because of the continuing nature of the 
conflict in their countries and none of the available solutions seem to be appropriate or 
attainable. Voluntary repatriation is clearly not a solution where the violence in the country of 
origin is on-going.23 The resettlement programme is not large enough to cater for this entire 
class of refugees,24 while the third solution of local integration, of which the end-product 
could be naturalisation, has thus far been interpreted so narrowly that only a handful of long 
term refugees have been able to access this solution.25 South Africa has also failed to 
                                                          
21 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No 109 (LXI) – 2009 on Protracted Refugee Situations, , UN GA 
Doc A/AC.96/1080, 8 December2009). 
22 Human Rights Watch ‘World report 2015 – Somalia’ (2015), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/54cf838115.html, accessed 2 July 2016. 
23 UNHCR ‘Discussion Note on Protection Aspects of Voluntary Repatriation Discussion Note on Protection 
Aspects of Voluntary Repatriation EC/1992/SCP/CRP3’ (1-04-1992), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/print/3ae68cd314.html, accessed 26 August 2016;   See also B S Chimni 
‘FromResettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable Solutions to Refugee 
Problems’ (2004) 23 Refugee Quarterly Status at 55. 
24 Ibid at Chimni. 
25 J Crisp ‘The Local Integration and Local Settlement of Refugees: A Conceptual and Historical Analysis’, 
Working Paper No 102 (2004) available at http://www.unhcr.org/407d3b762.pdf, accessed 14 August 2016. 
Crisp explains that Local Integration is a legal, economic, and social process granting refugees rights and 
entitlements; it allows them to become self-reliant and they are able to live amongst or alongside the host 
population, without fear of systematic discrimination; A Fielden ‘Local Integration: An Under-Reported 
Solution to Protracted Refugee Situations’ New Issues in Refugee Research UNHCR Research Paper No 158, 
June 2008; K Jacobsen ‘The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration for Refugees in Developing Countries’ 
Working Paper No 45, Tufts University, available http://www.unhcr.org/3b7d24059.html, accessed 8 June 2015 
at 1; See also chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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implement its progressive refugee laws effectively and this has led to an unacceptable 
situation where large numbers of refugees are living in a state of limbo.  
The UNHCR has recognised protracted refugee situations as a major problem and has in 
the last decade attempted to address this issue.26 The problem of protracted refugee situations 
is best summarised as follows by the UNHCR:  
 
The majority of today’s refugees have lived in exile for far too long, restricted to refugee camps or 
eking out a meagre existence in urban centres throughout the developing world. Most subsist in a 
state of limbo, and are often dependent on others to find solutions to their plight.27  
  
 The UNHCR has attempted to identify protracted refugee situations worldwide and has 
encouraged contracting States to find solutions.28 According to Slaughter and Crisp, the 
UNHCR has assumed responsibility for protracted refugee situations in order to fill gaps in 
the international legal regime that were not envisaged at the time of its establishment.29 
Unfortunately, South Africa has not been considered in any one of these studies. This thesis 
will aim to draw upon the work of the UNHCR and consider whether South African laws are 




                                                          
26 Loescher et al op cit note 14.  
27 UNHCR ‘Protracted Refugee Situations: The Search for Practical Solutions’, available at 
www.unhcr.org/4444afcb0.pdf, accessed December 2016. 
28 A Slaughter & J Crisp ‘A Surrogate State: UNHCR’s Role in Protracted Refugee Situations’ in G Loescher et 
al Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications (2008) at 123-141.  




3. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND REFUGEES IN PROTRACTED 
REFUGEE SITUATIONS: AN OVERVIEW 
 
The international law instrument specifically and comprehensively outlining the rights of 
refugees is the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the African refugee instrument is the 1969 
OAU Refugee Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
(OAU Refugee Convention),30 both of which declare that their purpose is to provide 
protection to refugees. This protection has found expression in the principle of non-
refoulement, which guarantees that refugees will not be returned to the place of harm.31 Both 
instruments also anticipated that refugee status would cease once conditions in the country of 
origin have changed to the extent that it is safe for refugees to return home.32 The issue of 
solutions for refugees are also addressed in both instruments, albeit differently, reflecting the 
different historical contexts out of which these instruments developed.       
The UN Refugee Convention has several civil, political and socio-economic rights33 that 
allow refugees an opportunity for integration into the country of asylum. These rights provide 
refugees an opportunity to develop the capacity for self-reliance and to sustain themselves. It 
has been argued by some commentators that because these rights allow for the local 
integration of refugees, who have held the status of refugees for a considerable time, more so 
                                                          
30 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted on 10 
September 1969 by the Assembly of Heads of States and Government CAB/LEG/24.3, entered into force on 20 
June 1974,  Article 11(3)  (hereinafter OAU Refugee Convention). 
31 UN Refugee Convention at Article 33(1); Article 2(3) of the OAU Convention. 
32 Ibid at Article 33(1).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
33  Ibid at Articles 2-34. 
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than for new applicants for asylum, local integration could be seen as a durable solution for 
refugees in protracted refugee situations.34 It can be argued by extension that refugees in 
protracted refugee situations are to this extent protected by the UN Refugee Convention since 
this treaty recognises a range of human rights for refugees.  
Although local integration is a common term in refugee protection, no formal definition 
exists.35  Local integration means, in essence, that a refugee is granted some form of durable 
legal status that allows him or her to remain in the country of asylum on an indefinite basis, 
and to participate fully in the social, economic, and cultural life of the host community. Local 
integration cannot be equated with permanent residence or citizenship because the refugees’ 
legal status does not change; he or she remains a refugee.36  Local integration has, however, 
                                                          
34 S Dryden & L Hovill ‘A Remaining Hope for Durable Solutions: Local Integration of Refugees and Their 
Hosts in the Case of Uganda’, available at, 
http://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/viewFile/21315/19986, accessed 12 November 2016; 
F Khan ‘Local Integration: The Preferred Solution’ Paper delivered Geneva (2007), available at 
www.refugeerights.uct.ac.za/papersdelivered, accessed on  24 June 2016.  
35 Crisp op cit note 25 at 1.  
36 UNHCR ‘Local Integration’ UN Doc EC/GC/02/6. 25 April 2002. For alternate definitions of local 
integration see B Harrell-Bond Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees (1986) Oxford University 
Press: Oxford at 7 where she proposes a working definition of integration as a ‘situation in which host 
communities are able to co-exist, sharing the same resources’; See also F Khan University of Cape Town, 
Refugee Rights Unit, Paper delivered at UNHCR Pre-Ex-com Consultations in July 2007 wherein the author 
referred to local integration as ‘a course of action which allows the refugee or the asylum seeker to lead a 
meaningful existence within the host State; it therefore must necessarily be a process which allows for the 
development of the human potential. This does not necessarily mean permanent residence or citizenship’; J 
Hathaway Rights of Refugees Under International Law (2005) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 978 
commenting on the approach suggested by Harrell-Bond states ‘so conceived, local integration is not really 




been envisaged as solution since the establishment of the international refugee protection 
regime in the 1950s. The Secretary-General of the United Nations at the time predicted that:  
 
[…] refugees will lead an independent life in the countries which have given them shelter. With 
the exception of hard-core cases, the refugees will no longer be maintained by an international 
organization as they are at present. They will be integrated in the economic system of the countries 
of asylum and will themselves provide for their own needs and those of their families. This will be 
the phase of the settlement and assimilation of refugees.37  
 
A proper application of local integration does, however, mean that the refugee can become 
self-reliant in the host State, provided the refugee can withstand all sorts of exclusion, such as 
xenophobia.38It can also help with the assimilation of refugees into the host State. 
Even though it is clear that the UN Refugee Convention anticipated that refugees would 
return to their country of origin when conditions permit, the Convention suggests that, in 
addition to local integration, a more durable solution must be found in the country of asylum 
by obligating States to provide for the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees as soon as 
possible.39  Ideally, local integration allows for naturalisation, but this is not always possible. 
Naturalisation is seen as the end product of local integration by most scholars.40   
The UNHCR has also regarded resettlement in a third country as a form of durable 
solution, but this option is only possible with the cooperation of States.41 Engaging in 
                                                          
37 K Jacobsen ‘The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration for Refugees in Developing Countries’ Working Paper 
No 45 Tufts University, available http://www.unhcr.org/3b7d24059.html, accessed 1 June 2016 at 1.  
38 This is discussed in great detail at chapter five of this thesis. 
39 UN Refugee Convention at Article 34. 
40 Hathaway op cit note 12 at 449. 
41 A Suhrke ‘Burden-Sharing During Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus National Action’  
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resettlement operations is not an express legal obligation on States, but is an implied 
obligation arising from the concepts of international cooperation, international solidarity,42 
and burden sharing.43 The UNHCR Resettlement Handbook states: ‘Resettlement is the 
transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought asylum to another State that 
has agreed to admit them as refugees and to grant them permanent settlement and the 
opportunity for eventual settlement.44 If permanent settlement implies the end of refugee 
status, resettlement would qualify as a durable solution because the beneficiaries would be 
entitled to a permanent legal status in the host country. There is no consistency in the practice 
of resettlement by host States and there is no agreement with regard to the durability of the 
status by host States.45 Resettlement as a durable solution is, therefore, dependent on the 
goodwill of States.46 
Voluntary repatriation, another form of durable solution identified by the UNHCR, 
requires the UNHCR, States, and aid agencies to work together to return the refugees to their 
country of origin. The UNHCR Statute47 is cited as authority for this solution. The UNHCR 
guidelines require a fundamental, stable and durable change to the situation in the country of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Journal of Refugee Studies (1998) 11 (4) at 396-415. 
42 Articles 1, 13, 55 and 56 of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly 2625 (XXV). 
43 Ibid. 
44 UNHCR‘The UNHCR Resettlement Handbook’ (2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/467fc0ee2.pdf, 
accessed 2 June 2016 at 28-29. 
45 E R Thielemann & T Dewan ‘The Myth of Free-Riding: Refugee Protection and Implicit Burden-sharing’ 
(2006) available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402380500512742 accessed 23 January 2017 at 351-369 
46 Ibid. 
47 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 14 December 
1950, A/RES/428(V), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3628.html, accessed 3 July 2016. 
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origin when considering voluntary repatriation.48 Unfortunately, the continued lack of safety 
within the refugees’ country of origin is a predominant and often persisting factor that forces 
refugees to stay in countries of asylum for years and, in some cases, for generations.49  
     Unlike the UN Refugee Convention, the OAU Refugee Convention does not make express 
provision for the rights of refugees, and hence does not expressly require the host State to 
guarantee any specific rights to refugees and asylum seekers. This lacuna poses problems 
relating to the State’s obligations to facilitate the local integration of refugees. Even though 
the OAU Refugee Convention does not expressly advocate for refugee camps, the lack of 
express recognition of refugee rights conduces to the perception in host States that providing 
asylum and refugee status is a matter of philanthropy, and not of respect for the rights of 
asylum seekers and refugees. Because the OAU Refugee Convention does not expressly 
compel States to facilitate the integration of refugees and because many African States have 
signed reservations to the socio-economic rights referred to in the UN Refugee Convention, 
such States in Africa have been able to house refugees in camps. It is apparent that some of 
these refugees have lived in these camps for generations and find themselves in protracted 




                                                          
48 UNHCR ‘Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection’ (1996), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3bfe68d32.html, accessed 29 June 2015.  
49 Hathaway op cit note 12 at 921. 
50 G Loescher & J Milner ‘Case Studies: Contemporary Protracted Refugee Populations in Africa and Asia’ 
The Adelphi Papers Vol 45, Iss (2005), available at 




4. IDENTIFYING PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS  
 
In 2009 the Executive Committee of the UNHCR adopted an Executive Committee 
Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations.51  The Conclusion defines a protracted refugee 
situation as one where ‘refugees are trapped in a protracted refugee situation for five years or 
more after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for the implementation of a 
durable solution’.52 This definition notably departs from that proposed in the earlier drafts of 
the Conclusion which described the phenomenon as a situation where 25 000 or more 
refugees were in a protracted situation.53 Such a numerical limitation on the definition would 
clearly have left many refugees in unprotected exile. Even though the UNHCR has 
recognised protracted refugee situations as situations where refugees have been in the country 
of asylum for an extended period of time without the possibility of an end to their asylum 
status or of meaningful integration in the host State, it has not studied or identified all 
existing protracted refugee situations. According to the UNHCR, there are about 30 major 
protracted refugee situations around the world where the average length of stay of refugees in 
these states in ‘virtual limbo’ is approaching 20 years.54 Loescher and Milner55 have noted 
that the 30 situations that have been identified by the UNHCR do not include many of those 
in urban settings around the world. 
                                                          
51 The 2009 UNHCR ExCom Conclusion op cit note 21. 
52 Refugee Studies Centre ‘Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations: Lessons from a Decade of Discussion’, 
January 2011, Forced Migration Policy Briefing 6, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4da83a682.html, 
accessed 3 July 2016; UNHCR ‘Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015’, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf, accessed on 31 July 2016. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Loescher et al op cit note 14. 
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As noted earlier, the issue of protracted refugee situations has not yet been raised in South 
Africa. Yet South Africa has reached the stage where a significant number of refugees are 
now in a protracted refugee situation; many have been here for five years or more with no 
prospect of returning to their countries of origin or with no prospect of a durable solution.56 
Conditions in their country of origin have made it impossible or unrealistic for them to return 
home. This presents the problem of appropriate legal and policy responses to address the 
problems that refugees in protracted situations face. 
 
5. RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
 
Even though neither the UNHCR nor the South African government has classified refugees in 
South Africa as being in chronic exile, many refugees have been in South Africa for five 
years or longer, with no durable solution in sight. In view of the above, the purpose of this 
study is to establish whether the law in South Africa adequately protects, and provides 
durable solutions for refugees in protracted refugee situations. The study will, therefore, 
address a number of specific issues: the nature and scope of protracted refugee situations; the 
nature of the human rights violations that refugees in protracted refugee situations face; and 
the measures that have been put in place to assist such refugees. The analysis of South 
African refugee law will reveal whether the law envisaged the problem of protracted refugee 
situations, inquire into the adequacy of the legal measures taken to respond to this problem, 
and investigate how those measures have been implemented in practice . Overall, the thesis 
demonstrates that although the existing law provides a legal pathway to ending refugee status 
                                                          
56  See chapter 6 of this thesis for an analysis of Somali Association of South Africa and others v The 
Chairperson of the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs and others Case No 18655/14).  
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in South Africa, that pathway has been inaccessible in practice. The thesis investigates why 
this has been the case.  
       By exploring these questions, this study will provide academic insight into an area of 
refugee law that has not been adequately addressed in legal scholarship. More specifically, it 
is relevant to South Africa as a host country for refugees. As noted earlier, South Africa has 
not yet been considered as a country with a protracted refugee situation by the UNHCR and 
the South African government, and neither has any research been conducted in this area. A 
critical aim of this study is to identify the protracted refugee situation as a problem in South 
Africa and to highlight the plight of refugees in this situation. Even though the rights of 
refugees in South Africa have been analysed in great detail and the failure to implement 
South Africa’s generous laws has been the subject of considerable research,57 no one has yet 
made the link between the failure to implement these rights and the creation of a protracted 
refugee situation in South Africa.    
 
6. THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH: A ‘SAFETY AND DIGNITY’ 
PERSPECTIVE  
 
To answer the above questions it is important to understand how refugees perceive 
themselves and whether their perceptions differ from how they are perceived by States. 
According to Haddad, how refugeehood is perceived by States is automatically different to 
                                                          
57 J A Klinck ‘Recognizing Socio-Economic Refugees in South Africa: A Principled and Rights-Based 
Approach to Section 3(b) of the Refugees Act’ International Journal of Refugee Law (2009) 21 (4) at 653-699; 
F Khan & T Schreier supra note 7; See also J Handmaker et al (eds) Advancing Refugee Protection in South 
Africa (2008) New York: Berghahn Books. 
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how refugees perceive it themselves.58 States will be preoccupied with issues of obligation 
and management, whereas refugees view their status from a safety and dignity perspective.59 
It is evident that refugeehood was never meant to be or could morally be conceived of as a 
permanent status.60 Refugeehood triggers a number of rights whatever the social context of 
the refugee, whether in a camp or an urban setting, in a developed or developing country. It is 
evident that the rights afforded to refugees do not automatically allow for nationality; yet, it is 
recognised that only rights of nationality or citizenship would allow for full participation in 
any given community.61 The security and sense of belonging, and the stability of being a 
citizen, is absent for refugees.   
It is acknowledged that refugees have benefitted generously from the right to dignity, 
whether via international human rights laws or the incorporation of human rights in the 
constitutions of States.62 Human rights, and in particular the right to dignity that underpins all 
human rights, are commonly understood as being inalienable and so fundamental that persons 
are entitled to it by their humanity.   
It has, unfortunately, also become apparent that that the universality of the right to dignity 
as a morally inclusive right for all humanity is questionable.63 The full benefit of the right to 
dignity is only acquired if the individuals seeking this dignity are members of a political 
                                                          
58 E Haddad ‘Who is (not) a Refugee?’ European University Institute EUI Working Paper SPS No. 2004/6 
available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/id/1769/sps2004-06, accessed on 12 December 2016 at 2-28.  
59 Ibid at 18. 
60 Ibid at 19.  
61 Ibid at 20. 
62 Hathaway op cit note 36; Khan & Schreier supra note 7; H Botha ‘The Rights to Foreigners: Dignity, 
Citizenship and the Rights to have Rights’ (2013) 130 SALJ at 837 – 869. 
63 H Arendt The Origins Of Totalitarianism (1968) Schoken Books: New York at 296. 
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community.64 It is for these reasons that the approach of this thesis will stem from the right to 
dignity, not simply as an abstract human right but as right that  considers citizenship or 
belonging to a political community as a foundation for the exercise of many other rights. The 
philosophical approach of Immanuel Kant to dignity as a human right will be used to 
demonstrate that there is a greater dignity in citizenship.65   Even though the protection by the 
UN Refugee Convention confirms the principle that all human beings shall enjoy 
fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination,66 it is apparent from the current 
refugee situation throughout the world that refugees are failing to access these rights. This 
thesis thus questions the rationality of the dominant approach to refugee law and shows that it 
is insufficient to allow refugees in protracted situations to live a meaningful life in the 
country of asylum.  
Ultimately, refugee protection has become a contest between the universality of human 
rights and the sovereignty of nations.67 This contest has a detrimental effect on the lives and 
livelihoods of long-term refugees and relegates refugees permanently to the status of ‘second-
class citizens’. Central to this thesis is the inadequacy of the invocation of dignity as a human 
right; whether the function of dignity is to establish rank (Jeremy Waldron), whether it ought 
                                                          
64  Ibid.  
65 De Waal J & Currie I  The Bill of Rights Handbook 4 ed (2001) Juta Co & Ltd: Cape Town at 231. The 
philosophical approach of Immanuel Kant has been chosen because he is regarded as the father of the modern 
concept of human dignity. According to Kant, human dignity recognises the intrinsic worth of the person, it is 
the source of a person’s innate rights to freedom and to physical integrity, from which a number of rights flow. 
In South Africa it is regarded as a foundational right.  
66 UN Refugee Convetion at the Preamble. 
67 Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Watchenuka 2004 (4) SA326 (SCA); See also Amnesty International 
‘Global Refugee Statistics’ (Amnesty International, 13August 2012) available at 
Http://www.amnesty.org.au/refugees/comments/29462/, accessed 12 May 2016. 
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to serve as a foundational right (Immanuel Kant and his notion of intrinsic worth) or whether 
because of the emotions that dignity invokes (Martha Nussbaum). 
This thesis will demonstrate that the right to dignity afforded to the refugee is offended 
because the refugee lacks membership to a political community. This conceptual approach 
will permeate this thesis and shape the development of its central argument.  
              
7. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A growing body of research on refugees in protracted refugee situations exists. Most of the 
literature on protracted refugee situations is, however, based on studies done in refugee 
camps.68 Very little exists on refugees in protracted refugee situations in urban settings and 
no literature exist on refugees in protracted refugee situations in South Africa.  
The general conclusion stemming from this review is that the current body of research is 
largely focussed on issues facing refugees in protracted refugee situations in refugee camps in 
Africa.69 The literature does not address issues faced by refugees in protracted refugee 
situations in urban settings70 in general and on refugees in a protracted refugee situation in 
South Africa in particular. The urban refugee experience in a developing country, such as 
South Africa, which has extensive laws to protect refugees, is a unique experience. Although 
scholars have recognised the unique challenges faced by refugees in South Africa, the 
                                                          
68 E Odhiambo-Abuya ‘From Here to Nowhere: Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa’, in A Edwards & C 
Ferstman (Eds) Human Security and Non-Citizens in the New Global Order (2008) Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge at 125-165. 
69 Ibid. 
70 N Briant & A Kennedy ‘Priorities of African Refugees in an Urban Setting’, (2004) 17 Journal of Refugee 
Studies at 437-459; Human Rights Watch ‘Hidden in Plain View: Refugees Living without Protection in Nairobi 
and Kampala’ (2003), available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenugan/, accessed on 4 June 2016. 
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emphasis of their studies has not been on refugees in protracted refugee situations. The 
literature on South African refugee law and practice mostly focuses on issues of status 
determination and the rights afforded to refugees by the Constitution, refugee law and 
international human rights law.71 Exceptions are the article by Handmaker72 on voluntary 
repatriation and a paper delivered by Khan73 on local integration. Still, the literature does not 
address issues of durable solutions for refugees in protracted refugee situations. 
This study draws on the general literature dealing with the concept of protracted refugee 
situations. The works of Milner, Loescher and Crisp,74 in particular, will be relied upon for 
the identification of protracted refugee situations as a problem facing the refugee world. 
These works deal with the nature and scope of protracted refugee situations as well as the 
human rights consequences faced by refugees in protracted refugee situations. In addition, the 
2009 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion75 will be studied in great detail in an attempt 
to understand the complexity of protracted refugee situations and to identify possible 
solutions that could be implemented in South Africa.  
South Africa was not considered at all during a decade-long research conducted by the 
Oxford Department of International Development.76 A policy briefing authored by Dr James 
Milner and Professor Gil Loescher in 201177 for the Oxford Department of International 
                                                          
71 See Khan & Schreier op cit note 7; J Handmaker,L de La Hunt & J Klaaren (eds) op cit note 57. 
72 Handmaker et al op cit note 57. 
73 F Khan op cit note 7. 
74 J Crisp ‘Africa’s Refugees: Patterns, Problems and Policy Challenges’ UNHCR Working Paper No 28, 
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ff582482.html, accessed on 1 November 2016; See also Loescher et 
al op cit note 14.  
75 The 2009 UNHCR ExCom Conclusion op cit note 21. 
76 Refugee Studies Centre op cit note 52. 
77 Ibid.  
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Development on refugees in protracted refugee situations, the purpose of which was to 
examine in detail the history and process of identifying protracted refugee situations as a 
significant international policy problem, will be considered in addition to the 2009 UNHCR 
Executive Committee’s Conclusion mentioned above. Furthermore, to illustrate how some 
contracting States have failed to anticipate how their restrictive policies have created 
protracted refugee situations and led to the violation of basic principles of international 
refugee law, the works of Crisp and Slaughter78 and Bonaventure Rutinwa79 will be 
considered. 
    Because South Africa is a signatory to the  OAU Convention, sections in the Convention 
have a direct impact on the protracted refugee situation, such as the concept of burden-
sharing, and the extension of the definition of refugees, will be reflected upon to 
demonstrate how these sections in the OAU Convention can be applied to assist refugees in 
protracted refugee situations.80 The concept of burden-sharing in particular will come 
under discussion because it is the one international refugee instrument where it is 
specifically mentioned. A large number of refugees in Africa are in protracted situations. 
Betts argues that the existing global refugee regime creates an obligation on States to 
protect refugees on their State, but its support for refugees on other States is unclear.81     
                                                          
78 Slaughter & Crisp op cit note 28. 
79 B Rutinwa ‘The End of Asylum? The Changing Nature of Refugee Policies in Africa’, 10 May 1999, ISSN 
1020-7473, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ff597752.html accessed 17 January 2016 at 5-6.  
80 M Sharpe ‘Organisation of African Unity and African Union Engagement with Refugee Protection: 1963-
2011’ (2013) 21 African Journal of International and Comparative Law at 50-94. 
81 A Betts ‘Public Goods Theory and the Provision of Refugees Protection: The Role of the Joint Product Model 
in Burden Sharing Theory’ (2013) 21 African Journal of International and Comparative Law at 50-94; E 
Odhiambo-Abuya ‘Past Reflections, Future Insights: African Asylum Law and Policy in Historical Perspective’ 
(2007) 19 International Journal of Refugee Law at 51-95; G Okoth-Obbo ‘Thirty Years on: A Legal Review of 
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     The available literature also deals with some of the concerns related to finding solutions 
for refugees, especially those pertaining to security.82 This chapter will explore and critique 
those concerns to lay the groundwork for the development of possible durable solutions. 
Thus far, extensive research has been done on three possible solutions.83 This study will 
consider their applicability in protracted refugee situations in South Africa 
Furthermore, Betts asserts that the link between refugee studies and migration is 
particularly important when reflecting on solutions for refugees in protracted refugee 
situations. According to Betts, migration studies views refugees as active participants and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (2001) 20 
Refugee Survey Quarterly at 79-138; A Zimmerman & C Mahler ‘General Provisions’ in Zimmerman (ed) The 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, A Commentary (2011) Oxford 
University Press: Oxford at 185-203; M Sharpe ‘The 1969 African Refugee Convention: Innovations, 
Misconceptions, and Omissions’ (2012) 58 McGill Law Journal at 11-12. 
82  N Binaifer ‘In the Name of Security: Erosion of Refugee Rights in East Africa’ World Refugee Survey, 
USCR, available at http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/name-security-erosion-refugee-rights-east-africa, accessed 
on January 2017; J Milner ‘Sharing the Security Burden: Towards the Convergence of Refugee Protection and 
State Security’ (2000) Working Paper Series No 4, University of Oxford, Queen Elizabeth House; 
A Betts ‘International Cooperation between North and South to Enhance Refugee Protection in Regions of 
Origin’ (2005) UNHCR Working Paper No 25 at 40–63; B S Chimni ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A 
View from the South’ (1998) 11 Journal of Refugee Studies at 350–374; B Rutinwa ‘Presence of Refugees: 
Impact on Local Governance and Administration’ (2004) The African; G Loescher & J Milner Protracted 
Refugee Situations: Domestic and International Security Implications, (2005) Oxford University Press: Oxford 
at 35-50. 
83 B Harrell-Bond ‘Repatriation: Under what Conditions is it the Most Desirable Solution for Refugees? An 
Agenda for Research’ (1989) 32 African Studies Review 41-69; M Zieck UNCHR and Voluntary Repatriation of 
Refugees: A Legal Analysis (1997) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague; J Hathaway ‘Refugee Law is not 
Immigration Law’ (2002) World Refugee Survey at 38–45. 
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acknowledges refugee agency.84 Refugees, according to Betts, are active participants and 
seek their own solutions; they are not necessarily waiting on either the UNHCR or host 
governments to provide them with solutions. 
It is evident that the available literature does not grant sufficient attention to durable 
solutions for refugees in protracted refugee situations in urban areas. Further academic 
scholarship on urban refugees in protracted refugee situations is therefore needed.  
 
8. METHODOLOGY    
 
This study will be undertaken largely from a scholarship perspective. For the scholarly 
research, the academic literature on protracted refugee situations, cited above in the literature 
review, will be drawn upon when discussing the concept of protracted refugee situations in 
chapter two. It will also draw on the academic literature when analysing the state of the 
refugees in South Africa as well as the suitability of durable solutions for refugees in 
protracted refugee situations in South Africa.  
       The thesis will also consist of legal analysis, which will not only provide a systematic 
review and critique of the existing international and South African laws pertaining to 
refugees, but will also evaluate their adequacy and recommend changes where necessary. 
There are several international and regional conventions that provide protection and durable 
                                                          
84 A Betts Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement (2013) Cornell University 
Press: New York; A Betts ‘The Migration Industry In Global Migration Governance’ in T Gammeltoft-Hansen 
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Routeledge: London; A Betts ‘Global Governance of Migration and the Role of Trans-Regionalism’ in R Kunz, 
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Routeledge: London; P J Ngandwe ‘The Paradox Of Migration and the Interests of Atomistic Nation-States: The 
Southern African Perspective’ (2013) 16 PER at 427. 
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solutions to refugees in protracted refugee situations. These conventions provide the broad 
legal principles for providing protection and formulating durable solutions to refugees in 
protracted refugee situations and have been complimented by several UNHCR Conclusions.  
       This thesis also draws on my experience as a legal practitioner, with more than 13 years’ 
experience heading the Refugee Rights Unit at the University of Cape Town, which advises 
on and represents refugees in various legal issues concerning their status. This information 
will be used in a way that respects my ethical duties as a legal practitioner and academic 
researcher. 
 
9. CONCLUSION AND CHAPTER SYNOPSIS 
 
This chapter has provided in broad outline a gist of the main issue that refugees in protracted 
situations face in South Africa. This issue revolves around ending the status of refugee status 
where repatriation to the home country is not possible. Should such refugees remain refugees 
indefinitely? What are the human implications of such a prolonged status? Are their durable 
solutions to protracted refugee situations? Has South Africa fashioned suitable durable 
solutions? If so, how accessible have been such solutions in practice? These are the core 
questions this thesis seeks to address. 
Chapter two unpacks the concept of protracted refugee situations. It begins by reviewing 
the supposed temporary nature of refugeehood and investigates whether the international 
refugee law anticipated protracted refugee situations. The UNHCR has in the previous decade 
directed its attention to protracted refugee situations and suggested a working definition that 
will be analysed in detail.85 The various known protracted refugee situations will also be 
identified with a view to considering whether such protracted refugee situation exists in 
                                                          
85 The 2009 UNHCR ExCom Conclusion op cit note 21. 
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South Africa as well. As noted earlier, the problems faced by all refugees in protracted 
refugee situations have not been adequately identified because the focus has thus far only 
been on those living in refugee camp settings.       
Chapter three looks at the normative framework that exists in international law on 
protection and solutions for refugees in protracted refugee situations. It will begin by 
examining the dominant approach to refugee protection and consider whether international 
refugee law provides a solution to long term refugeehood. More specifically, naturalization 
and local integration will be critiqued as possible solutions for long-stay refugees.  
  Chapter four will trace the evolution of refugee law in South Africa to see if it 
accommodates the temporary notion of refugeehood by charting its progress from its narrow 
race-based framework to the current one that seemingly places human rights at the centre. It 
will also analyse the Refugees Act with a view to providing a general overview of the 
legislative framework within which refugees in South Africa are given protection and care, 
exposing and critiquing its  approach to refugees. In particular, it will address the question 
whether South African law and policy contemplated the problem of a protracted refugee 
situation. The chapter will demonstrate that because of South Africa’s constitutional 
principles its refugee law adopted an urban policy as opposed to a camp-based one. It will 
furthermore analyse the provisions of the Constitution, especially those on human dignity and 
non-discrimination, in order to demonstrate its capacity for accommodating an approach to 
refugee law that can provide durable solutions to refugees caught up in protracted situations. 
This will be followed by an overview of the rights and jurisprudence that have evolved on 
those rights concerning refugees. Finally, it will highlight the fact that refugees have been 
resident in South Africa for a very long time with no solution in sight even though South 
Africa has acknowledged the temporary nature of refugee status.    
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Chapter five outlines South Africa’s application of local integration as a durable solution 
for its urban-based refugees. It will furthermore investigate whether South Africa’s local 
integration initiative has managed to effectively conceptualise and implement the UNHCR’s 
urban refugee policy. It is evident that refugee law in South Africa is based on its 
constitutional values and that it has therefore adopted a human rights approach. This chapter 
will therefore consider whether the rights identified by the UNHCR deemed necessary for the 
local integration of urban refugees can adequately protect refugees for it to be considered a 
durable solution. The purpose of the chapter is to establish whether the legal entitlements to 
the rights granted in South Africa are sufficient to allow for the legal, economic and social 
integration of refugees and whether it is sufficient for the protection of refugees in a 
protracted situation?   
Chapter six argues that only an end to refugee status can be considered a durable solution 
for a refugee in a protracted refugee situation. It also affirms that there is a legal pathway to 
end refugee status in South Africa by permanent residency and thereafter by means of 
naturalisation. The main focus of this chapter will be an analysis of the possible options that 
are tentatively available for the refugee to end his or her refugee status in South Africa and to 
be provided with a more durable form of residence than that which is offered by refugee 
status. This chapter will thus analyse the basis upon which a refugee can apply for permanent 
residence and naturalisation or citizenship in terms of South African law. The focus of this 
chapter is thus the change of legal status from refugee status to a more durable status such as 
permanent residence or naturalisation which will guarantee that a protracted situation is either 
ended or will not develop.  
Chapter seven will draw a conclusion and it makes some recommendations to end 
protracted refugee situations, and more importantly to prevent it from occurring in the first 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The problems faced by all refugees in protracted refugee situations have not been adequately 
identified because the focus has thus far been only on those living in refugee camp settings.86  
This chapter will begin by reviewing the supposed temporary nature of refugeehood, which 
remains a stumbling block to addressing the problem of indefinite refugee exile. The key 
question posed is whether the drafters of international refugee law anticipated protracted 
refugee situations. It will be useful to investigate whether there have historically been such 
situations in the world, whether they were considered problematic and what solutions were 
adopted.  
     Moreover, the need to define protracted refugee situations is acute, not just for the 
refugees from a humanitarian and a human rights perspective, but also for States, the 
UNHCR, as well as agencies tasked with the caring of persons displaced for prolonged 
periods.87 The UNHCR was able to direct its attention to the plight of long-term refugees and 
consequently drafted an Executive Committee Conclusion on Protracted Refugee 
Situations,88 suggesting a working definition that will be analysed in detail. A brief overview 
of this Conclusion on will also be undertaken. The various known protracted refugee 
situations will be discussed with a view to drawing some key feature of the notion of 
protracted refugee situations.  
                                                          
86 Loescher op cit note 14; Crisp op cit note 25; Amaya-Castro ‘International Refugees and Irregular Migrants: 
Caught in the Mundane Shadow of Crisis’ in M K Bulterman & W J M van Genugten (eds) Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law (2013); N H Goetz ‘Lessons Learnt from a Protracted Refugee Situation’, 
available at http://ccis.ucsd.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/wrkg74.pdf, accessed on 5 February 2016. 
87 Loescher op cit note 14 at 3.  
88 The 2009 UNHCR ExCom Conclusion op cit note 21. 
89 Hathaway & Foster op cit note 12. 
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2. THE SUPPOSED TEMPORARY NATURE OF REFUGEEHOOD IN 
INTERNATONAL LAW 
 
The status of a refugee was seemingly never envisaged to be a long-lasting status. On the 
contrary, it was always meant to be of a temporary nature. According to Hathaway and 
Foster, the UN Refugee Convention conceives of refugee status as a ‘transitory phenomenon 
that comes to an end if and when a refugee can reclaim the protection of his or her State or 
has secured an alternate form of status.’89 In reality, refugee status may be indefinite and the 
perpetual refugee status of most of the world’s refugees today provide clear evidence hereof. 
The temporary nature of refugeehood was highlighted by the first UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees in the statement made soon after the inception of the UN Refugee Convention in 
1951. He stated that ‘the status of a refugee should not be a permanent one’.90 The context 
within which he made this statement was the residual case load of refugees after World War 
II.91 The issue of displaced persons in Europe was resolved some 20 years after the end of 
World War II. Today’s protracted refugee situations show no signs of resolution.92  
The position of the UNHCR maintains that the international protection afforded to 
refugees is considered to be of an essentially temporary nature:  
 
It is the return of refugees to their own community or their integration into a new one which 
constitutes a permanent or durable solution…[I]international protection is of an essentially 
                                                          
89 Hathaway & Foster op cit note 12. 
90 UN General Assembly ‘Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons: 
Summary record of the Second Meeting’ UN Doc A/CONF2/SR2, 20 July 1951. 
91 J Milner ‘Protracted Refugee Situations: The Search For Practical Solutions’ in G Loescher & J Milner The 
State of the World’s Refugees (2006) Oxford University Press: Oxford at 105-127. 
92 Ibid at 105.  
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temporary nature and is the sum of all action which seeks to achieve the admission of a refugee 
into, and his secure stay in a county where he or she is not in danger of refoulement and can enjoy 
basic rights and human treatment until the above objective is achieved – that of a renewed 
belonging to a community.93 
 
2.1. The UN Refugee Convention 
 
Various elements of the UN Refugee Convention attest to the temporary nature of 
refugeehood. First and foremost, the UN Refugee Convention imposes no obligation on 
States to grant permanent admission to refugees. The legal obligation is only to host the 
refugee whilst he or she is at risk.94 In further recognition of the temporary nature of refugee 
                                                          
93 UNHCR ‘Note on International Protection (submitted by the High Commissioner)’ UN Doc A/AC 96/680 (5 
July 1986),  available at www.unhcr.org/.../note-international-protection-submitted-high-commissioner.html, 
accessed on 10 October 2016 at 4-5. 
94 UN Refugee Convention at Article 33; UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ‘UNHCR Note on 
the Principle of Non-Refoulement’ November 1997, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html, accessed 10 October 2016. 
G S Goodwin-Gill ‘The Dynamics of International Refugee Law’ International Journal of Refugee law (2013) 
25 (4) at 651-666; See Also F Khan & T Schreier (eds) Refugee Law in South Africa (2014) Juta Co. & Ltd: 
Cape Town at 3-4. The principle of non-refoulement safe-guards a refugee from being returned to a place where 
he or she may face serious harm; J Allain ‘The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-refoulement’ (2001) 13 International 
Journal of Refugee Law at 533-558; O Duffy ‘Expulsion to Face Torture? The International Law Principle of 
Non-refoulement’ International Journal of Refugee Law (2008) 20 (3) at 373-390;  Article 33(1) of the 1951 
UN Refugee Convention provides that:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’ The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention 
and the South African Refugees Act have a similar provision. 
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status, the UN Refugee Convention sets out the conditions under which refugee status shall 
cease to apply.95 The ‘cessation clauses’,96 as they have become popularly known, are cited 
as evidence of the supposed temporary nature of refugee status. They provide that access to 
national protection results in the termination of refugee status, and define various situations in 
which refugee status may come to an end.97 For example, a refugee may end her refugee 
status by re-availing herself to her country of nationality,98 by re-acquiring her nationality,99 
or by voluntarily re-establishing herself in her country of origin.100 These three forms of 
cessation are when return is considered by the refugee himself or herself and when their well-
being is entrusted to the country of origin. Alternately, the host country may determine that 
conditions in the country of origin have improved to the extent that the refugee cannot refuse 
to return.101 Finally, refugee status can come to an end if the refugee can secure the protection 
of another State.102 In each of these scenarios, the refugee is deemed to have secured the 
protection of a State and become part of a national community. These provisions show that 
the UN Refugee Convention was designed as a temporary substitute or, in Hathaway’s words, 
‘surrogate protection’,103 for national protection.  
                                                          
95 Discussion Note on the Application of the ceased circumstances Cessation Clauses in the 1951 Convention 
EC/SCP/1992/CRP.1 International Protection  (SCIP) 20 December 1991. 
96 UN Refugee Convention at Article 1C.  
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid at Article 1C (1). 
99 Ibid at Article 1C (2). 
100 Ibid at Article 1C (4). 
101 Ibid at Article 1C (5). 
102 Ibid at Article 1C (3). 
103 Hathaway op cit note 12 at 462: ‘The purpose of refugee law is to provide surrogate protection pending the 
resumption or establishment of meaningful national protection.’  
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     It was thus anticipated that, after a certain period, the refugees would no longer be in need 
of international protection, either because they could return to the country they had left, or 
because they could integrate in a country of asylum which would extend to them the same 
degree of protection as enjoyed by citizens of that country. The main means envisaged in the 
Convention to achieve integration with the host community was through assimilation and 
naturalisation.104 However, neither naturalisation nor assimilation is necessarily guaranteed 
by Article 34 of the UN Refugee Convention. This article merely imposes a duty on States to 
facilitate naturalisation.105  
     The UN Refugee Convention thus conceives the legal condition of a refugee as a 
temporary one. It is premised on the idea that they will one return home, resettle in a third 
country or become naturalised in the host country. If refugees are unable to secure permanent 
residence in the host country, on the one hand, or repatriation to the country of origin, on the 
other hand, this temporariness of status significantly impacts their lives; they will remain 
refugees indefinitely.106 
 
2.2. Refugee Camps as a Manifestation of Temporariness  
 
Refugee camps reflect a sense of temporariness attached to refugee status. Large numbers of 
refugees in camps administered by the UNHCR are in countries where the national 
governments have distanced itself from the functioning of these camps.107 States allowed the 
refugees to enter and do not refoule/return the refugees, but they do not provide them with 
                                                          
104 UN Refugee Convention at Article 34.  
105 Hathaway op cit note 12.   
106 Amaya-Castro op cit note 86 at 74. 
107 Amayo-Castro op cit note 86. 
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legal status – these are the refugees hovering in the legal sphere and where the UNHCR and 
aid agencies are ‘administering human misery’.108  
     Dunn states that refugee camps are designed for the short term. It is expected to meet an 
emergency need and then disappear. According to her, the temporary nature of camps shows 
up in their architecture. In Jordan’s Zaatari refugee camp, more than 83 000 people are 
housed in ‘row after stark row of simple tents that offer little shelter from snow, subzero 
temperatures, or flooding,’ even though there are no plans for the refugees to return to Syria 
or resettle anywhere else. In the Nyarugusu camp in Tanzania, Congolese refugees are forced 
to build their own houses out of nothing more than thatch and unbaked bricks so that the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the camp administrator, can raze 
the structures at any moment. Thomson, an anthropologist, reiterates this view that: 
‘Impermanence is designed into the refugees’ most intimate spaces. Their homes are 
constructed with destruction in mind.’109 
Refugee camps are legally possible; States can decide not to allow refugees to integrate by 
signing reservations to those rights in the UN Refugee Convention that allows for the 
freedom of movement, in particular, but also the socio-economic rights that will allow for 
                                                          
108 Loescher & Milner op cit note 82: ‘The majority of today’s refugees have lived in exile for far too long, 
restricted to camps or eking out a meagre existence in urban centres throughout the developing world. Most 
subsist in a state of limbo, and are often dependent on others to find solutions to their plight. Their predicament 
is similar to that of the tens of thousands of refugees who stagnated in camps in Western Europe in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The High Commissioner for Refugees at the time, Gerrit van Heuven Goedhart, called those camps 
‘black spots on the map of Europe’ that should ‘burn holes in the consciences of all those privileged to live in 
better conditions’. If the situation persisted, he said, the problems of refugees would fester and his office would 
be reduced to ‘simply administering human  misery’. 
109 E C Dunn ‘The Failure of Refugee Camps’, available at http://bostonreview.net/editors-picks-
world/elizabeth-dunn-failure-refugee-camps, accessed on 5 September 2016. 
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integration with the host community.110 Similarly, the OAU Refugee Convention does not 
provide for a meaningful integration into the host State because it is silent on the rights that 
allow integration into the host community. Hence, despite the intended temporary nature of 
refugee status, and the intended temporariness of refugee camps, refugees from countries 
where the conflict has not ended and are unable to return home have become a permanent 
presence in the countries where they have sought refuge. They have remained refugees in a 
number of States that have failed to integrate them.       
Even though nobody wants camps to be permanent - not the United Nations, host States, 
or international aid agencies - refugee camps have lasted decades or even generations, as the 
situation in the refugees’ home countries remains unstable. The average length of stay in a 
refugee camp is now more than 12 years.111 Palestinians have been displaced since 1948112 
and are entering their 69th year of displacement. In Georgia, where people were displaced 
from a war in the province of Abkhazia 23 years ago, refugees are still living in camps.113 
More than 200 000 people displaced from the Sudanese province of Darfur have been living 
                                                          
110 UN Refugee Convention,  Article VI. Reservations and Declarations : At the time of accession, any State 
may make reservations…of any provisions of the Convention other than those contained in articles 1, 3, 4, 16 
(1) and 33 thereof. 
111 Refugee Studies Centre ‘Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations: Lessons from a Decade of 
Discussion’ January 2011, Forced Migration Policy Briefing 6, available at, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4da83a682.html, accessed 3 July 2016.  
112 E C Dunn op cit note 109; A Shiblak ‘Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab 
Countries’ (1996) 25 Journal of Palestine Studies at 36-45. 
113 Report of the UN Secretary-General 7 May 2014, 68th Session, Agenda Item 34, ‘Protracted Conflicts in the 
GUAM Area and their Implications for International Peace, Security and Development, Status of Internally 
Displaced Persons and Refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/excom/bgares/5385a0779/status-internally-displaced-persons-refugees-
abkhazia-georgia-tskhinvali.html, accessed on 22 December 2016. 
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in the Zamzam Camp in shelters for longer than 12 years114 and the Dadaab refugee camp in 
Kenya has been a refuge for Somalis since 1991, when their country was plunged into civil 
war.115 The Nyagurusu camp in Tanzania is decades old and houses hundreds of thousands of 
Congolese refugees.116 Many of these refugee situations are characterised by mass 
influxes117of refugee populations and, as a result, their host countries have struggled to 
provide solutions where voluntary repatriation has not been possible.  
These refugee camps have become the ‘physical manifestation of the limbo state’ in which 
refugees find themselves.118 As put by Remnick, refugee camps are borne out of emergency 
situations and evolve into ‘cities of dependency, bureaucracy and static suffering’.119 They 
                                                          
114 IRIN ‘The Humanitarian Situation in Darfur’ (2013), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/520dff864.html, accessed on 20 February 2017. 
115 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ‘Dadaab – World’s Biggest Refugee Camp- 20 Years Old’ 
(2012) available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f44d3782.html, accessed on 20 February 2017. 
116 B Rutinwa ‘Prima Facie Status and Refugee Protection’ (2002) Working Paper No. 69; M Algier Managing 
the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government (2011) Polity: Cambridge; B Harrell-Bond 
‘Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees be Humane?’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly  51; G Verdirame & 
B Harrell-Bond Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced Humanitarianism (2005) Berghahn Books: New York. 
117 There is no universal definition of a mass influx. It is not referred to in the UN Refugee Convention or in the 
OAU Convention. It is mentioned but not defined in the South African Refugees Act at section 35. It has also 
been described as ‘mass outflow’ or ‘mass exodus’ by the UNHCR Executive Committee General Conclusion 
No No 65 (XLII) on International Protection of Refugees, UN GA Doc 12A A/46/12/Add.1, 11 October 1991; 
see also European Union ‘Council Directive of European Union’ 2001/55/EC, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddcee2e4/html, accessed on 3 December 2016; see also M Albert 
‘Governance and Prima Facie Refugee Status Determination: Clarifying the Boundaries of Temporary 
Protection, Group Determination, and Mass Influx’ (2010) 29 Refugee Survey Quarterly at 61-91. 
118 D Remnick ‘City of the Lost’ The New Yorker 26 August 2013, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/26/city-of-the-lost, accessed 13 November 2015.  
119 Remnick op cit note 118. 
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become places where the States need not deal with the presence of refugees, or where the 
refugees actually lose their legal presence on the national territory.120 Unlikely to return home 
or not well integrated in the society where they are staying, these refugees are trapped in what 
UNHCR calls ‘a situation of protracted displacement’.121 These refugees spend their entire 
lives in legal limbo, they are not refouled, and their presence is tolerated, but they are not 
allowed to settle or integrate.122 Because the temporariness of refugee status exists in the 
background, a situation that was meant to be temporary has slowly developed into a system 
that is quite permanent. 
 
2.3. The UNHCR as a Temporary Institution 
 
Established in 1951,123 even the UNHCR was meant to be a temporary institution. Its Statute 
stated that its mandate was to be reviewed in 1953.124 The UN General Assembly periodically 
renewed the UNHCR’s mandate until 2003, when it decided ‘to remove the temporal 
limitation on the continuation of the Office of the High Commissioner … and to continue the 
Office until the refugee problem is solved’.125 This has served as a constant reminder that 
                                                          
120 M Kagan ‘“We live in a country of UNHCR” The UN Surrogate State And Refugee Policy In The Middle 
East’ (2011) available at http://www.unhcr.org/4d5a8cde9.pdf, accessed November 2015. 
121 The 2009 UNHCR ExCom Conclusion op cit note 21. 
122 Op cit note 116; C Gaffey ‘Kenyan Court Blocks Government Decision to Close Dadaab Refugee Camp’, 
available at http://europe.newsweek.com/dadaab-camp-closure-kenya-high-court-554495?rm=eu, accessed on 
18 December 2016. 
123 UNGA Resolution 319 A (IV), 3 December 1949. 
124 UNGA Resolution 428 (V), 14 December 1950, at Article 5. 
125 UNGA Resolution 58/153, 24 February 2004. 
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refugee issues are seen as a temporary phenomenon and refugee crisis as an anomaly rather 
than something that needs to be accommodated in a durable way.  
Unfortunately, as Loescher and Milner have argued, the ‘legal temporariness of the 
UNHCR and refugeehood mask their factual permanence’.126 For far too many refugees, this 
temporary situation has turned into a permanent one. In spite of the fact that the UNHCR was 
created in order to respond to and provide relief to those facing  what was thought to be only 
a temporary crisis of displacement, refugees under a UNHCR mandate are, as is shown later 
in this chapter, now in protracted refugee situations.127 
This assumption of temporariness of status has a significant impact on the lives of 
refugees as they ‘hover in the legal sphere of refugee status’,128 a situation described by 
Oudejans as one of being ‘neither here nor there’.129 It is apparent that refugee status is a state 
in which refugees hover for a very long time because international refugee law does not 
guarantee citizenship or naturalisation.130 According to Amaya-Castro, the institution of 
refugee law allows States to deal with refugees by not dealing with them,131 in that States can 
decide not to allow refugees to integrate, so long as it does not return them to harm’s way.132 
 
 
                                                          
126 G Loescher & J Milner ‘Responding to Protracted Refugee Solutions: Lessons from a Decade of Discussion’ 
(2011) 6 Forced Migration Policy Briefing at 1-27.   
127 Ibid. 
128 Amayo-Castro op cit note 86. 
129 N Oudejans  Asylum: A Philosophical Inquiry into the International Protection of Refugees (2011) Boxpress: 
Oisterwijk. 





 2.4. ‘Temporary Protection’ as a New Form of Protection 
 
Recently, a new phenomenon referred to as ‘temporary refugee protection’, has developed 
which has brought further confusion about the nature of refugee protection. There has been a 
drive to link the supposed temporary nature of refugeehood with a form of temporary State 
responsibility for the protection of refugees.133 Some States have thus resisted granting 
formal refugee status and instead opted for short-term humanitarian assistance.134  
This new notion of temporary protection shows contrasting perspectives. On the one hand, 
it is seen as a non-formalized, non-specific status of State tolerance of refugees or ‘refugee-
like’ persons for short or long periods of time in their territories, or on the other hand a more 
specific status of temporary protection with specified parameters for beneficiaries, such as 
duration of status, standards of rights and criteria for cessation included in domestic 
legislation.135 In spite of the contrasts, it appears to have elements in common with refugee 
status, such as admission, non-refoulement, and basic human rights. But most importantly, it 
                                                          
133 A Edwards ‘Temporary Protection, Derogation and the 1951 Refugee Convention’ (2012) Melbourne 
Journal of International Law at 1-41; For a thorough study on the range of practice of temporary protection, see 
‘Inter-Governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugees And Migration Policies in Europe, North America and 
Australia’ (1995) available at https://igc.ch/, accessed on 26 October 2016. 
134 Ibid at Edwards.  
135 N Yakoob ‘Workshop Report: Report on the Workshop on Temporary Protection: Comparative Policies and 
Practices’ 1999 (13) Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, Summer at 617; J Fitzpatrick ‘Flight from Asylum: 
Trends toward Temporary “Refuge” and Local Responses to Forced Migration’ 1994 (13) Virginia Journal of 
International Law at 35; M Kjaerum ‘Temporary Protection in Europe in the 1990’s’ (1994) 6 (3) International 
Journal of Refugee Law at 444-456; K Hailbronner ‘Temporary and Local Responses to Forced Migration: A 
Comment’ 35 (1994) Virginia Journal of International Law at 81; S Martin et al ‘Temporary Protection: 
Towards a New Regional and Domestic Framework’ 12 (1998) Georgetown Immigration Law Journal at 543. 
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has eventual return as the most important element. Crucially, it does not offer a change of 
status from refugeehood to a more durable form of status in the host State.   
This new form of temporary protection is specifically targeting refugees in mass-influx 
situations,136 often offering lesser degrees of protection.137 Fitzpatrick views the UN Refugee 
Convention as intended primarily for individualised assessments and therefore inappropriate 
for group assessments and situations of mass-influx. Rutinwa argues:  
 
One of the matters over which a near total consensus exists is that the traditional regime of refugee 
protection, based on the 1951 Convention of Refugees and its regional complements is in crisis. 
The system is no longer adequate to deal with the problem of forced migration in the manner and 
magnitude it is currently being experienced. The contemporary forced migration phenomenon is 
characterized by mass influx of composite populations, many of whom are not refugees within the 
definitions found under existing instruments and therefore, strictly speaking, do not qualify for 
international protection.138 
  
Akram and Rempel have argued that temporary protection is advantageous for both the 
refugee and the host State.139 For the host State, temporary protection is a humanitarian 
response to a mass influx and States do not have to differentiate between those who qualify 
under the UN Refugee Convention. It offers the host State an alternate to providing full 
                                                          
136 J Fitzpatrick ‘Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime’ (2000) 94 The 
American Journal of International Law at 282; See also B Rutinwa ‘Temporary Protection and its Expression 
Under the ‘Reformulation of Refugee Law’ Model’ in J Handmaker et al (eds) (2001) Perspectives On Refugee 
Protection In South Africa at 50. 
137 Amaya-Castro op cit note 86 at 72. 
138 Rutinwa op cit note 79 at 50. 
139 S Akram & T Rempel ‘Temporary Protection as an Instrument or Implementing the Right of Return for 
Palestinian Refugees’ (2004) 22 Boston University International Law Journal at 1.  
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asylum and absolves it from having to grant refugee status to large groups of people. 
Temporary protection has been implemented as part of a responsibility-sharing deal and 
demonstrates to the arriving foreigner the temporary nature of the assistance.140 The 
advantages for the putative refugee, according to the proponents, include the following: an 
expedited refugee application procedure, some protection rights which may be granted and 
the fact that putative refugee is granted, this status for a specific time frame allowing them to 
make plans for repatriation or resettlement.141    
Proponents of temporary protection do not see it as being a derogation from the UN 
Refugee Convention or international human rights law.142 Whatever the merits of this new 
proposed form of protection, it is clear that it is not meant to cater for refugees in protracted 
situations. 
 
2.5. Protracted Refugee Situations as a Challenge to the Temporariness of 
Refugeehood 
 
As long as being a refugee is still considered an anomaly to normal citizen–State relations in 
international law, asylum cannot be considered a durable solution.143 The state of 
refugeehood is not a solution because refugees do not have a normal citizen-State 
relationship. Regular migrants, on the other hand, even if they remain migrants have a choice; 
                                                          
140 Rutinwa op cit note 79 at 140.  
141 UNHCR ‘Conclusion on People Displaced by the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia’  (1992), available at 
http://www.unhcr.ch/legal/bibliographic/papers.4htm, accessed on 24 March 2016.  
142 J Fitzpatrick ‘Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime’ (2000) 94 (2) The 
American Journal of International Law at 279-306. 
143 Edwards op cit note 133 at 10.   
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they can come and go from a host State as it pleases them and re-establish the normal citizen-
state relation with their States.144   
When refugees are expected to remain refugees, they are deprived of a normal citizenship 
bond with a State. Only the re-attachment to a home State through repatriation or the host 
State through local integration, naturalisation or third country resettlement will lead to a 
normal citizenship bond for the refugee.145 By implication, asylum or protection is intended 
to be temporary in nature, even though in reality it can be protracted.146 It is clear that 
protracted refugee situations challenge the original assumption that being a refugee is a 
temporary and not a permanent situation. 
 
3. DEFINITION OF PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS 
 
The phrase ‘protracted refugee situations’ does not appear in any hard international law 
documents. However, attempts have been made to define it. For example, Odhiambo-Abuya 
has defined protracted refugee situations in general terms as situations in which refugees 
remain in host countries for a prolonged, often for an unspecified duration of time, with no 
durable solution in sight.147 In this section, the focus is on the definitions developed by the 
UNHCR and the criticism that those definitions have elicited.  
 
                                                          
144 M Teitelbaum ‘The Role of the State in International Migration’ (2002) 8 The Brown Journal of World 
Affairs Winter at 157 -167. 
145 E Haddad The Refugee In International Society: Between Sovereigns (2008) Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge at 34. 
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3.1. Definitions Developed by the UNHCR 
 
The UNHCR decided to develop a definition for protracted refugee situations in 2001. Since 
then, the UNHCR has developed several definitions of the term. The 2001 definition was 
proposed for adoption by the UNHCR’s Africa Bureau. It identified protracted refugee 
situations as: Situations where refugee groups have been in exile for a long time with no 
durable solution in sight.148 
Although this definition is not particularly clear, the explanation provided by the UNHCR 
sufficiently highlights the plight of refugees in a protracted situation in refugee camps 
generally. It recognises such refugees to be in a situation where over time, ‘there has been 
considerable changes in refugees’ needs, which neither the UNHCR nor the host country 
have been able to address in a meaningful manner, thus leaving refugees in a state of material 
dependency and often without adequate access to basic rights (e.g. employment, freedom of 
movement and education) even after a substantial number of years in the country’.149 
The UNHCR came to this definition after an assessment of their annual programmes in 
Africa revealed that a substantial number of their programmes continued to provide for the 
care and maintenance for refugees who had been in exile for a long time.150 The UNHCR 
realised that the care and maintenance programme failed to ensure that refugees lead a 
meaningful and dignified life in exile.151 The UNHCR thus identified the need to formulate a 
strategy to address protracted refugee situations and the term has since become a familiar 
                                                          
148 UNHCR Africa Bureau ‘Discussion Paper on protracted refugee situations in the African Region’ (2001), 






feature of the discourse on international refugee issues, especially in the African context.152 It 
is important to note that this definition developed because the UNHCR noted the continued 
‘material dependency’ of these refugees even after a long time in exile. 
       When it became apparent to the UNHCR that protracted refugee situations were a 
worldwide phenomenon and not only an anomaly in Africa, it decided to revise the 2001 
definition. In 2004 it identified it as a situation ‘in which refugees find themselves in a long-
lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and 
essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile.’153 
It defined protracted refugee situations as situations where: Refugee populations of 25 000 or 
more who have been in exile for five years or more in developing countries.154  
        The 2004 definition met with immediate resistance because of the specific numerical 
requirement (25 000) and to a specific region (in developing countries). Crisp, head of the 
UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Unit responded by formulating a definition of his own. He 
claimed that ‘refugees can be regarded as being in a protracted refuge situation when they 
have lived in exile for more than five years, and when they still have no immediate prospect 
of finding a durable solution to their plight by means of voluntary repatriation, local 
integration, or resettlement’.155 His definition and understanding of protracted refugee 
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situations, he acknowledged, applied only to those situations in which refugees lived in 
camps.156 The UNHCR’s 2004 attempt to understand protracted refugee situations did not 
advance the meaning significantly compared to the 2001 attempt.  The focus of the definition 
remained on their ‘material dependence’ on the UNHCR, the host State or aid agencies. 
However, it did in addition also refer to their social and psychological needs remaining 
unfulfilled. 
       The UNHCR developed another definition in 2009, which was formally accepted by 
members of the UNHCR Executive Committee (all member States and significant 
stakeholders).157 According to the 2009 definition, protracted refugee situations are: 
situations where refugees have been in exile for five years or more after their initial 
displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions.158 
Milner hailed it as a significant development that reflected a ‘growing international interest in 
one of the most complex and difficult humanitarian problems facing the world’.159  
       This definition is an improvement as it omits any reference to the number of refugees 
caught in such a situation as the 2004 definition, mainly because it became clear that such a 
numerical limitation was arbitrary. It would have excluded many refugees who lived in 
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similar situations, such as the 20 000 Rohingas in Bangladesh or the 17 000 Burundians in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).160  
     All of these UNHCR definitions, as well as that proposed by Crisp, have some elements in 
common, they all have a temporal, a geographic or a numerical element. As the latter has 
already been sufficiently addressed, the next two subsections only dwell on the first two 
elements.   
 
3.1.1. Temporal Requirement 
The first element of these definitions is that these refugees have to be in exile for a 
considerable time. While the 2001 definition required that refugees must be in exile ‘for a 
long time’,161 later definitions removed the uncertainty on this temporal element by replacing 
it with a definite minimum requirement of five years. In particular, the latest 2009 definition 
introduces an important element, emphasising the point from which this duration of the status 
is measured.  
Although this time period of five years, at first appears to be random and arbitrary,162 a 
closer look reveals that it is not uninformed. Many countries allow for citizenship or 
permanent residence after a certain number of years of continuous residence, and in many 
countries, the minimum period of continuous residence is five years.163 This temporal 
requirement means that the UNHCR is opening the possibility for ending one’s refugee 
status. In addition, this five year requirement is also consistent with Article 34 of the UN 
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Convention, which encourages States to consider naturalisation and assimilation within a 
reasonable time as options of ending refugee status.  
A notable change introduced in the 2009 definition is the phrase ‘since the initial 
displacement’ of the refugee.164 This inclusion is particularly relevant in South Africa, where 
the initial displacement is ignored when refugees apply for permanent residence. In reality, 
refugees may have been in South Africa for 10 years on temporary asylum permits because of 
government’s failure to expeditiously determine their refugee status. 165 They only become 
eligible to apply for permanent residence after five years of continuous residence with 
documented refugee status.  
Whether the solution for refugees after five years of continuous stay in a country as a 
refugee will be permanent residence, resettlement or repatriation, these definitions at least 
draw attention to the fact that refugees have been in exile for a considerable time and that the 
international community, including the UNHCR, should find solutions to their protracted 
refugee status.  
 
3.1.2. Geographical or Social Context 
The 2004 definition made a geographical reference to refugees in a ‘developing country’ 
understandably because the existing research at the time revealed that refugees in protracted 
situations were only found in developing countries.166 The status remains largely the same 
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now. For example, it has been reported by the UNHCR that in the 25 countries most affected 
by prolonged presence of refugees are all in the developing world.167 The protracted refugee 
populations referred to by the UNHCR168 are, in addition to being found in developing 
countries, typically found in refugee camps.  
     Unfortunately, the UNHCR has not conducted studies of long-staying urban refugees; 
even of those in developing countries. There is however a growing number of long-stay 
refugees in urban areas, South Africa being one example. Although there are clearly no 
refugee camps in South Africa, Somalis, Burundians, Rwandans and Congolese have been 
living as refugees in South Africa since 1994.   
 
3.3. Interim Conclusion on the UNHCR Definitions 
 
The above definitions have been widely criticised,169 the main criticism being that the 
definitions are not comprehensive and, as a result, do not cater for all refugees in protracted 
refugee situations. As noted earlier, these definitions drew on the UNHCR’s experience with 
camp-based refugees under their care. Even though the definitions do not explicitly exclude 
urban-based refugees, Odhiambo-Abuya and others170 have raised the question whether 
urban-based refugees who are not in care and maintenance programs will be recognised by 
the UNHCR as being in a protracted situation and whether they will be eligible for assistance 
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from UNHCR. Odhiambo-Abuya also drew attention to the fact that because the UNHCR 
definitions have developed as a result of the experiences of those refugees dependent on the 
UNHCR for survival, the plight of those falling outside of UNHCR programmes were 
therefore not fully recognised. More importantly, even if the definitions developed by the 
UNHCR can be used to identify urban-based refugees as being in a protracted situation, the 
solutions suggested may not be appropriate because the specific prejudices suffered by urban 
based refugees are unknown.  
       A further major criticism is that the documents in which these definitions are articulated 
do not address causes of protracted refugee situations at all or discuss the harms faced by 
those refugees.171 According to Odhiambo-Abuya, this oversight would ordinarily not have 
mattered, but the fact that the UN Refugee Convention definition outlines the harms faced by 
refugees creates an expectation that the definition in the Conclusion should have the same 
structure.172 Milner agrees with Odhiambo-Abuya, stating that in the same way that the UN 
Refugee Convention definition recognises the role of the country of asylum and identifies the 
harm faced in the country of origin, a definition of protracted refugee situations must 
recognise that countries of origin, host countries and the international community are all 
implicated in the causes of protracted refugee situations.173  
       Even though Odhiambo-Abuya finds the temporal limitation introduced in the definition 
inherently problematic; he questions whether the length of time a refugee sojourns in a host 
State should have an effect on the type of refugee protection provided.174 However, 
Hathaway disagrees and argues that this is already the case with new arrivals benefitting from 
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fewer rights than long-term refugees.175 He states that the UN Refugee Convention is 
structured in this way with benefits ranging from non-refoulement, on the one hand, to access 
to naturalisation on the other.176 A similar approach is used by the refugee aid agency 
providing humanitarian assistance, the type of assistance provided at the beginning of the 
displacement, (which automatically should be of an emergency nature) and the subsequent 
care and maintenance generally aiming to change to a more meaningful protection.177         
    In spite of the above-mentioned criticisms, all the definitions have some merit. They have 
recognised that refugees are harmed in numerous ways as a result of being in exile for a 
significantly long time. In particular, the 2009 definition is commendable for various reasons. 
It identifies refugees who have been displaced for a period of five years or more as refugees 
who are in chronic exile and, more importantly, it counts the five year period from the 
moment of initial displacement. The merits of this inclusion must be recognised. It is the 
experience of many refugees that are initially received as temporary asylum seekers by a 
number of States that they remain with this temporary status for a number of years.178 South 
Africa is a good example; the South African Refugees Act allows for the initial reception of 
refugees as asylum seekers,179 the result being that many may remain with such temporary 
status for a number of years before refugee status is confirmed.180 Equally commendable in 
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the 2009 definition is the absence of the reference to a particular geographic location. This 
now means that protracted situations can be found not only in developing countries, but also 
in developed countries, whether the refugees are housed in camps or ‘integrated’ into the 
communities of the host State.  
 
3.4. A Brief Overview of the 2009 Conclusion on Protracted Refugee 
Situations 
 
Most commendable about the 2009 Conclusion is that the group is recognised as being in a 
protracted refugee situation, not because of the lack of solution, but the lack of 
implementation of the durable solutions.181 Surprisingly, it continues to mention voluntary 
repatriation as the preferred solution despite the fact that the largest number of refugees in 
protracted refugee situations is from failed States and States trapped in protracted conflict, 
that is, States where it is clearly impossible for refugees to return voluntarily. While the 
UNHCR recognises that there can be ‘no one size fits all’ solution, its position that voluntary 
repatriation as the preferred solution is regrettable, given the reason above.        
       The 2009 Conclusion also encourages refugees in long-stay refugee situations to pursue 
self-reliance strategies pending durable solutions. It, unfortunately, does not promote local 
integration as a solution. 
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       The 2009 Conclusion also noted the detrimental effects of long-lasting exile on all 
aspects of refugee lives, whether physical, mental, economic and social. Disappointingly 
though, prolonged refugee presence in the host State has only been viewed in negative terms 
for the State. It is said to ‘suffer negative consequences to the local environment and natural 
resources’. The refugees are also perceived as a burden in host States, and the Conclusion 
fails to recognise that refugees can benefit host societies.  
There is consensus that irrespective of whether refugees are camp-based or urban refugees 
in protracted situations, the country of origins’ conditions is the main determinant of whether 
refugees cannot return home. However, the international community and the host State must 
find appropriate solutions. It is apparent that the solutions will be different because of the 
different conditions in the different countries where refugees have resided for a long time.182 
The 2009 Conclusion has been criticised for, among other things, not taking into account 
different situations of refugees, such as undocumented and documented refugees. More than 
humanitarian assistance and different innovative solutions are needed for refugees in 
protracted situations. 
       The 2009 Conclusion does, however, recognise the duty of States to share the burden of 
protecting refugees and the need for a multi-sectoral approach within UN agencies, with 
elements of a humanitarian strategy. An obvious limitation of the 2009 Conclusion is that it 
does not have the binding effect of hard law: at best, it has the status of soft-law.  
 
 
4. CAUSES OF PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS  
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According to Goetz,183 there are two categories of causes of protracted refugee situations: 
direct and indirect causes. Conflict in the country of origin or issues related to the conflict in 
the country of origin is directly caused by, specifically, internal, ethnic, or tribal conflicts.184 
Conflicts often go on indefinitely. For example, the civil wars in Somalia and the eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo have gone on for a long time. Most refugees in protracted 
refugee situations are from war-torn countries.185 Even though these crises are well-
publicised and known, the international community’s response to such conflicts, particularly 
in the African context, has been inadequate186 and, as result, continued to occur, preventing 
refugees from returning home. On-going conflicts in the country of origin are thus a primary 
cause of protracted asylum.187 In Africa, states Sytnik, the impossibility of return is largely 
attributable to the continuation of conflict in the country of origin with host country and the 
failure to integrate refugees in local communities and to provide them permanent residence in 
host countries.188 
Goetz also points to another direct cause of protracted refugee situations caused by 
refugees who have refused to return home, even after the conflict has ended in the country of 
origin.189 They may have ‘compelling reasons’190 for not wanting to return and the host State 
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may in turn refuse to regularise their stay in terms of immigration laws. Paragraph 136 of the 
UNHCR Handbook provides an explanation of the compelling reasons exception: 
  
It [i.e., the ‘compelling reasons’ exception] deals with the special situation where a person may 
have been subjected to very serious persecution in the past and not therefore cease to be a refugee, 
even if fundamental changes have occurred in his country of origin. … The exception, however, 
reflects a more general humanitarian principle, which could also be applied to refugees other than 
statutory refugees. It is frequently recognized that a person who—or whose family—has suffered 
under atrocious forms of persecution should not be expected to repatriate.191 
 
The UN Refugee Convention has not extended the compelling reasons exception to all 
refugees, except post-World War II Jewish refugees, who were protected from the cessation 
clauses.192 However, some States,193 such as South Africa, have included the ‘compelling 
reasons exception’ in their domestic laws.194 In States that have not included the compelling 
reasons exception in their domestic legislation, but who continue to tolerate such a refugee 
presence have added to the population of refugees in protracted situations. 
According to Goetz, the failure by host States to provide alternative durable solutions to 
repatriation is the main indirect cause of prolonged refugee exile.195 The refusal to consider 
alternate solutions and the lack of capacity or political will by host States is problematic from 
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a human rights perspective because of the failure to accept refugees as full members of the 
host community after a protracted period of exile has a negative impact on basic human 
rights.196 
 
5. EXAMPLES OF PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS 
 
According to the UNHCR, there are about 30 major protracted refugee situations around the 
world and the average length of stay is now approaching 20 years.197 The bulk of these 
refugees are from countries where conflicts have persisted for years, such as Somalia.  
 
5.1. Historical Perspective 
 
The phenomenon of protracted refugee situations is not new. After World War II it took 
approximately 20 years for all the World War II refugees in Europe to be settled, either in 
their countries of origin or in third countries as resettled refugees. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
tens of thousands of refugees were located in camps in Western Europe; these were all 
refugees who could not, or refused to, return to their country of origin after World War II.198 
The UNHCR at the time referred to these camps as ‘black spots on the map of Europe that 
should burn holes in the consciousness of all those privileged to live in better conditions’.199 
If the situation persisted, he said, his office would be reduced to administering human 
                                                          
196 Loescher and Milner at op cit note 82. 
197 Loescher and Milner op cit note 167. 
198 Loescher and Milner op cit note 82 at 105. 
199 Address of Dr. Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) ‘Refugee 
Problems and their Solutions’ (Oslo 12 December 1955). 
55 
 
misery.200 The situations of the refugees in camps were settled some 20 years after the end of 
the World War II.201 
     The climate after the World War II in Europe was such that it could absorb large numbers 
of people for labour.202 Many countries chose to naturalise refugees or resettled them, and 
voluntary repatriation was not the preferred solution.203 Many chose not to return to their 
country of origin, even though it was clear that conditions had changed and that it was safe to 
return.204 Resettlement was also used as a durable solution for the 200 000 Hungarians who 
fled the 1956 Hungarian revolt,205 which was the first major post-war crisis that the UNHCR 
had to deal with.206 
In a remarkable departure from its earlier practice, as shown above, the UNHCR and 
various States regarded voluntary repatriation as the preferred solution to protracted refugee 
solutions, as attested to in the 2009 Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations.207 
5.2. Palestinian Refugees  
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In 1948, large numbers of Palestinians became refugees and remain so to this day.208 
Palestinian refugees in Arab States are in their 69th year of refugeehood and continue to live 
in the 58 refugee camps dotted across the Arab world.209 The cause of flight for these 
refugees was the newly formed State of Israel that immediately turned these refugees into 
stateless persons.210 Israel has not recognised the right of return of these refugees and their 
host countries have consistently refused to absorb them into their host communities.211 As a 
result, these Palestinians are currently in a protracted refugee situation, one of the longest 
protracted refugee situations in the world.  
      In 1951 the Palestinian refugee community was already in existence.  It is evident that the 
drafters of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention were aware of the existence of the Palestinian 
refugees; however, the initial response of the UNHCR was to deny Palestinian refugees 
assistance because of the geographic limitation of the UN Refugee Convention.212 The UN 
Refugee Convention only provided protection to refugees from Europe.213 Arab States also 
resisted the inclusion of the Palestinian refugees under the UN Refugee Convention because 
the Convention places a responsibility to protect and support refugees on the host State. 
Instead, assistance was provided to the Palestinian refugees by the UN Relief and Works 
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Agency Assembly Resolution in the Near East (UNWRA),214 which was specifically created 
to provide social and economic assistance to them.   
     From the very beginning, it was obvious that the Palestinian refugee situation was heading 
for a protracted situation. Neighbouring Arab States, where Palestinians sought refuge, made 
it abundantly clear that they were not going to nationalise the Palestinian refugee.215  The 
Arab States’ refusal to take responsibility for the Palestinian refugees thus gave birth to the 
notion of a protracted refugee situation. More than 1.5 million individuals continue to live in 
58 recognized Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Irrespective of whether they are 
under a UNHCR mandate or not, Palestinian refugees are de facto and de jure stateless 
refugees and those Palestinian refugees resident in an Arab State will thus remain in a 
protracted refugee situation unless a political solution is reached that will see their return to 
the homes they fled in 1948. Palestinian refugees living in neighbouring Arab States are thus 
the longest refugee population in modern times.  
 
5.3.  Post-colonial African refugees  
 
According to Harrell-Bond, the ‘refugee producing upheavals in Africa and Asia were 
presumed to be a temporary phenomenon caused by decolonization and the struggles against 
imperialism’.216 The assumption in Africa, that refugees would return home when the entire 
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continent was liberated and that each country would be a stable nation State, influenced the 
contents of the OAU Refugee Convention, which, therefore, includes an explicit reference to 
voluntary repatriation as a solution.217 The OAU Refugee Convention calls for a temporary 
intervention and assistance for refugees from a humanitarian perspective and encourages 
burden-sharing.218 It not only makes it clear that that it prefers to provide protection on a 
temporary basis, but also endorsed this approach by excluding naturalisation and assimilation 
from the OAU Refugee Convention.219 Thus, even though protracted refugee situations are 
not directly mentioned in the OAU Refugee Convention, the conclusion cannot be 
automatically drawn that protracted refugee situations were not envisaged by the drafters of 
the Convention.  
     It is evident that soon after African countries gained independence one party dictatorial 
regimes and military regimes sprang up, causing many citizens to flee. Internal and 
international armed conflicts have continued to act as the main drivers of the refugee crisis in 
Africa.220 Of the 30 protracted refugee situations identified by the UNHCR, more than half 
are in Africa.221 Furthermore, more and more of these refugee situations have become 
protracted because those refugees cannot return home and also because they are placed in 
camps and not being integrated into the host communities.222The UNHCR first drew attention 
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to the situations of prolonged exile from their experiences in Africa; this was, however, based 
only on their experiences in refugee camps. 
 
5.4.  Sahrawi refugees 
 
Some of the Sahrawi first fled the Western Sahara in 1975 after Morocco forcibly annexed 
the territory following the departure of the Spanish colonial government.223 This resulted in 
the establishment of the Sahrawi refugee camps near Tindouf in South-Western Algeria and 
is currently estimated to house approximately 155 000. They have been assisted by the 
UNHCR and the Algerian government since that time.224  The Sahrawi refugee context is 
identified by UNHCR as ‘one of the most protracted refugee situations worldwide’225 and is 
the organisation’s second oldest refugee caseload. This refugee community has lived in exile 
and have been dependent on international assistance for a considerable time.  
    The Polisario/SADR and the Algerian government systematically stress that neither local 
integration nor resettlement are considered to be acceptable or viable solutions to the 
protracted refugee situation,226 highlighting the need for a political solution to this political 
conflict. The political impasse between the Moroccan, Algerian and Polisario/SADR parties, 
and the lack of political will amongst international actors, renders repatriation to the Western 
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Sahara unlikely in the foreseeable future.227  By 2017, no durable solution to this situation 
had been found. 
 
 5.5. South Africa as an Example of Urban Refugees in a Protracted 
Refugee Situation 
 
Even though several studies have been conducted on the urban refugee population in South 
Africa, none have focused on the protracted refugee status of some of these refugees. Of the 
112 000 recognised refugees in South Africa228 the largest number are from Somalia and 
Congo.229   These refugees have been living in South Africa for five years or more after their 
initial displacement and are finding themselves in seemingly unending exile. Somalis in 
particular have been living in South Africa as refugees since 1994 and are unable to return to 
Somalia where conflict and persecution persist. The UNHCR’s resettlement programme is 
also not large enough to accommodate this entire class of refugees, and the third solution of 
naturalisation has been interpreted so narrowly that only a handful of refugees have benefited 
from this solution. 
   Whilst each of the protracted refugee situations has its own particular causes and 
characteristics,230 the common causes are unresolved political instability at home, and the 
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failure by the international community to increase resettlement opportunities, or host 
countries to integrate refugees in their communities.231  These refugees may have food and 
shelter and an assurance that they will not be returned to a place of harm, but they do not 
have legal membership of the communities in which they live.     
 
6. PROBLEMS FACED BY REFUGEES IN PROTRACTED 
SITUATIONS  
 
According to the UNHCR, although the lives of refugees in protracted situations may not be 
at risk, ‘their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain 
unfulfilled after years in exile’.232 The challenges these refugees face may vary depending on 
the circumstances of each situation and each refugee. However, some common challenges 
have been identified.  
        One of the most crucial ones is that such refugees tend to lack legal membership in the 
community they find themselves in because they are deprived of certain key civil and 
political rights. According to Aleinikoff,233 whether or not the individual refugee has a right 
to nationality or of belonging to a political community, the international community has a 
‘duty to resolve’ the state of refugeehood within a reasonable time. The de facto statelessness 
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of long-term refugees is problematic and the most serious consequence of long-term 
refugeehood is statelessness.234 
       The problem of long-stay refugees in refugee camps has been the focus of much 
research,235 and as such the problems faced by them have generally been better identified 
than those of long-stay refugees in urban areas. The absolute despair of refugees in camps is 
well-documented.236 The rights that have been restricted, such as the freedom of movement 
and the prison-like situations in closed refugee camps,237 the fact that essential economic, 
social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled,  underscores the uncertain future that 
many refugees face in exile.238 Refugee camps adversely affect the human dignity, human 
potential and physical security of refugees. The threat to the security of the refugees in camps 
is obvious and preventable. Even though the OAU Refugee Convention provides that camps 
should not be on the borders of the refugee-producing countries, in practice many refugee 
camps in Africa have been established along borders.239 The lack of laws, especially where 
States have relinquished the governance of the camps to aid agencies, has led to the violation 
of women and girls in particular. The refugee camp situation cannot lead to self-sufficiency 
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and integration for the refugee population thus prolonging the stay of the refugee and 
reinforcing the dependency status of camp-based refugees.  
     This thesis will investigate how the basic rights of long-term refugees living in urban areas 




This chapter has shown that international refugee law is based on the idea that refugee 
protection is based on the presupposition that refugee status is a temporary one, and therefore 
that protection will subsist as long as the cause of flight exists. Such presuppositions about 
temporariness can be found in the UN Refugee Convention which places on states to provide 
protection to refugees for the duration a refugee is at risk and the provisions about cessation 
of refugee status. It is also evident in the practice of keeping refugees in refugee camps and in 
the fact that the UNHCR itself was created as temporary institution, although it has been 
renewed periodically since it was first established.  
     However, the existence of protracted refugee situations presents challenges to the 
supposition of temporariness of international refugee law. As this chapter has shown, such 
situations have existed from the time the UN Refugee Convention was adopted up to now. 
After several attempts, the UNHCR has provided a satisfactory definition of protracted 
refugee situations. It has said that a refugee situation will be deemed to be protracted refugees 
have been displaced and lived in exile for a period of at least five years from the moment of 
the initial displacement with no end to their status in sight. On this definition, more than 30 
refugee situations have been adjudged as being protected. This thesis uses this definition to 
argue that such situation exists with respect to refugees of Somali and Congolese origin living 
in South Africa. 
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     As the temporary nature of refugee status is not acknowledged and host states simply 
receive refugees without having a commitment to secure an end to their refugee status, 
protracted refugee situations will continue to develop.  Refugees in protracted situations face 
serious denials of human rights. For example, they lack legal membership in the community 
they find themselves in because they are deprived of key civil and political rights. As their 
situation becomes more and more protracted, they also become more prone to statelessness. 
This thesis argues that durable solutions must be found for these refugees in order to avoid 



































This chapter looks at the normative framework in international law on the protection of 
refugees and will consider whether it makes sufficient provision for refugees in protracted 
situations. It will begin by providing an overview of the international protection of refugee 
rights and demonstrate why guaranteeing refugees rights on paper in the host country does 
not matter much in practice. Thereafter, the chapter will consider the question whether States 
have an international obligation to find durable solutions to prolonged refugee status. What is 
the nature of such an obligation? Is it founded on treaty law, soft law or both?  
Crucially, this chapter investigates the possible durable solutions that international law 
provides. In particular, it considers and critiques the international law provisions on local 
integration or assimilation and naturalization. How are these terms couched in international 
law? What kinds of obligations do they impose on States?  
 Lastly, this chapter considers the notions of burden-sharing and international solidarity as 
possible solutions to protracted refugee situations.  
 
2. THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
As noted in the introductory chapter, the most important treaty protecting the rights of 
refugees in international law is the UN Refugee Convention. In Africa, this treaty has been 
supplemented by the OAU Refugee Convention. In addition to these two, various 
international human rights treaties240 recognise several rights that can be used to protect 
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refugees. It is, therefore, no longer possible to interpret or apply the UN Refugee Convention 
in isolation. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties241 makes it clear that 
provisions of international treaties must be interpreted based on the ordinary meaning of the 
words used and in the context of the whole treaty, including its purpose, and in the juridical 
context of subsequent agreements concluded by States’ parties.242 Such subsequent 
agreements include human rights treaties and the jurisprudence interpreting them.243  
In light of the UNHCR’s Executive Committees’ Conclusion No 8,244 it appears to be 
perfectly rational to adopt a human rights approach when applying the UN Refugee 
Convention.245 The UNHCR Executive Committee states that the duty to protect refugees 
goes beyond respecting the norms of refugee law; it includes the obligation ‘to take all 
necessary measures to ensure that refugees are effectively protected, including through 
national legislation, and in compliance with their obligations under international human rights 
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and humanitarian law instruments bearing directly on refugee protection’.246 This view is 
understandable given that treaties, such as the ICCPR, extend their protection to ‘everyone’ 
or to ‘all persons’. For example, Article 2 of the ICCPR obligates each State party ‘to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognised in the present Covenant without distinction of any kind’.247 The Human Rights 
Committee, which monitors the implementations of the ICCPR, has held that rights in the 
ICCPR ‘must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, 
such as asylum seekers and refugees’.248  
 The UNHCR holds firmly that human rights should be extended to refugees especially, 
since by definition they are refugees because they have been denied human rights: 
 
Human rights violations are a major factor in causing the flight of refugees as well as an obstacle 
to their safety and voluntary return home. Safeguarding human rights in countries of origin is 
therefore critical both for the prevention and for the solution of refugee problems.  Respect for 
human rights is also essential for the protection of refugees in countries of asylum. 249  
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Clearly, ensuring that refugees are not discriminated against and have access to human rights 
is crucial to their overall protection. However, the degree to which refugees can enjoy their 
rights depends on how well they are integrated in the host society.  
 
3. MEMBERSHIP OF A NATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A 
PRECONDITION FOR THE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF 
REFUGEE RIGHTS? 
 
Membership to a national or political community is a prerequisite to the effective protection 
of human rights. Solutions for refugees in protracted situations must therefore begin with this 
assumption. According to Aleinikoff and Poellot, refugees are de facto stateless persons and 
are, therefore, unable to benefit from the full range of human rights.250 They argued that one 
of the reasons behind the creation of the modern refugee regime was precisely to address the 
gap in human rights protection.251 Coles has similarly contended that ‘possession of a 
national community is important to an individual because of the social nature of the human 
being and because of the indispensable role of such a community in human well-being, 
development and security of the individual’.252 Arendt also made this point in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism: ‘[T]he fact of not having a nationality or not enjoying in practice the 
protection of a State places stateless persons, de jure or de facto, in a position of inferiority, 
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incompatible with the respect of human rights.’253 Arendt at the same time asserted that 
stateless persons lived in a ‘legal limbo’ and found that without a nationality, without 
attachment to a State or political community, human rights were worthless.254 Arendt may 
have been too pessimistic, but the distinction she drew between human rights and the rights 
of the citizen is important.  
These arguments demonstrate the significance of the right to a nationality or political 
membership to the enjoyment of human rights by every person.255 It is thus unsurprising that 
refugees face challenges to the full enjoyment of their human rights in their host States.        
According to Benhabib, there is a way out of the ‘lack of rights’ for refugees or stateless 
persons.256 Benhabib believes that Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’ can be placed on a more 
secure footing by re-conceptualising it in theoretical terms.257 Whereas for Arendt the right to 
have rights denotes a political right closely related to membership in a political community, 
Benhabib’s understanding is that it is sufficient for a person to be recognised as being 
‘worthy of equal respect and equal protection’.258 Benhabib believes that the interest of the 
refugee can be guaranteed in ways other than the right to residence or nationality.259 She 
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believes that the dignity of the refugee is recognised by being afforded equal protection and 
equal respect.260  
Benhabib’s solution might be sufficient to protect refugees in need of temporary 
protection but not those in protracted refugee situations. The dignity afforded to human 
beings generally is not at the same level as the dignity granted to the citizen because of the 
superior relationship between the individual and the State that citizenship provides. Even for 
refugees who need temporary protection, it could be argued that Benhabib underestimates 
what it takes for non-citizens such as refugees to enjoy or have access to rights. Not only does 
it take extraordinary measures for the refugee to access the rights that are guaranteed to them 
on paper, as non-citizens, refugees cannot also enjoy the full range of human rights available 
to citizens.  
According to Kant, the right to dignity vests in every human being irrespective of their 
status or rank.261 He also asserts that a person cannot be stripped of their dignity; everyone is 
entitled to it irrespective of their actions, no matter how abhorrent. Kant therefore attaches 
dignity to humanity as such.262 Kant also recognises role-related dignitas, but he brings the 
dignity that originates from humanity together with the role-related dignitas (e.g. aristocracy) 
by saying that ‘no human being can be without a dignity because he at least has the dignity of 
a citizen’.263 Kant thus states that the dignity of a citizen is the one dignity to which every 
human being is entitled.264 This statement has important implications for refugees in 
protracted refugee situations. Such refugees do not have a citizenship; they are de facto 
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stateless and, consequently, are deprived of this form of Kantian human dignity, ‘dignity in 
citizenship’, as opposed to the abstract dignity of a human person. 
According to Waldron, citizenship has become a sort of status that grants the bearer a 
certain dignity. This is evident from the fact that citizenship comes with a bundle of rights 
and privileges and is generally regarded as a positive status.265 Waldron believes that the right 
to dignity can extend equally to everyone because the status differences have largely been 
abandoned (slaves, nobility); hence, the concept of the universality of human rights.  
However, different legal statuses continue to exist; being a citizen is a legal status, being a 
refugee is a legal status, being a permanent resident is a legal status – we are not as 
Waldron266 or Vlastos,267 whom he quotes, like to believe, a single status system yet, we are 
not yet all ‘Brahmins’.268 
 Even though Waldron and Vlastos believe in a single status society, Waldron 
acknowledges that are two types of status: sortal and conditional.269 Conditional statuses are 
the conditions individuals are in, it may not be forever, such as minors. Sortal statuses are 
relative to condition status. The idea behind sortal status is that there are different kinds of 
persons.270 Though hard to find today, it could be slaves or, during Apartheid, the victims of 
racist policy. Where do refugees fit here; at first instance it could easily be said that they are 
in a condition status, but a closer look will show that refugees in protracted situations are not, 
because it is a condition that they cannot come out of because of lack of solutions. They 
                                                          
265 J Waldron ‘Citizenship and Dignity’ (2013) Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series 1–24.   
266 Ibid. 
267 G Vlastos ‘Justice and Equality’ in J Waldron (ed) Theories Of Rights (1984) Oxford University Press: 
Oxford at 54.  
268 Ibid.  




could very well be a sortal status, but this is precisely what the concept of human dignity 
denies. There are not different kinds of people; all people have ‘legal citizenship’. According 
to Waldron, the shape of the principle of dignity is given the name of ‘legal citizenship’. 
Waldron uses legal citizenship in a broad sense and not in the narrow technical sense of 
having a nationality of a particular country, more in the sense of equal access to rights. For 
everyone to have legal citizenship is clearly the ideal but there is no evidence that Waldron 
considered refugees in protracted refugee situations in his analyses. 
In reality this is very different, and the treatment of refugees, in particular long-term 
refugees, and their exclusion from a national or political community will always make them 
the other. This permanent condition (condition status) of refugee hood thus impacts on their 
dignity and the only way they can benefit from the right to dignity is if the notion of 
citizenship is extended to them.  
Botha states that in countries where we find refugees or other immigrants, citizenship 
often works as an us vs them concept, marking a contrast between a privileged class and a 
less privileged class, and it’s valued by those who have it.271 Botha finds that it remains the 
case even if most constitutional rights and human rights generally are accorded to non-
citizens, as well as the fact that these rights are given in the spirit of citizenship.272 However, 
it cannot be said that the dignity of the citizen merges with human dignity because the dignity 
of the citizen remains relational and specific.273 This is reinforced by the fact that citizenship 
connotes the quality of the relationship between a State and those subject to its power.274  If 
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everyone, therefore, has a State that is responsible for him or her, it may be a way of realising 
human dignity for everyone. 
The United States Supreme Court has also described the right of citizenship as ‘the right to 
have rights’.275 In Trop v Dulless the US Supreme Court held that the loss of citizenship was 
a cruel and unusual punishment and nothing less than an offence to the ‘dignity of man’.276 
The US Supreme Court helped answer the question of the relation between ‘dignity in 
citizenship’ and the ‘abstract human dignity’ that underpins human rights. It refers to the 
likely hardships of de-nationalisation and concluded that taking away citizenship is ‘the total 
destruction of the individuals’ status in an organised society’.277 The Court found that the 
dignity of man was offended by being made stateless.278 
The ICESCR demonstrates that nationality or citizenship is important to the full 
enjoyment of human rights.279 This is the case because the extent to which socio-economic 
rights are granted to non-citizens by the ICESCR is left to the individual States, depending on 
their economic situation.280 There is thus no obligation to grant the same socio-economic 
rights to non-nationals. Socio-economic obligations are also subject to progressive 
realisation.281 
Even though the civil and political rights of the ICCPR extend to everyone, including 
refugees, Hathaway notes that the ICCPR often formulates rights on the basis of 
                                                          




279 F Marouf & D Anker ‘Socio-Economic Rights and Refugee Status: Deepening the Dialogue between Human 
Rights and Refugee Law’ (2009) 103 American Journal of International Law at 784. 
280 ICESCR at Article 2 (3).  
281 ICESCR Article 2(2). 
75 
 
‘inappropriate assumptions.’282  He cites the example that the guarantee of fairness in judicial 
proceedings does not address the more basic issue of access to courts.283 It must also be 
pointed out that political rights are generally not guaranteed to non-citizens and, as a result, 
refugees are generally not allowed to vote, contest for public office, or to be represented in 
democratic institutions, such as parliament.  
In conclusion, membership to a political community is crucial to the enjoyment of human 
rights. Because refugees in protracted situations lack such membership for a long period of 
time, they cannot enjoy the full array of rights and hence their dignity is impaired. Restoring 
refugees’ membership to a political community demonstrates a commitment to human rights 
and is an important step to finding durable solutions to refugees in such protracted situations. 
The next question to be answered in this chapter is whether the host State has a duty in 
international law to provide membership to its political community to refugees in a protracted 
refugee situation.  
 
4. THE UN REFUGEE CONVENTION AND REFUGEES IN 
PROTRACTED SITUATIONS284 
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Provisions of the UN Refugee Convention have to be interpreted in the context of the whole 
Convention. One of the key provisions that provides guidelines to the analysis and 
interpretation of the Convention is Article 5, which provides that ‘[n]othing in this 
convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits granted by a contracting State to 
refugees apart from this Convention’.285 This provision should be read as requiring 
governments to respect all the rights of refugees recognised in this treaty and other 
international human rights treaties.  
     Additionally, the UN Refugee Convention also grants more superior rights to refugees the 
longer they stay in the host State. According to Hathaway, the Convention ‘grants enhanced 
rights as the bond strengthens between a refugee and the State party in which he or she is 
present’.286 At the lowest level, refugees are subject only to the jurisdiction of the host State, 
even though they are not physically present, such as on a boat carrying a State flag or on a 
national airline or in an embassy.287 The refugee is simply under the control of the host State 
and the refugees’ safety is assured.288 Only two core rights are protected under this extra- 
territorial jurisdiction: the right not to be returned to harm289 and the right to non-
discrimination.290  
       Furthermore, the UN Refugee Convention dictates the standard of treatment to be 
accorded to refugees as opposed to other aliens. It provides that refugees should either be 
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treated as favourably as the ‘best alien’ or as ‘aliens generally’,291  if they are in the same 
circumstances.292 Some provisions of the UN Refugee Convention aim at providing special 
rights or benefits to refugees while other provisions recognise rights to refugees by 
comparison with citizens or non-citizens.293 
In addition to defining a refugee,294 the UN Refugee Convention guarantees a bundle of 
rights to refugees that are aimed at providing them international protection that is broader 
than mere physical safety.295 The right to non-refoulement,296 together with a range of socio-
economic and civil rights is all guaranteed to refugees. Some of these rights are subject to 
reservations, while others are not.297  
Crucially, the UN Refugee Convention also provides for cessation298 of refugee status. 
One way to end refugee status is through re-availment to the country of origin. The refugee 
regains membership of the political and social community with full membership rights. 
Membership to a political community is precisely what refugees’ lack, no matter how many 
rights are guaranteed by the UN Refugee Convention. Refugees are unlike all other migrants 
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who may return home and whose bond with their State and citizen is assured; refugees by 
definition cannot. 
If return to the home State is not possible for refugees, the only way a refugee may 
become a member of a political community with full rights is if another State grants such 
rights. Hence, for prolonged exile to come to an end, such refugees must be considered for a 
durable solution other than voluntary repatriation and the only durable solution recommended 
by the UN Refugee Convention that meets the requirement of full membership to a 
community, are ‘assimilation and naturalisation’. However, as Feller has argued, ‘The UN 
Refugee Convention foreshadows various types of solutions, as refugee status is by definition 
temporary, but again envisages no special arrangements to ensure they are realisable in a 
timely and durable manner’.299 Refugees in protracted refugee situations are therefore an 
anomaly in international refugee law and, unfortunately, a solution to such long-term 
refugeehood is not readily available in the UN Refugee Convention, with the exception of 
Article 34, which will be discussed below.     
 




Article 34 is the closest that the Convention gets to a solution to prolonged refugeehood in a 
host State. 
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The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of 
refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to 
reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.300 
 
Whereas the word naturalisation301 has a distinct immigration status, assimilation does not. 
It is widely accepted that to be naturalised, one has to acquire the nationality of a political or 
a national community and that such a status is accompanied by various rights. It is also 
widely accepted that nationality can be acquired in various ways. Refugees in protracted 
situations can potentially acquire nationality by means of an application for naturalisation 
under Article 34, and thus end their prolonged refugee status. 
Assimilation, on the other hand, does not have a clear legal meaning. At the drafting of the 
UN Refugee Convention,302 the Israeli representative submitted that assimilation was a term 
‘well-known in sociology [that] bore an unpleasant connotation vaguely related to the use of 
force’.303 ‘If assimilation was not voluntary’, he continued, ‘it would be an attack on the 
spiritual independence of the refugee’.304 Assimilationist policies are generally viewed in a 
negative sense because in its worst form a State could put extreme pressure on minorities to 
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relinquish their culture and adopt the culture of the State to ensure a homogenous national 
identity. 305 
Despite strong objections, the drafters retained the term, arguing that assimilation was not 
intended to be a term of compulsion, but to be used ‘in the sense that refugees became part of 
the national community, that they were not isolated in the country of refuge and that they 
understand the ways of the new national community so that they could be fit for 
naturalisation’.306 Commentators agree that the drafters intended assimilation to be 
understood in the sense of integration into the economic, social and cultural life of the host 
community without forcing refugees to forsake their own culture and way of life.307 The 
preferred term by the UNHCR today is ‘integration’ rather than ‘assimilation’. Integration 
allows the refugee access to a number of rights and privileges in the host State.308  
Although assimilation and naturalisation may be two distinct processes, there is a nexus 
between them. The fact that assimilation/integration is mentioned first in Article 34 could be 
an indication that it is a process that is necessary before naturalisation can be facilitated. This 
is what Hathaway refers to it as a bifurcated approach,309 whereby local integration is treated 
as a prerequisite for naturalization. In fact, it has been identified as a process which could 
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lead to permanent residence rights and, ultimately, the acquisition of citizenship by 
UNHCR.310  
The link between naturalisation and integration is especially important for refugees who, 
unlike other aliens, often lack an effective nationality and thus may be considered to be de 
facto stateless, a situation which is abnormal and should not be regarded as permanent.311 
Thus, while facilitating the integration of newly recognised refugees is an independent 
obligation from naturalisation, it can be a stepping stone to naturalisation.  
The fact that the UNHCR regards local integration as a durable solution for refugees even 
though it does not lead to ending refugeehood warrants an in depths analysis of the concept.  
 
5.2. Assimilation: The Local Integration Approach 
 
5.2.1. What is Local Integration?312 
According to the UNHCR, ‘[i]integration requires preparedness on the part of the refugees to 
adapt to the host society, without having to forego their own cultural identity. From the host 
society it requires communities to be welcoming and responsive to refugees, and public 
institutions that are able to meet the needs of the diverse population’.313 Local integration has 
three specific dimensions – legal, economic, and socio-cultural.314 In terms of the legal 
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dimension, refugees are granted durable residence with a progressively wider range of rights 
that are equivalent to those granted to its citizens. These rights include, amongst others, 
freedom of movement, access to the labour market, access to public relief and assistance, 
access to healthcare and education, the right to travel and identity documents as well as the 
right to family unity,315 which ought to be sufficient to lead to the social and economic 
integration of refugees. Although local integration is touted as a durable solution, it can lead 
to protracted refugee situations if the end-product of local integration is not the termination of 
refugee status. Jacobsen identifies the refugee who has obtained permanent residence as 
someone who has full integration, as opposed to the refugee with local integration that may or 
may not lead to permanent residence. She states: 
 
Paths to refugee integration vary widely. Some of the most common scenarios are described 
below. Full integration refers to refugees who are granted asylum, residency, and full and 
permanent membership status by the host government. Under these circumstances, refugees 
acquire the protection of the host State and enjoy the full range of economic, social, and civil 
rights accorded to permanent legal residents, including access to citizenship under the same terms 
as others. Local integration may take place when it is not safe for refugees to return home after a 
prolonged period in exile. In such cases, a host government may decide to allow refugees to 
integrate locally, in the first-asylum country. Local integration may or may not lead to permanent 
residence and eventual citizenship.316 
 
Hathaway’s explanation of local integration is more precise. According to him, ‘Local 
integration means in essence that a refugee is granted some form of durable legal status that 
allows him or her to remain in the country of asylum on an indefinite basis, and fully 
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participate in the social, economic, and cultural life of the host community’.317  So conceived, 
he says, local integration is not really distinguishable from the primary solution envisaged by 
the UN Refugee Convention – simple respect for rights.  
 
5.2.2. Local Integration as a Durable Solution  
The UNHCR Executive Committee’s Conclusion on Local Integration318 makes reference to 
local integration as one of three durable solutions for refugees. The other two are 
resettlement319 and voluntary repatriation.320 These two are distinctly different from local 
integration because they signify the end of refugee status. Therefore, the UNHCR’s reference 
to local integration as a durable solution is problematic, especially in light of the fact that it 
acknowledges that it is distinct from naturalisation and that the refugee retains his or her 
status as a refugee.321 
Local integration without the possibility of termination of refugee status can thus lead to 
an anomalous situation of a permanent refugee status. Kant, in his theory, views citizenship 
as a sort of dignity; it is thus a status-term.322 It is also evident that citizenship comprises a 
bundle of rights, powers, duties and liabilities and is generally regarded positively, whereas 
the term ‘refugee’ has never been regarded in a positive light.323 Refugee status is associated 
with various negative terms, such as burden-sharing,324 and signifies a lesser status. Unlike 
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refugee status, citizenship is cherished, not only because it is associated with the rights, 
powers and responsibilities of a privileged class, but also because of the general quality of the 
relationship between the State and those subject to its power.325         
    It should also be noted that local integration is not an option for those countries that 
entered reservations to the UN Refugee Convention. The Convention allows for the 
reservation of a number of rights, except the right to non-discrimination, freedom to practice 
religion, access to court and non-refoulement.326 Reservations may thus be signed to the right 
to ‘assimilation and naturalisation’. The rights that reservations are allowed to are obviously 
much harder for the host State to grant to refugees because it imposes a duty on the State. 
Hathaway and Cusick have noted that a plain reading of the UN Refugee Convention 
demonstrates that the rights granted are not mere standards of achievement for States, but that 
they are enforceable against State parties and as such stated in the language of legal 
obligation.327 States that have not signed any reservations to the UN Refugee Convention are 
thus obliged to grant refugees these rights.  
     Local integration as envisaged by the UNHCR does provide a wide range of rights to 
refugees that can facilitate the refugees’ integration into the host community. According to 
the UNHCR, the range of the rights available ought to allow the refugee to live a meaningful 
life in the host State.328 The question to explore here is thus whether the range of rights 
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offered to refugees in the UN Refugee Convention can adequately assist with the effective 
integration/assimilation of refugees in the host State ‘legally, socially and culturally’.329 
 
5.2.3. Is the Availability of ‘Rights on Paper’ Sufficient for the Social, Legal, 
and Economic Integration of Refugees?  
 
As shown in section 5.2.1 above, the UN Refugee Convention guarantees refugees a number 
of rights. According to Hathaway the socio-economic rights are, however, made available 
from a citizen’s perspective rather than a general human being perspective, which 
immediately puts refugees at a disadvantage.330 Similarly, Aleinikoff asserts that the 
‘otherness’ of refugees hampers their access to and enjoyment of the given rights’.331 While 
refugee rights are for the moral, social, and economic well-being of the refugee, they do not 
take away the stigma associated with the second-class status of being a refugee. As has been 
argued earlier, the rights, generous as they may be, cannot be fully enjoyed the refugees 
simply because they are refugees.332 
For example, the UNHCR has said that for refugees to be able to live meaningfully in the 
host State, they have to enjoy the right to documentation, the right to work, the right to 
education, the right to a family, the right to shelter, freedom of movement, and the right to 
acquire and dispose of property.333 However, these rights can only be enjoyed if refugees are 
properly and expeditiously documented to enable them to acquire or enjoy the rights offered. 
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Irrespective of which country refugees find themselves in, the immediate issuance of 
documentation is vitally important so that refugees are not vulnerable to arrest or 
deportation.334 The consequences are harsh for refugees if they lack identification 
documentation. They may not be allowed to enroll for education, be eligible for employment, 
open a bank account or acquire property.335  
The UN Refugee Convention336 makes provision for the issuance of identity documents, 
but there is no guarantee the documentation issued by the host State to the refugee will 
sufficiently allow for their legal, social, and economic integration. The UN Refugee 
Convention does not require the identity document to have any form or serve any purpose 
other than for the refugee to identify him or herself.337 Neither is it required to be a rights-
bearing document. In many countries, identity documents serve as residence permits or proof 
of domicile. However, there is no indication that identity documents for refugees must be in 
the same form or serve the same purpose as those identity documents issued to citizens.338 
According to Amit and Krigler the refugee identity document has thus not proven to be an 
enabling document. The clear distinction between the identity document for refugees and the 
identity document for the citizen has negatively impacted on the rights of the refugee.339 
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Refugees in protracted refugee situations, in particular refugee identity documentation serves 
as an obstacle to full access to their rights. 
     In addition to being documented, it is also vitally important for refugees in protracted 
refugee situations to access socio-economic rights. Such access to socio-economic rights 
assures refugees of their dignity by giving them a sense of belonging and the tools to cope 
economically and socially in the host State. 
Most important amongst these socio-economic rights is the right to work. Despite the 
recognition of the right to work in the UN Refugee Convention,340 refugees face many 
obstacles to finding work.341 It is obvious that the drafters considered the right to work as an 
important right in the integration of refugees.342 If properly implemented, this right can 
facilitate the economic and social integration of refugees in the host State by enabling 
refugees to become self-reliant and make a positive contribution to their host communities.343 
The South African Supreme Court of Appeal in Watchenuka held that the right to work is an 
essential element of human dignity344 and crucial to achieving economic self-sufficiency.  
This right to work also has the potential to lead to a durable solution for refugees. In many 
jurisdictions, including South Africa, continuous employment for a number of years allows 
for the immigrant to become eligible to apply for permanent residency.345 Although the UN 
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Refugee Convention does not expressly state that refugees can become eligible for permanent 
residence after continuous work for a number of years, this right is critical to the economic 
and social integration of refugees.346  
Equally important to the integration of refugees is the right to education. International 
human rights instruments are both wider and more generous than the UN Refugee 
Convention with regard to the right to education. The minimum core has been defined by 
commentators on Article 13 of the ICESCR347 as including the right to equal access to public 
education institutions, free compulsory primary education, free choice of education without 
interference and the right to be educated in the language of one’s choice. Similarly the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child348 specifies that primary education must be free. The 
UN Refugee Convention at Article 22349 does not make ‘lawful stay’ a requirement of access 
to education and must thus be interpreted as allowing asylum seekers to have access to public 
education. It would naturally be difficult for refugees to integrate without enjoying the right 
to education. Once again, access to this right is hindered because refugee documentation is 
generally issued for short periods.350  
    The UN Refugee Convention also places an obligation on the contracting State in Article 
26 to allow refugees freedom of movement and the freedom to choose a place to stay. 351 
Refugees need to be able to move freely in the country of asylum if they want to access the 
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rights which are key to their ‘functional integration’, as referred to by Da Costa,352 or their 
‘structural integration’, as referred to Bloch,353 to be able to become self-reliant. The 
restriction to freely choose a place of residence can be detrimental to the social well-being of 
refugees who would generally choose to live with established refugee communities or areas 
of the host country.  
Unfortunately, refugees are treated differently from other foreign nationals and in some 
countries, refugees are detained for long periods.354 In other countries refugees are even 
restricted to certain areas in the country.355 The refusal to suitably document refugees can of 
course severely hamper their right to freely move in the country of asylum and, therefore, 
integrate in a meaningful way. Unless these rights are exercised generously refugees in 
protracted refugee situations cannot benefit therefrom.  
     The UN Refugee Convention at Article 13 requires the refugees’ right to acquire property 
to be the same as ‘for aliens generally’.356 Ownership of especially immovable property is a 
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strong indication of the need for a durable stay in the country of refuge. The ability to acquire 
immovable property, therefore, is an important right for long-stay refugees. State parties have 
an obligation to facilitate the integration of refugees, allowing refugees to establish 
themselves, but the right to acquire property significantly impacts on their right to an 
adequate standard of living. Insofar as the UN Refugee Convention allows for refugee 
ownership of immovable property, it makes it possible for the host State to create favourable 
conditions for the continued and long-term presence of refugees; this right is therefore useful 
for a refugee in a protracted situation in that it gives the refugee a sense of permanence. 
However, if a refugee is not issued enabling documentation or is unable to access suitable 
work opportunities, then the right to acquire property becomes meaningless.  
The UNHCR in its Conclusion on Local Integration has also identified the right to family 
unity or reunification as important, even though it is absent from the UN Refugee 
Convention, because it ‘recognizes that family members can reinforce the social support 
system of refugees, and in so doing, promote the smoother and more rapid integration of 
refugee families.’357 However, Jastram and Newland found that refugees struggle to have 
family members join them or have their family recognised as refugees and in some countries 
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5.2.4.  Conclusion  
 
This brief analysis of the above-mentioned rights clearly demonstrates that in spite of the 
UNHCR’s recognition of local integration as a durable solution, it is as Hathaway stated ‘no 
more than mere respect for Convention rights’ and therefore sufficient for refugees in the 
short-term but inadequate for refugees in prolonged exile. The above analysis has also 
highlighted that despite the existence of these rights, States are struggling to implement it in 
manner that will ensure an effective and meaningful existence of the refugee in the host State. 
Local integration cannot be deemed to be a solution for refugees in prolonged exile, firstly 
because it is unfair to expect refugees to live their entire lives as ‘the other’. Secondly, local 
integration, as envisaged by the UNHCR, does not end refugee status. Such refugees would 
be de facto stateless refugees and there is a strong possibility of their refugee children born in 
exile becoming stateless. Thirdly, the UN Refugee Convention may have correctly identified 
these rights as necessary for integration, but these rights have in some instances been so 
vaguely put forth in the UN Refugee Convention, that whilst sufficient to cater for new 
refugees, they will be insufficient for the refugee in a protracted situation. These rights also 




The previous section dealt with the assimilation or integration of refugees in the host State 
and showed that assimilation on its own cannot end refugee status, but it can be a step to 
naturalisation. This section analyses the concept of naturalisation under the UN Refugee 




5.3.1. Definition and Implications 
 
Naturalisation is the legal act or process by which a non-citizen in a country may acquire 
citizenship or nationality of that country. According to Manby, the terms nationality and 
citizenship may be used interchangeably today,359 but they used to be two distinct concepts in 
South Africa during Apartheid. 
 
In African countries under colonial rule or South Africa under apartheid, only those of European 
descent had both nationality and full citizenship rights. Similarly, it used to be common for women 
to have nationality of a state but not full citizenship, because they did not have the right to vote. 
Today, human rights law principles of non-discrimination require that all those who are nationals 
of a state enjoy the same rights.360  
 
It is beyond doubt that citizenship symbolises the strongest bond between the State and the 
holder.361 In Nottebohm, the International Court of Justice said ‘[a]ccording to the practice of 
States, to arbitral and judicial decisions, and to the opinion of writers, nationality is a legal 
bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, 
interest and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties’.362 
Citizenship provides the holder with specific rights, such as the right to diplomatic protection 
when outside the country, the right to hold political office and vote, that is, rights which are 
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not available to non-citizens.363 This thesis has also demonstrated that the citizen is generally 
treated better than the non-citizen.364  It is obvious that granting citizenship is a prerogative of 
the State.365 Citizenship is indisputably the most durable form of solution for a refugee in a 
protracted refugee situation. It ends refugee status and it allows the refugee to be part of a 
national community. Refugees may be granted various rights in the spirit of citizenship by 
hosts’ States, but the lack of citizenship means that they will remain vulnerable.366 From a 
legal point of view, citizenship for the refugee not only represents the right to full legal and 
diplomatic protection from a State, both within and outside the country, but it also indicates a 
commitment to the State on the part of the refugee.367  
Whilst the UN Refugee Convention does not enshrine an absolute right of residence and, 
in fact, the enjoyment of most of its provisions is conditional on the immigration status of the 
refugee, the notion of permanence is not alien to the UN Refugee Convention.368 The notion 
of permanence for refugees may be slowly emerging and perhaps not yet institutionalised, but 
it was already postulated by Grahl-Madsen369 when he examined the plight of refugees 
without a country of origin, that is, stateless refugees. He argued that when the State is unable 
to remove a refugee, he gains freedom of movement and residence, he must be considered to 
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be ‘lawfully staying’ in the territory such that  ‘after a number of years (normally about three 
years) his interest in growing roots must override any other considerations’.370 Grahl-Madsen 
argued that it ‘has never been envisaged that there should be any group of underprivileged 
refugees, subject to the whims of the authorities’.371  
In short, a refugee who has stayed uninterrupted in a host State for a considerable time 
acquires a legitimate expectation to be treated fairly, including applying for naturalisation. 
This type of approach is consistent with Article 34, which provides for assimilation and 
naturalisation. This Article is the closest the UN Refugee Convention comes to ending 
refugee status in the host country.372   
Even though the duty Article 34 imposes on States is merely to facilitate assimilation and 
naturalisation, not an unqualified duty on the host State to end refugee status, States cannot 
ignore it. 
 
5.3.2. States’ Obligations in Relation to Naturalisation          
 
As noted earlier, Article 34 of the UN Refugee Convention provides that States ‘shall as far 
as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees’. The use of the word 
‘shall’ suggests that a duty is imposed on the State.373 However, this duty is qualified by the 
words ‘as far as possible’. The State can decide whether it is possible for it to naturalise any 
individual or any number of refugees.374 The decision by the State must, however, be guided 
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by the well-known principle of good faith. As a result, States cannot simply ignore a 
provision in an international legal instrument that they have ratified.375  For instance, if a 
State refuses to assimilate or naturalise a refugee simply because it is unwilling, this would be 
a violation of the Convention.376 
Once the State has made the decision to allow for the naturalisation of refugees, the State 
must abide by the other requirements of Article 34, namely, to ‘expedite’ naturalisation 
proceedings and to ‘reduce the cost’ of naturalisation. Unlike the duty to provide for 
naturalization, the duty to expedite and reduce the costs of naturalization is framed without 
qualification. These unqualified duties are especially necessary because refugees generally do 
not enjoy all their rights due to their status. In many countries, naturalization procedures 
involve long waiting periods, which is contrary to what Article 34 expects of States.377  
The UNHCR has explained the duty to facilitate naturalisation as follows: 
 
To ‘facilitate’ naturalization means that, refugees and stateless persons should be given appropriate 
facilities for the acquisition of the nationality of the country of asylum and should be provided 
with the necessary information on the regulations and procedures in force. Furthermore, it implies 
that national authorities should adopt legal or administrative procedures for the benefit of refugees 
by which they are enabled to qualify for naturalization earlier than aliens generally, they are not 
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required to give evidence of loss of their former nationality and that the fees normally paid for 
naturalization proceedings are reduced or waived.378 
 
It is thus implied that States should, in addition to expediting the procedures and reducing 
costs, also reduce legal obstacles to applying for naturalisation generally. Many States 
require applicants for naturalisation to prove, among other things, that they are of good 
character.379 Some States may even require applicants to provide proof of their former 
nationality or professional qualifications. States are expected by Article 34 to reduce the 
burden on the refugee and relax such onerous requirements. The treatment of refugee 
applicants for naturalisation, according to Hathaway, should be in line with the treatment for 
the ‘most favoured alien’.380 
 
5.3.3. Length of Legal Sojourn Before Acquiring Nationality  
 
Article 34 does not recommend a time period that a refugee must spend in the host State 
before he or she becomes eligible for naturalisation. However, this issue was raised by the 
drafters, according to the travaux prepatoire.381 It was recommended by the Canadian 
representative that the period from initial displacement before formal refugee status is granted 
must be taken into account,382 and that the refugee’s stay in the host country must be 
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uninterrupted before the refugee can be eligible for naturalization.383 The Italian government 
objected to the naturalisation of refugees who have just entered a country, arguing that such 
action might ‘embitter the internal situation’ or cause ‘the gravest concern to over-population 
and unemployment’.384  The French representative submitted that the duty to ‘expedite the 
proceedings’ should not apply to the period of residency prior to application for 
naturalisation.385  In the end, the draft committee agreed not to include a specific time period 
within which to obligate states to allow for naturalisation.386 Article 34 thus recommends 
naturalisation without giving an indication of the length of sojourn in the host State for a 
refugee to become eligible to make such an application.  
A possible way for individual States to address this issue is to apply the principle of non-
discrimination that exists in international human rights law and is probably also available in 
the national laws of most countries.387 As stated above, according to the immigration laws of 
many States, foreigners become eligible for permanent residence or naturalisation after a 
period of uninterrupted stay in a host State. Refugees ought to be placed in a better position 
than ordinary immigrants because of their particular vulnerabilities and a large number of 
countries have reduced the time period for refugees to become eligible to apply for 
naturalisation.388 This type of approach might prevent protracted refugee situations.  
                                                          
383 Ibid. 
384 Ibid. 
385 See also Grahl-Madsen op cit note 369. 
386 Weiss op cit note 302.  
387 See chapter six for an explanation of the applicability of the principle of non-discrimination for refugees. 
388 In 1969, the Council of Europe recommended to all members that refugees be subject to a minimum period 
of residence that does not exceed five years. In current German law for instance, the residency requirement may 
be reduced from the normal 8-year period to 6 years in the case of refugees. In Kenya, for example, naturalised 




5.3.4. Conclusion  
 
Notwithstanding that the duty to facilitate naturalisation is qualified by the phrase ‘as far as 
possible’, Article 34 is binding on States. Article 34 is clearly breached where a State party 
does not allow refugees to secure their citizenship, and refuses to provide a ‘cogent 
explanation for that inaccessibility’. It is incumbent on State parties, at the very least, to 
provide a good faith justification for excluding refugees from naturalisation.389        
 
6. SOLUTIONS FOUND ELSEWHERE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
6.1. The OAU Refugee Convention 
The OAU Refugee Convention does not expressly refer to the issue of naturalisation, but 
Article II, which  states that member States must ‘use their best endeavours to secure the 
settlement’ of refugees, which could be interpreted as an implied obligation on States to 
provide a secure residence for refugees.390 Furthermore, by virtue of its recognition of the UN 
Refugee Convention,391 Article 34 of the latter also becomes applicable to African States. It 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
notes that at the time Denmark reduced the requirement from seven to six years in the case of refugees, in 
Belgium from six to three years, and in the Netherlands from five to four years. He also writes that some states 
reduce other hurdles to naturalisation, such as exempting refugees from the requirement to renounce dual-
nationality in Switzerland and Finland. In Denmark, the language and integration requirements are relaxed for 
refugees.  
389 Weiss op cit note 302 at 989.  
390 Manby op cit note 360; 1969 OAU Refugee Convention at Article II. 
391 Article VIII (2) of the OAU Convention. 
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must be noted, however, that some African States have entered reservations to Article 34 of 
the UN Refugee Convention.392  
With regard to durable solutions, it is evident that voluntary repatriation has always been 
regarded as the most desirable solution in Africa.393 However, according to Rutinwa, the 
other solutions, particularly local integration, were given greater significance than is 
generally acknowledged.394 In the preamble of the Recommendations (IV) of the Conference 
on the Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problems (1967),395 
voluntary repatriation was expressly said to be ‘the best solution to refugee problems’. 
However, in the same recommendations the conference also observed:  
 
Considering that whilst the voluntary repatriation of refugees to the country of origin should be 
emphasized as the ideal solution of the refugee problem, it is nevertheless necessary to promote, 
for those refugees who do not wish to repatriate in the foreseeable future, a durable solution in the 
country of asylum, with a view to integrating them in the new country from an economic, social 
and legal point of view.396 
 
                                                          
392 Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique have all signed reservations to Article 34 of the UN Refugee Convention. 
393 Rutinwa op cit note 79.  
394 Rutinwa op cit note 79. 
395 United Nations ‘Economic and Social Council: United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa’ (1969-
01). Report of the conference on the legal, economic and social aspects of African refugee problems, available 
at http://repository.uneca.org/handle/123456789/17552, accessed on 15 March 2016.  
396 Ibid.  
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Similarly, at the Arusha Refugee Conference (1979),397 repatriation and local integration 
were given almost equal importance.398 The conference noted the provisions of the OAU 
Refugee Convention’s Article V concerning voluntary repatriation and stressed the 
importance of voluntary repatriation as a solution to refugee problems. At the same time, the 
conference noted the provisions of Article 34 of the UN Refugee Convention concerning 
naturalisation of refugees and stressed the importance of naturalisation as a solution for 
African refugee problems in cases where voluntary repatriation can no longer be envisaged 
and where refugees have attained a sufficient degree of integration in their country of 
asylum.399 
 It is evident that African States considered the naturalisation of refugees before and after 
the drafting of the OAU Refugee Convention in 1969 as a solution in cases where voluntary 
repatriation is not appropriate.  
 
7. BURDEN-SHARING AND REFUGEES IN PROTRACTED 
SITUATIONS  
 
                                                          
397 Recommendations from the Pan-African Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa, Arusha 
(Tanzania) Adopted at the Pan-African Conference on the situation of refugees in Africa in Arusha, 7-17 May 
1979. 
398 L G Eriksson et al ‘The Recommendations from the Arusha Conference on the African Refugee Problem: An 
Analysing Account of the Conference on the African Refugee Problem’ (1979) 20 The Journal of Modern 
African Studies at 350-352.  
399 Eriksson op cit note 398. 
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Seeking solutions is one of the UNHCR’s main functions, and States are explicitly called 
upon in Article 35400 of the UN Refugee Convention to provide the UNHCR assistance so 
that it can carry out its functions effectively. The importance of finding durable solutions is 
also made clear in the first paragraph of the UNHCR’s founding statute,401 which states that 
the High Commissioner shall assume the functions of ‘providing international protection [to 
refugees] … and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting 
governments and, subject to the approval of the governments concerned, or their assimilation 
within the new national communities’.402 
Before the UN Refugee Convention, the first General Assembly (GA) resolution 
addressing refugees stated that a new international refugee body must consider solutions for 
refugees in addition to protecting them from non-refoulement.403 The need to find solutions 
has been confirmed in subsequent GA resolutions adopted after the UN Refugee Convention. 
Shortly after World War II, the GA committed member states  to finding durable solutions. It 
stated: ‘… we commit ourselves to safeguarding the principle of refugee protection and to 
upholding our responsibility in resolving the plight of refugees, including through the support 
                                                          
400 Article 35 of the UN Refugee Convention provides: ‘The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations, 
which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the 
application of the provisions of this Convention.’ 
401 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees GA Resolution 428(V), Annex, 
I.1, UN Doc A/RES/428(V) (1950) available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/428(V), accessed on 14 March 2016. Hereinafter 
referred to as UNHCR Statute. 
402 UNHCR Statute op cit note 401. 
403 Aleinikoff & Poellot op cit note 233. 
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of efforts aimed at …. finding durable solutions for refugees in protracted situations … .’404 
The need to find solutions has also been confirmed in several UNHCR Conclusions.405 At the 
beginning of the Arab Spring, the UNHCR committed itself to securing solutions, explaining 
that ‘international protection of refugees is a dynamic and action-oriented function that is at 
the core of the mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner and that it includes - the 
ensuring of durable, protection oriented solution’.406 
In the case of protracted refugee situations the UNHCR has identified the international law 
concepts of burden-sharing and international solidarity as a means to providing solutions for 
refugees in protracted refugee situations. The concept of burden-sharing can be found in the 
preamble of the UN Refugee Convention407 as well as in the 2009 Conclusion on Protracted 
Refugee Situations.408 Various other Conclusions have reiterated the view that solutions can 
be found for refugees in protracted situations by means of cooperation between states and the 
UNHCR.409            
                                                          
404 International Assistance to Refugees within the Mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees GA Res 1166 (XII), UN Doc A/RES/1166 (XII) 1(a) 2 (Nov 26 1957)., available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1166(XII)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION 
accessed on 14 March 2016.  
405 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No 104 op cit note 308. 
406 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees GA Res 65/194, 20, UN Doc A/RES/65/194 
(Feb 28 2011), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/res/65/194 UNHCR, 
accessed on 14 March 2016.  
407 See  UN Refugee Convention at preamble. 
408 The 2009 UNHCR ExCom Conclusion op cit note 21. 
409 UNHCR’s Executive Committee has highlighted the importance of burden-sharing. See UNHCR Executive 
Committee Conclusion No 85 (XLIX)-1998 on International Protection, UN GA Doc A12 A/53/12/Add.1, 9 
October 1998 (Reiterating that refugee protection is primarily the responsibility of States and that it is best 
achieved through effective cooperation between all States and the UNHCR). 
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Several other Conclusions mention international solidarity.410 Most recently, UNHCR’s 
Executive Committee issued a statement reaffirming ‘commitment to the principles of 
international solidarity and burden-sharing, in supporting host countries and in responding to 
the assistance needs of refugees and the communities hosting them’ and calling upon the 
international community to share the burden of countries that are hosting Syrian refugees.411 
As Fellers has said, ‘refugee protection is a global concern and a common trust’, which 
means that responsibility for it is shared, not individual.412 
The OAU Refugee Convention mentions burden-sharing specifically in its preamble 
where it calls for international co-operation to ‘solve the problems of refugees in Africa’ and 
in Article II (4) where it expressly states: 
 
where a member-State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, such members 
State may appeal directly to other member states and through the OAU, and such other member 
                                                          
410 Executive Committee Conclusions 22, 29, 33, 41, 89, 95 reiterate the importance of burden-sharing. 
411 Since adopting UNHCR’s Statute, the General Assembly has continued, from the 1950s until today, to 
reiterate the urgency and importance of UNHCR’s mandate to provide solutions. See eg International Assistance 
to Refugees Within the Mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees GA Res 832 (IX), 
U.N. Doc.A/RES/832(IX)1(Oct.21,1954), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/832(IX)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION, 
accessed on 14 March 2016. (finding that UNHCR must ‘in accordance with this Statute, to undertake a 
programme designed to achieve permanent solutions …’). 
412 UNHCR Executive Committee Report of the Sixty-fourth Session of the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme, Annex 1, UN Doc A/AC/96/1132 (Oct 9 2013), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/525b aeae9.html, accessed on 15 March 2016; UNHCR Sixty-first Session of the 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Agenda Item 5(a), at 1 (Oct. 6, 2010) (statement 
of E Feller, Assistant High Commissioner concerning Protection: Rule of Law 60 Years On), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4cac7f2f9.pdf, accessed on 14 March 2016.  
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States appeal directly to other member-states and through the OAU, and such member state shall in 
the spirit of African solidarity and international co-operation take appropriate measures to lighten 
the burden of the member-state granting asylum.413 
 
As is the case with other treaties that provide for international co-operation, this is rather 
vague, probably unenforceable, and has not being used in practice. The law has, however, 
been expressed. Co-operation between States has worked in both the European Union and 
Latin America and has legal and practical relevance.414    
Refugees in a protracted situation could benefit from the international solidarity or burden-
sharing commitments promised by the international community in international law by 
providing durable solutions. However, burden-sharing or international solidarity depends on 
State cooperation and diplomatic good offices.  
So far, the UNHCR has understood international solidarity and burden-sharing as 
requiring States to take ‘action with a view that burden-sharing should be directed towards 
facilitating voluntary repatriation, promoting local settlement in the receiving country, and 
providing resettlement opportunities in third countries as appropriate’.415 Accordingly, the 
UNHCR has regarded resettlement416 as an expression of international solidarity and a 
solution to protracted refugee situations. Resettlement has, however, come under harsh 
criticism because it is generally seen as being used by countries that do not want to receive 
                                                          
413 1969 OAU Convention at Article II (4). 
414 P Schuck ‘Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal’ (1997) 1 Yale journal of international law at 272. 
415 Para IV (1) UNHCR Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx, Excom Conclusion 
no 22 (1981).  
416 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook (2011) op cit note 44 at page xi.  
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asylum seekers directly. According to Treoller, resettlement is used by States ‘as an alibi for 
protectionist migration policies and not for humanitarian or solidarity reasons’.417  
However, resettlement remains a useful tool for international solidarity and burden-
sharing.418 The US State Department has expressed its support for the resettlement of 
refugees in protracted refugee situations identified by the UNHCR and have resettled many 
refugees in protracted situations in the US.419 Whatever the underlying political reasons may 
have been, resettlement has been effectively used in the past to provide protection to large 
numbers of refugees in protracted refugee situations.420  
Another example of international solidarity was when the international community took 
action through the Comprehensive Plan of Action developed by the UNHCR to address the 
crises of the Vietnamese Boat. In 1979, during the Indo-Chinese conflict, some Southeast 
Asian States were reluctant to receive the ‘Vietnamese Boat Refugees’ and this caused 
humanitarian and political crises. Some Western States assumed responsibility to receive 
refugees from countries of first asylum, which made the Southeast Asian countries stop 
their pushbacks.421
 
Over one million refugees were resettled to Western States through this 
programme.422 The UNHCR has also devised several other comprehensive plans to assist 
                                                          
417 G Treoller ‘UNHCR Resettlement: Evolution and Future Direction’ (2002) 14 International Journal of 
Refugee law at 92. 
418 N Zucker ‘Refugee Resettlement in the United States: Policy and Problems’ (1983) 467 The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 172-186 
419 Protracted Refugee Situations - US Department of State, available at www.state.gov › ... › Policy Issues › 
Policy Issues, accessed on 22 October 2016.  
420 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook (2011) op cit note 44. 
421 A Hurwitz The Collective Responsibility Of States To Protect Refugees (2009) Oxford University Press: 
Oxford at 144-146 
422 A Betts ‘Comprehensive Plan of Action: Insights from CIREFCA and the Indochinese CPA’ (2006) Working 
Paper No 20 at 32. 
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refugees identified by them to be in a protracted situation. In 2008, the UNHCR, through its 
special initiative on protracted refugee situations, proposed that the UNHCR and States work 
together to resolve five situations where refugees had been living in exile for long periods of 
time, using a combination of solutions including resettlement. The five identified protracted 
situations were: Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran; Rohingya 
refugees (from Burma) in Bangladesh; Eritrean refugees in eastern Sudan; Croatian and 
Bosnian refugees in Serbia (Serbians who fled Croatia and Bosnia during the Yugoslav 
Wars); and Burundian refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania.423  
       The UNHCR has thus relied on burden-sharing and international solidarity in cases 
where the host was unable to naturalise refugees because it found it too burdensome.  
 
8. CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has shown that despite the fact that international refugee law and human rights 
treaties recognise a wide range of human rights that refugees have, refugees are unable to 
enjoy them because of their status. States need to do more than guarantee on paper refugee 
rights. Many practical problems prevent refugees from accessing their rights. Their status as 
the ‘other’ and their lack of belonging to a political community puts them at a disadvantage 
and accounts for the continuing discriminatory treatment against them. Refugee status has to 
end at some point in order for refugees to enjoy their dignity and all their rights. 
This chapter has shown that international law provides an adequate basis for saying that 
refugees are entitled to durable solutions that end their refugee status. Although voluntary 
repatriation is one such important solution, it is unavailable in some refugee situations for 
reasons such as the persistence of the reasons for flight and asylum in the home State. It has 




been shown that the UN Refugee Convention, the OAU Convention, and the Stateless 
Convention allow for the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees. These avenues could be 
used to protect refugees in protracted situations. However, assimilation or local integration 
has been interpreted narrowly by the UNHCR and as such does not include permanent 
residence. This chapter has argued that such a narrow conception of local integration cannot 
be regarded as a durable solution to refugees in protracted situations. 
Naturalisation, on the other hand, has the advantage of ending refugee status. While some 
States have entered reservations to the naturalisation provision, South Africa has not done so 
and is therefore bound to implement the obligations that flow from it. These include the 
obligation to facilitate naturalisation as far as possible and to reduce the costs and burden of 
naturalisation.   
The principle of international solidarity can play a role in finding solutions for refugees in 
protracted situations where assimilation and naturalisation have been deemed to be too 
onerous for States. The UNHCR together with States have made available solutions, such as 
resettlement to a third country and have successfully initiated comprehensive plans of action 
for refugees in protracted situation. It is incumbent on a state that claims that it cannot offer 
naturalisation to refugees in protracted situations to explore, through diplomatic channels, 
avenues for international cooperation to share the burden of responsibility to refugees in 
protracted situations. 
The next three chapters will critique South Africa’s law, practice and policy on refugees in 














































1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
Thus far this thesis has established that international refugee law acknowledges the 
temporariness of refugee status. Although not decisive, it also recognises that refugee status 
has to come to an end in the host State if return to the country of origin is not viable. The 
UNHCR sought to address this problem by adopting the 2009 Conclusion on Protracted 
Refugee Situations as discussed in a previous chapter.424  
       This chapter will trace the evolution of refugee law in South Africa by charting its 
progress from a narrow race-based origin to a new framework that places human rights at the 
centre. It will also provide a general overview of the legislative framework within which 
refugees in South Africa are given protection and care. In particular, it will address the 
question whether South African refugee law and policy contemplated the problem of a 
protracted refugee situation. It will also demonstrate that because of South Africa’s robust 
constitutional framework, its refugee law adopted an urban policy as opposed to a camp-
based one. The provisions of the Constitution, especially those on human dignity and 
equality, are analysed to establish a constitutional basis for durable solutions to refugees 
caught up in a protracted situation. This will be followed by an overview of the rights of 
refugees and jurisprudence thereon.  
                                                          




2. THE EVOLUTION OF REFUGEE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The history of refugee law and policy in South Africa spans across colonial, Apartheid and 
post-Apartheid eras. It shows that South African refugee law and policy have evolved from a 
preoccupation with race as its organising framework under colonialism and the Apartheid 
regime, to a framework that places human rights at the centre under the new Constitution.425 
 
2.2. Colonial and Apartheid Refugee Law and Policy 
 
The first refugees to arrive in Southern Africa in 1687 were the protestant French 
Huguenots,426 who fled from religious persecution in France. They came to Southern Africa 
from Holland as part of a colonial programme when South Africa was under Dutch colonial 
rule.427 After the formation of South Africa as a nation State in the Twentieth Century, the 
country provided sanctuary to many refugees from other regions and countries such as 
Eastern Europe, Rhodesia and Mozambique. These refugees were of European descent and 
race was the basis of their acceptance into South Africa.428 Both the French Huguenots four 
                                                          
425 S Peberdy Selecting Immigrants: National Identity and South Africa’s policies 1910 – 2008 Wits University 
Press: Johannesburg, chapter three. 
426 P Coertzen ‘The History of the Huguenots in South Africa’, available at 
ngtt.journals.ac.za/pub/article/download/5/4, accessed on the 25 March 2016. See also P Denis Memory and 
Identity: The Huguenots in France and the Atlantic Diaspora  (2003) University of South Carolina Press: 
Columbia at 286-291. 
427 Ibid. 
428 Peberdy op cit note 425. 
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centuries ago and refugees of European descent during Apartheid were immediately absorbed 
into South Africa as nationals.429 Crush points out that, ‘as soon as it was established that the 
refugee was readily assimilable with the European inhabitants of the Union (South Africa), 
meaning that they were white, their presence was embraced’.430 There were no prolonged 
periods of living as refugees in South Africa for such refugees. In most cases, the grant of a 
durable stay was immediate and their status was equivalent to that of a citizen.431  
Even though the UN Refugee Convention and the OAU Refugee Convention were already 
in operation, they had no impact on South Africa’s refugee law during Apartheid. Refugee 
admission remained race-based and the broad discretion accorded by law meant that the entry 
and settlement of desirables, like Europeans or Africans of European descent such as 
Rhodesians and Mozambicans, were granted full citizenship immediately.432 
       By contrast, South Africa ‘refused to acknowledge the presence of black refugees from 
these same countries who were refouled, repatriated or ignored and forced to live as 
undesirables on the margins of society’.433 Black Africans were only allowed into South 
Africa as migrant labourers who could be sent back when no longer needed.434 It was only in 
1991 that the Apartheid government enacted the Aliens Control Act,435 which empowered the 
                                                          
429 Ibid; J Crush ‘Immigration, Human rights and the Constitution’ in J Crush (ed) Beyond Control: Immigration 
and Human rights in a Democratic South Africa (1998) IDASA: Cape Town at 2. 
430 Ibid. 
431 Crush op cit note 429. 
432 Ibid at 487.  
433 C Murray ‘Mozambican Refugees: South Africa’s responsibility’ (1986) 2 South African Journal of Human 
Rights at 154. 
434 J Crush ‘A Historical Overview of Cross-Border Movement in South Africa’ in D A McDonald (ed) On 
Borders: Perspectives on International Migration in Southern Africa (2000) Southern Africa Migration Project: 
Ontario at 12-20. 
435 Act 96 of 1991. 
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Minister to issue temporary permits to ‘prohibited persons’.436 The Act was highly criticised 
for not being favourable enough to black refugees437 and it was only during the last days of 
Apartheid that a memorandum of understanding was signed with the UNHCR that the black 
refugees from Mozambique would be recognised as such, but only for the purpose of 
repatriation.438  
 
2.3. Post-Apartheid Refugee Law and Policy 
 
By 1994, South Africa decided to move away from the policy of exclusion to one of inclusion 
on the basis of its new constitutional values.439 South Africa not only ratified the international 
refugee law instruments, it also enacted refugee specific legislation. South Africa ratified the 
OAU Refugee Convention in 1995 and acceded to the UN Refugee Convention and its 
Protocol in 1996.  It is thus only in a post-Apartheid South Africa that refugees were accepted 
on the basis of human rights and international refugee law.  
                                                          
436 Ibid. Section 41(1) states: ‘The Minister may issue to a prohibited person a temporary permit on the 
prescribed form to enter and reside in the Republic for the purpose, and subject to the other conditions 
mentioned therein’. 
437 Peberdy op cit note 425; Crush op cit note 429. 
438 J Handmaker J & D Ndessomin ‘Solucão Durável? Implementing a Durable Solution for Angolan Refugees 
in South Africa’ in J Handmaker et al (eds) Advancing Refugee Protection in South Africa (2011) Berghahn 
Books: New York; T Polzer ‘Adapting To Changing Legal Frameworks: Mozambican Refugees in South 
Africa: An Historical Overview’ (2007) 19 International Journal of Refugee Law at 22-50; See also C Dolan 
‘Repatriation from South Africa to Mozambique: Undermining Durable Solutions?’ in R Black & K Koser (eds) 
The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction (1999) Berghahn Books: New 
York/Oxford. 
439 Handmaker & Ndessomin ibid. 
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These constitutional developments and ratifications significantly altered the basis of South 
African refugee law and policy. In 1997, the Green Paper on migration440 was produced, 
which conceptualised the draft refugee policy. According to Hathaway, South African 
refugee law is founded on four elements: temporary protection, protection of refugee rights, 
collective responsibility, and that it was solution-orientated.441 The Green Paper categorically 
stated that while South Africa, as a sovereign nation, had the right to decide who enters its 
territory, it would exercise this right in a manner that reflected the country’s commitment to 
human rights:  
 
As a sovereign state, South Africa reserves the right to determine who will be allowed entry to the 
country and under what conditions. The design and implementation of immigration policy must, 
however, be faithful to the new Constitution and Bill of Rights. It must also be consistent with our 
commitment to upholding universal human rights, administrative justice and certain basic rights 
for all the people who are affected by the South African state442 
 
The Green Paper led to the development of two White Papers, one for Refugee Law443 and 
one for Immigration Law.444 There was a general consensus that immigration and refugee 
issues should be dealt with separately.445  
                                                          
440 The Draft Green Paper on International Migration published in South African Government Gazette -  GN 849 
in GG 18033 of 30 May 1997. 
441 J Hathaway ‘Towards the Reformulation of International Refugee Law’ (1996) 15 Refuge 1.  
442 1997 Green Paper op cit note 440 at Section 1.1.3. 
443 Draft Refugee White Paper, Pretoria, Government Gazette No 18988, June 1998. 
444 White Paper on International Migration, Pretoria, Government Gazette No 19920, April 1999. 
445 J Klaaren et al ‘Talking a New Talk: A Legislative History of the Refugees Act of 1998’ in Handmaker et al 
op cit note 437 at 50-51. 
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     The Immigration White Paper,446 which resulted in the Immigration Act 13 of 2002, 
accepted the spirit of the Green Paper. Recognising the potential contribution of migrants, 
South Africa simultaneously adopted an affirmative action policy whereby employers were 
compelled to search for suitably qualified South Africans first and to invest in their training 
and development.447 While this policy is not directed at refugees it was inevitable that 
refugees would be affected by it.448 Similarly, the control-orientated aspect of the 
Immigration Act has had an impact on refugees. For example, international refugee law and 
domestic refugee law allow for the non-penalisation of the illegal entry of refugees, but the 
Immigration Act criminalises illegal entry. Perhaps most important for refugees is that a 
permanent residence application straddles both the Refugees Act and the Immigration Act, as 
will be the shown in chapter six. 
     The Refugee White Paper, in its introductory paragraph, sets out succinctly the intentions 
and obligations regarding South Africa’s refugee policy and legislation. It states:  
 
The government of South Africa is committed to the granting of asylum to refugees; to provide 
them protection and search for a solution in line with its obligations and responsibilities which it 
assumed under the international law, as well as by incorporating a number of basic principles and 
standards in the Constitution.449 
 
With the exception of the need for ‘collectivised protection’, the principles proposed in the 
Green Paper were incorporated in the White Paper. On the whole, the White Paper, on which 
                                                          
446 Immigration White Paper op cit note 444. 
447 V Williams ‘In Need of Protection: Good Policy versus Harsh Reality for Refugees in South Africa’ (2000)  
9 (3) Refugees, Conflict & Conflict Resolution. 
448 Williams op cit note 447.  
449 Draft Refugee White Paper op cit note 443 at Part 4. 
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Refugees Act 130 of 1998 was based, represents a significant departure from the past 




2.3.1 A Brief Overview of the Refugees Act 
South Africa enacted the Refugees Act450 in 1998. Whilst the implementation of the Refugees 
Act leaves much to be desired,451 substantively it is compatible with international refugee and 
human rights law.  
     Among other things, the Refugees Act sets out structures and mechanisms for 
administering status determination. These structures include Refugee Reception Offices,452 
which are staffed by reception officers453 and status determinations officers,454 as well as two 
oversight bodies – the Refugee Appeal Board455 and the Standing Committee of Refugee 
Affairs456 – to review and to hear appeals against decisions taken by the status determination 
officers.  
                                                          
450 Act 130 of 1998. 
451 I Palmary ‘Refugees, Safety and Xenophobia in South African Cities: The Role of Local Government.’, 
available at http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papalm4.htm, accessed 1 March 2016; See also C Kavuro 
‘Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Barriers to Accessing South Africa's Labour Market’ (2015) 19 Law, 
Democracy and Development  at 232 – 260.    
452 Refugees Act at section 8. 
453 Ibid at section 8 (2). 
454 Ibid. 
455 Ibid at section 12 (1). 
456 Ibid at section 9 (1). 
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     The Refugees Act also offers a generous range of rights and entitlements to refugees.  It 
defines the refugee in terms similar to the UN Refugee Convention as well as the OAU 
Refugee Convention.457 It expressly states that all rights in the Bill of Rights of the South 
African Constitution apply to refugees.458  
                                                          
457 Refugees Act at section 3 provides: Subject to Chapter 3, a person qualifies for refugee status for the   
purposes of this Act if 20 that person - 
(a) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his or her race, tribe, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of his or 
her nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or, 
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her former habitual residence is unable or, 
owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it; or 
(b) owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing or 
disrupting public order in either a part or the whole of his or her country of origin or nationality, is 
compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge elsewhere; or 
(c) is a dependant of a person contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b).  
458 Ibid. Section 27 states: 
27. Protection and general rights of refugees 
A refugee - 
(a) is entitled to a formal written recognition of refugee status in the prescribed form; 
(b) enjoys full legal protection, which includes the rights set out in Chapter 2 of the Constitution and 
the right to remain in the Republic in accordance with the provisions of this Act; 
(c) is entitled to apply for an immigration permit in terms of the Aliens Control Act, 1991, after five 
years' continuous residence in the Republic from the date on which he or she was granted asylum, if the 
Standing Committee certifies that he or she will remain a refugee indefinitely; 
(d) is entitled to an identity document referred to in section 30; 
(e) is entitled to a South African travel document on application as contemplated in section 31; 
(f) is entitled to seek employment; and 
(g) is entitled to the same basic health services and basic primary education which the inhabitants of the 
Republic receive from time to time. 
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     Like the UN Refugee Convention and the OAU Refugee Convention, the Act has 
provisions on cessation of refugee status459 and recognises the principle of non-
refoulement.460 Significantly, the Act provides for possibilities for ending refugee status after 
a period of continuous stay.461  These possibilities are the subject of critical discussion in 
chapters five and six of the thesis.    
       The major shift in refugee law and policy from Apartheid to democracy can be 
summarised as follows. South Africa has moved from the ad hoc approach during Apartheid, 
which allowed abuse by the executive and administrative officials462 and excluded black 
refugees. The previous policy used the doctrine of sovereignty to regard citizenship as a 
prerogative of the State such that the State could choose without censure to whom it granted 
refugee status and citizenship. Now, this right has to be counterbalanced by the country’s 
commitment to human rights.  
  
2.3.2. Protracted Refugee Situation in Current Refugee Legislation 
 
As is evident from the previous discussions on the temporary nature of refugeehood in 
chapter two, one way of establishing whether legislators and policy-makers were mindful of 
protracted refugee situations is to establish whether they considered the fact that refugeehood 
was a temporary phenomenon.  
                                                          
459 Ibid. Section 5 of the Act provides for the  Cessation of refugee status 
460 Refugees Act at section 2 provides for the general prohibition of refusal of entry, expulsion, extradition or 
return to other country in certain circumstances. 
461 Refugees Act at section 27(c). 
462 Crush op cit note 429. 
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     Initially, South Africa sought to highlight the action of refugee protection as a temporary 
one. The Green Paper on migration said: ‘The objective of the model is to provide temporary 
protection to persons whose basic human rights are at risk in their country of origin, until 
such time as they are able to return home in safety’.463 The UNHCR raised an objection to the 
use of the phrase ‘temporary protection’, arguing that refugee protection should be granted 
for ‘as long as it is needed’.464 According to the UNHCR, the term ‘temporary protection’ did 
not imply protection for the entire duration that it was needed, but rather for a short while 
only. The UNHCR justified its criticism of ‘temporary protection’, because the UNHCR only 
invokes cessation (that is the termination of refugee status) when protection is no longer 
necessary, not simply after a brief period of protection. 
     In defence of the South African Green Paper, Hathaway, who was one of the drafters of 
the Paper, responded that ‘temporary protection’ was consistent with the idea that refugee 
protection must be provided for as long as such protection is needed.465 It is clear from South 
African refugee policy that South Africa did not intend to withdraw protection ‘whilst 
needed’ and that the term ‘temporary protection’ was not intended to be protection for a brief 
period. However, the UNHCR’s criticism remains valid if one considers the question of 
protracted refugee situations. South Africa, in its formulation of temporary protection, did not 
explicitly state that it recognised the temporary nature of refugeehood, something the 
UNHCR professes too. South Africa missed the opportunity to directly address the issue of 
protracted refugee situations, and the consequences thereof by not stating it boldly, thus 
allowing for a misconception to occur. At the time the South African Green Paper was being 
                                                          
463 1997 Green Paper at section 4.2.2. 
464 J Hathaway ‘Temporary Protection of Refugees: Threat or Solution’ in J Handmaker (2001) Perspective on 
Refugee Protection in South Africa Lawyers for Human Rights: South Africa. 
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drafted, there were already known protracted situations in the world. The threat of long-term 
refugees becoming de facto stateless refugees also existed. These issues were not addressed 
in the Green Paper. It can, therefore, be said that the drafters of the Green Paper on 
immigration did not link the concept of temporary protection to the problem of protracted 
refugee situations.  
     Nevertheless, the intended temporary nature of refugeehood is evident in South African 
refugee policy, because the temporary protection offered is strongly linked to the concept of 
durable solutions.466 The Green Paper also stated that absorption into the South African 
community should only be considered as an option if voluntary repatriation is not possible, 
but it did recognise that there will be some refugees who should be diverted from the usual 
system of protection and be admitted as permanent residents immediately. It identified 
unaccompanied minors and those traumatised by torture as examples of such refugees.467 
Furthermore, the Green Paper also acknowledged the temporary nature of refugeehood by 
considering permanent residence after a five year period of continuous stay for those unable 
to return to the country of origin. A five year maximum duration was considered to be a fair 
balance between the need to ensure a temporary protection and the need for stability and 
security.468 
                                                          
466 1997 Green Paper at section 4.6.1 ‘Because we believe that a continuing commitment to refugee protection 
will only be possible if it is solution-oriented, temporary protection must be delivered in a way that is dedicated 
to preparing refugees for a successful return, when and if conditions allow.’ 
467 C Eyber & J Hathaway ‘Refugee Protection in South Africa: A Conversation’, available at 
www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/migrationdocuments/interviews/inter1.htm accessed 5 December 2016.  
468 1997 Green paper at s 4.6.7 provides ‘More generally, the duration of temporary protection must be 
constrained to what is reasonable to advance a programme of solution-oriented protection. An outside limit to 
temporary protection should be clearly established in recognition of the psychosocial need of refugees 
ultimately to have access to enduring stability and security. Particularly where temporary protection is delivered 
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     For its part, the White Paper embraced the temporary nature of refugeehood469 although it 
does not use the term ‘temporary protection’.  The White Paper provides that refugees may 
apply for naturalisation after a period of five years of being recognised as a refugee in South 
Africa.470 No further requirements are need. The White Paper does not also expect refugees to 
apply for permanent residence first before naturalisation.  
     However, the White Paper makes no direct mention of voluntary repatriation as a durable 
solution. It only recognises cessation and naturalisation as an end to refugeehood. It therefore 
can be seen as a strong statement of acceptance that refugee status cannot continue into 
perpetuity, despite the fact that it does not expressly state that naturalisation is meant to 
prevent a protracted refugee situation. 
       The Refugees Act, which followed the White Paper, recognises a legal pathway to 
ending refugee status in South Africa, but is not as generous in extending naturalisation to 
refugees as the White Paper. The Act is nevertheless considered progressive, not least 
because of its adoption of the UN Refugee Convention’s Article 34. The Act has embraced 
the concepts of ‘assimilation and naturalisation’ as found in the UN Refugee Convention by 
providing a clear legal pathway to ending refugee status. Thus, where return was not possible 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in the rights-regarding and solution-oriented manner proposed here, the evidence of repatriation practice to-date 
in other countries suggests that a five-year maximum duration would strike a fair balance between the need to 
ensure the ability to temporary protection to allow for the regeneration of a substantial part of asylum capacity, 
without exposing refugees to psychosocial risk. Refugees should benefit from a firm guarantee to make 
permanent residence available at the end of the temporary protection period.’ 
469 Draft White Paper op cit note 443. 
470 Ibid at section 4.8.3. 
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after five years of continuous stay as a recognised refugee, the refugee can apply for 
permanent residence.471          
     Unlike the White Paper, the Refugees Act adopted the bifurcated approach whereby 
permanent residence precedes naturalisation. This has complicated access to naturalisation 
because a further requirement was introduced by the Refugees Act which states that refugees 
must prove that they will remain refugees ‘indefinitely’. This requirement must be met before 
refugees can apply for permanent residence. This cumbersome administrative process will be 
discussed in chapter six. 
The inclusion of permanent residence is linked to the durable solution of repatriation. Only 
those refugees who are unable to prove that they are unable to return to the country will be 
eligible to apply for permanent residence. The notion of temporary protection is also linked to 
immigration status and it was envisaged in such a way that such temporary protection should 
not be a ‘back door to permanent immigration’.472 This policy standpoint suggests 
transforming refugee status into durable immigration status might not be as straightforward as 
the law seems to suggest on the face of it.  
    
2.3.3. The Issue of a Protracted Refugee Situation in the 2016 Green Paper 
 
A new Green Paper was published in 2016 which speaks directly to the issue of a protracted 
refugee situation.473 The Paper reiterates that South Africa has a sovereign right to manage its 
                                                          
471 Chapter five will provide a detailed analysis of both the pathway and processes involved in permanent 
residence.   
472 1997 Green paper on migration at s 5.3.2.   




international migration in its national interests and notes that the national interest is to be 
defined in line with the country’s constitutional values, human rights, national security and 
peace, stability and developmental aspirations.474 It is therefore not surprising that the Paper 
once again affirms the urban policy its refugees. It justifies this policy thus: ‘The current 
policy of non-encampment should continue as permanent camps in our context would create 
serious logistical, security and humanitarian problems. It is far better to integrate those given 
refugee status’.475 South Africa thus remains committed to an urban refugee policy.476  
According to the 2016 Green Paper, South Africa’s inability to cater for indigent asylum 
seekers is a gap in its policy for refugees. Nevertheless, the Paper maintains that the urban 
policy where refugees take care of themselves is the better option for South Africa. 
Consequently, while the 2016 Green Paper does not advocate for the withdrawal of socio-
economic rights for refugees, it makes a strong statement that temporary asylum seekers 
should be denied the right to work and that their movement should be restricted until their 
refugee claims have been processed. 
     It is, however, with regard to the permanent integration of refugees that the 2016 Green 
Paper will have more devastating consequences for long-staying refugees, if is enacted into 
law. One of its major aims is to block the refugees’ pathway to permanent residence. The 
2016 Green Paper views the current approach to the granting of residency or naturalisation as 
being ‘mechanical and compliance-based’, rather than being tailored to achieving strategic 
goals such as nation building. It states that: ‘it is a misconception that immigrants have a 
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475 Ibid at page 67. 
476 Ibid at page 67. 
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constitutional right to progress toward residency or citizenship status. A sovereign state has 
the prerogative to determine who enters its territory and to enact laws accordingly’.477     
Not only is the 2016 Green Paper completely silent on protracted refugee situations, it also 
categorically states that it does not see why South Africa has to convert refugee status into 
permanent residence. It links durable solutions to the temporary protection of refugees and 
only whilst conditions in the country of origin do not allow return. It states:  
 
Refugees are allowed to apply for permanent residence even though their status is inherently 
temporary. This is because refugees are expected to return to their country of origin once 
conditions there allow them to return safely. This should not be regarded as automatic but linked to 
finding durable solutions in the event of conditions changing, such as developments in the country 
of origin of the refugee.478  
 
It proposes as an intervention that ‘refugees should not be allowed to apply for permanent 
residence on the grounds of the number of years spent in the country’.479 This will clearly be 
disastrous for refugees who cannot return to their country of origin. Once again, the criticism 
remains: South Africa has not considered the problem of refugees in a protracted refugee 
situation in. In fact, this new approach will compound this problem.  
    As South Africa has not filed any reservations to the UN Refugee Convention, it is bound 
to respect Article 34 of this treaty and thus not to block the pathway to naturalization. Failure 
to do so means that South Africa is violating its obligations in international law.   
  
3.   SOUTH AFRICA’S ADOPTION OF AN URBAN REFUGEE POLICY 
                                                          
477 2016 Green Paper op cit note 473 at page 39. 
478 Ibid at page 40. 




The previous chapter has shown that the UN Refugee Convention recognises a wide range of 
rights that ought to be sufficient for the safety and protection of refugees and for them to live 
a meaningful life in the host State. Similarly, South Africa’s laws, as has been shown above 
recognise a wide range of rights for refugees. The UNHCR has nevertheless introduced the 
concept of an urban policy for refugees 480 when it realised that the rights on paper were not 
sufficient for the meaningful integration of refugees in urban areas.481 The Urban Policy 
became necessary since neither the restriction on freedom of movement nor the lack of 
resources failed to stem the urbanisation of refugees.482 The objective of the UNHCR’s Urban 
Policy is two-fold: to promote the self-reliance of refugees, and avoid their dependency on 
the UNHCR for assistance.483 The Policy affirms that ‘the overriding priority remains to 
ensure protection and, in particular, non-refoulement and treatment in accordance with 
recognised basic human standards’.484  
       The Urban Policy, as envisaged by the UNHCR, allows for the enjoyment of a range of 
rights. It is viewed as a counterweight to the confinement of refugees in camps. It considers 
                                                          
480 UNHCR ‘UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas’ (2009), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ab8e7f72.html, accessed 25 July 2016. 
481 L Landau ‘Protection and Dignity in Johannesburg: Shortcomings of South Africa's Urban Refugee Policy’ 
(2006) 19 Journal of Refugee Studies at 308–327; See also J Crisp J Janz J Riera & S Samy Surviving in the 
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urban areas and cities in particular to be legitimate places for refugees to enjoy their rights, 
including those stemming from their status as refugees as well as those that they hold in 
common with other human beings.485 The Urban Policy therefore sets out to ‘expand the 
protection space’ for refugees.486 Its aim is to facilitate the enjoyment of the rights by 
refugees and their integration in their local communities.487 
It is evident that the refugee camp situation cannot be justified and various scholars have 
confirmed this. Agamben, for example, has identified the camp as the pure space of 
exception. For him, the camp represents a place where the exception becomes the rule. The 
‘bare life’ of the individual in the camp is revealed as ‘subjected to the raw power of the State 
to ignore, deny and exclude’.488 Refugee camps in which refugees are housed have been 
likened to ‘concentration camps’.489 They breach human rights laws and treaties on multiple 
fronts.490 
The UNHCR, by means of its Urban Policy, encourages host governments to accede to 
and respect the international refugee law and human rights instruments and to adopt and 
implement appropriate domestic legislation.491 The Policy also strives to ensure that refugees 
have access to justice systems, are treated as equals before the law, and are not subjected to 
                                                          
485 Ibid. 
486 Ibid at paras 14-22. 
487 O Naoko & J Crisp ‘Evaluation of the Implementation of UNHCR's Policy on Refugees in Urban Areas.’ 
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any form of discrimination by law enforcement agencies and other representatives of the 
State.492 Most importantly, the Urban Policy recommends that host governments play a major 
role in the integration of refugees; they are expected to provide reception facilities and 
undertake registration of refugees and ensure that they are documented.493 Not only must the 
host government determine the status of refugees, it must also reach out to the refugee 
community and foster constructive relations between refugees and citizens;494 ensure the 
security of refugees and promote livelihoods and self-reliance;495 ensure access to healthcare, 
education and other services; and allow for the freedom of movement of refugees.496 The 
main strong points of the Urban Policy is its focus on urging host governments to foster 
constructive relations between refugees and citizens, and on ensuring respect for the rights of 
refugees guaranteed by the UN Refugee Convention.   
South Africa has ratified the international refugee law and human rights instruments and 
has adopted and implemented appropriate domestic refugee legislation. In addition, its 
constitutional rights also apply to all those physically present in the country, including 
refugees.497 The constitutional framework of South Africa as well as its adoption of human 
rights laws cannot therefore validate the ‘bare life’ as identified by Agamben in the refugee 
camps.  
South Africa has already distinguished itself as one of few African countries to allow 
refugees to self-settle in urban areas.498 The Urban Policy is, therefore, inherent in South 
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African law and the government plays a significant role in protecting refugees and finding 
durable solutions for them, as opposed to the practice in countries which have refugee camps 
where the UNHCR is largely in control of the running of the camps and is responsible for 
finding durable solutions.  
South African refugee legislation makes provision for all the necessary elements for the 
successful local integration of refugees. Refugees are entitled to documentation that allows 
them to legally sojourn in South Africa and the government is empowered to determine who 
is and who is not a refugee in South Africa.499 The legislation also guarantees various socio-
economic rights which ought to allow refugees to integrate into South African society.500 
While it recognises the rights of the individual refugees, it does not provide for group 
determinations, except in cases of emergency. The policy adopted by South Africa is 
therefore in line with its constitutional commitments to human rights and dignity, and with 
the UNHCR’s Urban Policy. As stated above, South Africa has enacted a refugee policy 
intended to ‘maximize freedom and protection by promoting refugees’ temporary integration 
into local communities’.501 
However, the presence of refugees in urban areas raises significant protection concerns 
that ought to be remedied with the progressive realisation of their rights in South Africa. In a 
study done exploring the experiences of a selected group of refugees and asylum seekers in 
Johannesburg, Landau argues that South Africa ‘lacks institutional prerequisites for 
translating refugees’ legal rights into true entitlements and that the shortcoming is 
exacerbated by the economic migrants using the asylum system’. He states that: 
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Despite its intention to protect the welfare and dignity of those seeking refuge in South Africa, 
South African refugee policy reflects almost no State obligations for providing specialized 
assistance, even for unaccompanied children and the disabled. Rather, its explicit obligations are 
limited to bureaucratic processes intended to facilitate access and integration. Moreover, while the 
Constitution guarantees that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it’, the Refugees Act makes 
no specific provision for a durable solution within South Africa and the Government has 
consistently resisted efforts to allow naturalization for refugees who have remained in the country 
for extended periods.502 
 
According to Landau, it has become obvious that South Africa is struggling to fairly 
implement its progressive refugee laws as laid out in the Refugees Act.  
As far back as the drafting of the 1997 Green Paper, Hathaway cautioned South Africa 
that the traditional means of implementing refugee law serves ‘fewer and fewer people, less 
and less well’. He identified two problems: the first being individuated State responsibility 
and the second being a lack of durable solutions.503 It is evident that fewer and fewer refugees 
are being assisted and that the assistance provided to the few is diminishing as well. In 
addition to Hathaway’s grim forecast, various other factors have come to light, such as bad 
faith operations on the part of government, the many fraudulent asylum applications and poor 
implementation of the asylum system.504 Others have cited the following reasons for this: 
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administrative bungling,505 lack of political will to assist refugees,506 corrupt government 
officials,507 xenophobia508 and even disregard for the rule of law.509 In Kiliko, the court had to 
issue a structural interdict to force government to meet its responsibility.510 It is evident that 
20 years of the Refugee Act, which has been hailed as a very progressive legislation, refugees 
still struggle to integrate.   
Landau has rightly argued that South Africa’s urban policy requires more than the 
mechanical application and extension of rights to urban refugees. The South African 
government must play a greater role in the integration of refugees. Because the Bill of Rights 
has a direct bearing on all persons present in South Africa, it is expected that the values of the 
constitution, such as Ubuntu, will assist the refugee integrate in a meaningful way into South 
African society. This chapter will therefore continue by discussing South Africa’s 
constitutional obligations to refugees and the jurisprudence of South Africa’s Courts thereon, 
the aim being to find out whether such jurisprudence can benefit refugees in protracted 
situation in South Africa.    
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4. SOUTH AFRICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
 
4.1. The Bill of Rights and Non-Citizens 
 
As noted earlier, South Africa adopted its final Constitution in 1996. At its core, the 
Constitution seeks to remedy South Africa’s isolation and previous disregard of human rights 
by bringing its laws into harmony with international human rights standards. Section 9 of the 
Constitution thus obligates the courts, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, to ‘promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom’,511 and to consider international law. Furthermore, section 233 of the Constitution 
requires courts, when interpreting legislation, to ‘prefer any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law’.512    
     The South African Bill of Rights has been lauded for recognising a wide range of rights 
encompassing both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. For 
example, it guarantees the right to freedom and security of person,513 the right not to be 
subjected to slavery or forced labour,514 the right to freedom of conscience and religion,515 
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513 Ibid at section 12. 
514 Ibid at section 13.  
515 Ibid at section 15.  
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freedom of movement,516 and the right to fair labour practices.517 Among the socio-economic 
rights, the Bill of Rights enshrines the right to have access to adequate housing, and the right 
to have access to health care, food, water and social security, including appropriate social 
assistance.518 With regard to these socio-economic rights, the government has a duty to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of each right.519 The right to emergency medical treatment, unlike 
these socio-economic rights, is not framed with the qualifications related to availability of 
resources, progressive realisation and reasonable measures.520  
 In addition to the rights of adults, the Constitution recognises specific rights for children. 
These include the right of ‘every child’ to a name and nationality, to family care or 
appropriate alternative care, to ‘basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social 
services’, to be ‘protected from maltreatment, neglect or abuse’, ‘not to be detained except as 
a measure of last resort’, and to be ‘protected in times of armed conflict’.521  
It is noteworthy that the Bill of Rights uses the term ‘everyone’ when defining general 
constitutional rights and ‘every child’ when defining the special or specific rights of children. 
Both these terms can be interpreted to refer to refugees, adults, and children respectively.  
The rights that do not extend to refugees or non-citizens are specifically identified by the Bill 
of Rights. For example, section 20 provides that ‘[n]o citizen may be deprived of 
citizenship’.522 Section 22523 provides that every citizen has a right to choose a trade, 
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occupation and profession. Apart from these few exceptions, the rest of the rights in the Bill 
of Rights apply to non-citizens, including refugees.  The extensive protection given to human 
rights means that the South African Constitution has a framework for a rights-based approach 
to refugee protection. In the next section, this chapter lays emphasis on the rights to human 
dignity and equality as fundamental building blocks of an effective refuge protection regime, 
especially in a protracted situation.  
  
4.2. The Rights to Equality, Non-Discrimination and Human Dignity 
 
With the advent of the constitutional era in South Africa and the fact that the foundation of 
South African refugee law is respect for the universality of human rights, there has been a 
realistic expectation that refugees will live with dignity in South Africa. As demonstrated 
above, the acceptance of the Urban Policy, as opposed to the warehousing of refugees in 
refugee camps and detention centres clearly developed out of respect for human rights. 
However, respect for human rights does not necessarily mean that the right to dignity extends 
equally to everyone or that discrimination is not practised. As argued in the previous chapter, 
refugees cannot fully live in dignity unless the ‘notion of citizenship’524 is extended to them. 
The right to non-discrimination is crucial to refugees. Hathaway claims that ‘a guarantee 
of non-discrimination might in fact be virtually the only legal guarantee that many refugees 
require because ‘any unequal treatment must be properly justified according to consistently 
applied and acceptable criteria’.525 The right to equality and human dignity are well 
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entrenched in international law.526 As a result, the protection of human rights does not depend 
on one’s affinity to a State via nationality or citizenship. As the Human Rights Committee 
has said, ‘[t]he enjoyment of the Covenant Rights is not limited to citizens of States parties, 
but must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as 
asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may find themselves in the 
territory or subject to jurisdiction of the State Party’.527 
 In South Africa, the right to equality and the right to human dignity are recognised as 
independent rights and as fundamental constitutional values.  For example, section 1(a) and 
(b) of the Constitution provides that the Republic of South Africa is founded on ‘human 
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), opened for signature 18 December 
1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981); International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, opened for signature 18 December 1990, 2220 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 July 2003); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for 
signature 13 December 2006 (entered into force 3 May 2008). 
527 General Comment No 31 UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add13[10], referring to General Comment No 15,UN 
Doc HRI/GEN/1 Rev. 
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dignity’, ‘the achievement of equality’, ‘non-racialism’ and ‘non-sexism’.528 Furthermore, 
section 7(1) recognises equality as a democratic value. The right to equality is protected in 
section 9 as having several elements: the right to equality before the law, the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law, the right to full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms, and the right not to be discriminated against unfairly. Section 10 provides that 
‘[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected’. 
In South Africa, human dignity is intimately connected with the idea of rights – whether 
with the ground of rights, the content of certain rights or the form and structure of rights.529 
This thesis endorses the concept that dignity is not only a moral concept: it is, moreover, a 
juridical concept.530 In the same way that the preamble to the ICCPR asserts that the rights 
contained in the Covenant ‘derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’,531 the 
South African Bill of Rights does too.532 However, that does not necessarily mean that it must 
be treated as a moral idea only because a deeper understanding of the human being is 
expected.533  
  Even though South African Constitutional law operates from the premise that dignity is 
‘inherent in every human being’ and that we should strive to uphold everyone’s dignity, the 
right to dignity is yet to be fully defined.534 Some scholars claim that ‘its intrinsic meaning 
                                                          
528 Constitution op cit note 511. 
529 Waldron op cit note 524. 
530 De Waal & Currie op cit note 65 at 251. 
531 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) at the preamble. 
532 Constitution op cit note 511 at preamble. 
533 De Waal & Currie op cit note 65 at 135 on the method of interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
534 A Chaskalson ‘The Third Bram Fischer Lecture-Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of Our 
Constitutional Order’ (2000) 16 South African Journal on Human Rights  at 193. 
135 
 
has been left to intuitive understanding’.535 Christopher McCrudden, one of the leading 
proponents of this school of thought, dismisses the use of dignity in human rights 
jurisprudence, arguing that the concept houses too many intractable political debates.536 After 
a wide investigation into the concept’s juridical use, McCrudden concludes that ‘there are no 
coherent national interpretations of the concept of human dignity, let alone a transnational 
one’.537 
In contrast to this approach, other scholars have argued that dignity considerations reflect 
the Kantian moral imperatives. Proponents of this approach often turn to Kant’s Groundwork 
to the Metaphysics of Morals,538 where Kant argues that human beings should be treated as 
ends not means.539  
                                                          
535 O Schachter ‘Human dignity as a Normative Concept’ (1983) American Journal Of International Law at 849. 
‘We do not find an explicit definition of the expression of dignity of the human person in international 
instruments or in national laws. Its intrinsic meaning has been left to intuitive understanding, conditioned in 
large measure by cultural factors’. See also S Pinker ‘The Stupidity of Dignity’ Richard Dawkins Institute for 
Reason and Science (Sunday 1 May 2008). Additionally, the Supreme Court of Canada citing the work of J Fyfe 
‘Dignity as Theory: Competing Conceptions of Human Dignity at the Supreme Court of Canada’ (2007) 70 
Saskatchewan Law Review signaled that it would consider abandoning the concept of human dignity altogether. 
More specifically, at para 22 of R v Kapp [2008] 2 SCR 483, 2008 SCC 41 the Supreme Court of Canada states: 
‘human dignity is an abstract and subjective notion that, even with the guidance of the four contextual factors, 
cannot only become confusing and difficult to apply; it has also proven to be an additional burden on equality 
claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement it was intended to be.’ 
536 C McCrudden ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of 
International Law 655 at 656.  
537 Ibid. 
538 Kant op cit note 261 at 84–85. 
539 De Waal & Currie op cit note 65 at 251.   
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Over the past few years, a third approach seeking to re-establish the connection between 
dignity and rank in legal theory has emerged. Jeremy Waldron, the leading proponent of this 
view, suggests that the judicial concept of human dignity affords an equal and high-ranking 
status to all human beings.540 Waldron maintains that the universality of the human rights 
approach currently in place means we have ‘adopted the idea of a single status system, 
evolving a more or less universal status, a more or less universal legal dignity that entitles 
everyone to something like the treatment before the law that was previously confined to high-
status individuals’.541 Furthermore, according to Waldron, Kant’s use of dignity is 
complicated, Kant does use the term in ways that line up more closely to the traditional 
connotations of nobility, such as that ‘no human being can be without a dignity because he at 
least has the dignity of a citizen’.542 Waldron states that this statement of Kant associates 
dignity with rank. This ranking, he states, is however analogous to the well-known modern 
day conception of equal rights which has no rank or caste or class on the face of it.543 This 
idea of human dignity, of according this high ranking status to everyone,544 is what Waldron 
endorses.  
 
4.3. The South African Courts Interpretation of the Right to Dignity and 
Equality  
 
                                                          
540 Waldron op cit note 524 at 233. 
541 Waldron op cit note 524 at 241. 
542 Kant op cit note 261 at 84–85. 
543 Waldron op cit note 524. 
544 Ibid at 200. 
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The South African Constitution is generally considered to be based on the Kantian approach 
and suggests that dignity is the ground of rights.545 In S v Dodo, Ackerman J of the South 
African Constitutional Court traced the origins of the concept of dignity to Kantian moral 
philosophy, where human dignity is considered to be what gives a person his or her intrinsic 
worth, and said: ‘Human beings are not commodities to which a price can be attached; they 
are creatures with inherent worth and infinite worth; they ought to be treated as ends in 
themselves, never merely as means to an end.’546  In Makwanyane, O’Regan J said that 
‘recognising the right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human 
beings’, and that ‘all human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and 
concern’.547 Chaskalson has made similar remarks.548  
      Whilst recognising the right to dignity as a foundational value, the South African 
Constitutional Court has not ventured a definition of dignity.549 In Le Roux v Dey,550 it said 
that human dignity has a wide meaning which covers a number of different values. The 
Constitutional Court has on several occasions linked the right to dignity and the equality and 
held that human dignity can serve as the overall goal of all rights. Although the Constitution 
seemingly places human dignity on par with equality, human dignity is more foundational 
than the right to equality and non-discrimination. Thus, the Constitutional Court has held that 
                                                          
545 De Waal & Currie op cit note 65. 
546 Ackerman J in S v Dodo – 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) at para 38 stated that ‘Human beings are not commodities 
to which a price can be attached; they are creatures with inherent worth and infinite worth; they ought to be 
treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means to an end.’  
547 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 144. 
548 Chaskalson op cit note 534 at 196. 
549 De Waal & Currie op cit note 65 at 251. 
550 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) at para 138. 
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unfair discrimination constitutes an assault on the dignity of the person.551 In President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Hugo,552 the Constitutional Court said that ‘the purpose of South 
Africa’s new Constitution and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all 
human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of 
particular groups’ and that this ‘dignitarian concept lay at the heart of the prohibition of 
unfair discrimination’.553 The Constitutional Court also stated in Minister of Finance v Van 
Heerden554 that equality in the Constitution does not tolerate distinctions that treat other 
people as ‘second-class citizens’, thereby emphasising the point that dignity and equality are 
interdependent.555 In Mohamed v the President of SA,556 the Constitutional Court referred to 
the universal applicability of the Bill of Rights as the basis for every person’s dignity.  
     If the right to dignity as a foundational right in South Africa acknowledges or starts from 
the premise that ‘all human beings have equal intrinsic worth’557 then it ought to have no 
problem recognising the common humanity of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa. 
Even though refugee law in South Africa is rights-based and refugees ought to be able to 
enjoy these rights, refugees are finding it difficult to access these supposedly universally 
applicable rights.  
                                                          
551 Ibid. 
552 1997 (6) BCLR 708. 
553 Hugo supra note 552 at para 41. 
554 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC). 
555 Ibid. The link between anti-discrimination and dignity is also apparent from Canadian jurisprudence where 
the court held that the purpose of the anti-discrimination provisions of the Charter was to prevent the violation 
of the essential human dignity. The Canadian Court held that ‘dignity infuses all elements of the of the 
discrimination analysis’; See Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 1999 (1) SCR 497. 
556 Mohamed and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2001(3) SA 893 (CC). 




5. THE RIGHTS TO DIGNITY AND EQUALITY FOR REFUGEES AND 
SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS’ INTERPRETATION  
  
The previous chapter has revealed how citizenship works as an us v them concept, and that 
membership to a political community is crucial to the enjoyment of human rights.558 
However, bearing in mind the acceptance of the concept of universality of human rights in 
the South African Constitution and in international human rights instruments, this section will 
analyse the manner in which the South African Courts have applied the rights to dignity and 
equality to refugees and other migrants (non-citizens).  
 
5.1. By Limiting the Sovereignty of the State  
 
Watchenuka559 is considered seminal with regard to the interpretation of the right to dignity 
of non-citizens. In this case, the Supreme Court of Appeal boldly stated that ‘human dignity 
has no nationality’ and that the right to dignity can be used to prevent the ‘humiliation and 
degradation’ of any person even if it limits the sovereignty of the State.560           
     Mrs Watchenuka and her disabled son fled Zimbabwe and sought asylum in South Africa. 
She soon found herself destitute when faced with no social assistance from the government 
because of her temporary asylum seeker status and inability to access employment because of 
a general prohibition on the right to work and study for asylum seekers.  
     Faced with the decision whether to grant asylum seekers the right to work and study, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal recognised the power of the State to differentiate between citizens 
                                                          
558 See chapter three. 
559 Watchenuka supra note 67. 
560 Ibid at para 25. 
140 
 
and non-citizens and to decide whom to admit on its territory and on what terms. The Court 
quoted from an old American judgment561 in which it was stated:  
 
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent 
in sovereignty, and essential in self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its 
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to 
prescribe.’562  
 
This international maxim cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Appeal has since 
been qualified considerably by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),563 the 
UN Refugee Convention, the OAU Convention, and the South African Constitution itself, all 
of which impose an obligation on the government to provide protection to refugees.564 The 
State’s sovereign authority to determine the entry and exit of refugees presented itself at the 
drafting of the UDHR. By recognising the ‘right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution’,565 States were obligated to allow entry to refugees even as they retained 
                                                          
561 Nishimura Ekiu v United States 142 US 651 (12 SCt 336, 35 LEd 1146), 18 January 1892. 
562 The same dictum was referred to approvingly by the Constitutional Court in Chairperson of the National 
assembly, Ex Parte: In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) paras 21-31 within the context of the challenge to section 22 of the amended 
constitutional text, which restricts the right to freedom of trade, occupation or profession to citizens. See Also 
the Union of Refugee women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 SA 395 (CC) at 
para 46. 
563 GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).. 
564 See part 4 of this chapter for a discussion of the Bill of Rights; see also chapter three of this thesis for a 
detailed discussion of the international law instruments protecting these rights. 
565 Article 14 of the UDHR states: 
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. 
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their right to control their borders and regulate immigration. This right of States to control 
their borders was also encroached upon by the international obligation to refrain from the 
forcible return of asylum seekers to a country of persecution and the right to ensure that 
refugees ‘enjoy’ asylum.    
     In Watchenuka, the Court stated that the context within which State sovereignty was 
phrased can be distinguished from situations where the dignity of a person is impacted upon. 
The Court thus recognised the foundational nature of the right to dignity and used it to limit 
the right to sovereignty. It demonstrated that the right to dignity, which is boldly declared in 
international treaties and the South African Constitution, can be relied upon to challenge 
notions of sovereignty to protect non-nationals, in this case, asylum seekers, from 
‘humiliation and degradation’.566 The Court found that a person who exercises his or her right 
to apply for asylum in South Africa and is destitute ‘will have no alternative but to turn to 
crime, or to begging or foraging’. In such cases, the Court held, ‘the deprivation of the 
freedom to work assumes a different dimension when it threatens positively to degrade rather 
than merely inhibit the realisation of the potential for self-fulfillment’.567 
     Furthermore, the Supreme Court of appeal in Watchenuka raised the issue that the 
applicants in this case were asylum seekers and, therefore, easily identified as immigrants on 
the ‘lowest rungs of the immigration ladder’568 and that even they should be afforded the 
right to dignity. It therefore declared that ‘… human dignity has no nationality. It is inherent 
in all people – citizens and non-citizens alike – simply because they are human. And whilst 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or    
from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 





that person happens to be in this country – for whatever reason – it must be respected, and is 
protected, by section 10 of the bill of rights’. 569 
     The Court did not base its decision on the immigration status of the person: instead, it 
viewed the impact of the denial of the right on the person’s human dignity. In spite of its bold 
statements, the Court did not uphold the general right to work of asylum seekers but left it to 
the adjudicating body, the Standing Committee of Refugee Affairs, to decide on a case by 
case basis whether to grant the right to work and to do so in cases where a denial of this right 
would lead to the ‘humiliation and degradation’ of the asylum seeker.    
     The Court, consequently, appealed to the common humanity which inheres in everybody, 
irrespective of nationality or citizenship. Overall, this judgment affirms the right of a non-
citizen to be free from humiliation and degradation and effectively severs human dignity 
from nationality while carefully traversing the tensions between the universality of human 
rights and state sovereignty. 570 
 
5.2. By Drawing Similarities with Citizens 
 
In Khosa,571 the Constitutional Court drew similarities between citizens and non-citizens (in 
this case permanent residents). The applicants were Mozambican citizens who had lived in 
South Africa since 1980, and had acquired permanent resident status. They were destitute and 
would have qualified for social assistance grants if they were citizens. The applicants applied 
for social assistance in terms of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 and the Welfare Laws 
Amendment Act 106 of 1997. Their applications were rejected on the basis of their 
                                                          
569 Watchenuka supra note 67 at para 32. 
570 Botha op cit note 62. 
571 Khosa & Others v Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) SA 505. 
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permanent residence status. Thy thus challenged the decision, arguing that it infringed upon 
their constitutional rights not to be discriminated against unfairly and to social assistance.572   
In addressing the question whether it was reasonable to exclude non-citizens from social 
assistance, given the prima facie entitlement in the constitution for ‘everyone to have access 
to social assistance’,573 the Court identified the following four factors as relevant: the purpose 
served by the social security assistance, the impact of the exclusion, relevance of the 
citizenship requirement, and the impact on other intersecting constitutional rights – in this 
case equality.574 It concluded that the purpose of social assistance was not only to ensure the 
availability of the basic necessities for everyone but also respect for the values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom.575 With regard to the issue of access to social grants, the Court 
held that differentiating on the basis of citizenship ‘must not be arbitrary or irrational or mark 
a naked preference’.576 
  The State submitted that permanent residents could apply for naturalisation and then 
become eligible for social grants and that they should therefore wait before applying for 
social assistance. The Court considered this and found that naturalisation was not guaranteed 
upon application. The Court also considered the financial burden on the State, but held that 
the State had not provided sufficient evidence to justify the claim that it could not afford 
                                                          
572 Section 27(1) of the Constitution states that eeveryone has the right to have access to— 
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
(b) sufficient food and water; and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate  
social assistance.  
573 Ibid. 
574 Khosa supra note 571 at para 49. 
575 Ibid at para 52 
576 Ibid at para 53. 
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extending social grants to eligible permanent residents. In the end, the Court chose to decide 
this case from an unfair discrimination perspective. Employing the proportionality analysis, it 
concluded that the impact of exclusion from social assistance on the life and dignity of 
permanent residents outweighed the financial and immigration considerations relied on by the 
State. This judgment is in line with Watchenuka which affirmed citizens and non-citizens 
were equal in dignity and had to be treated equally.  
However, the Court in Khosa was careful in limiting the extension of social grants to those 
‘who like citizens have made South Africa their home’. 577 The concept of being tied to the 
citizenry, in other words, the level of attachment to the host State was crucial in the Courts 
determination to extend the granting of social assistance to permanent residents.578 The 
reason offered by the Court in Khosa was that permanent residents have demonstrated their 
ties to the South African society.  
 To this extent, this judgment is problematic in that it lays emphasis on the similarities 
between permanent residents and citizens, namely their immigration status, instead of 
considering their eligibility for social security based on their shared human dignity. The right 
of access to social assistance is recognised both under the South African Constitution and the 
ICESCR.579 Although States have at times used ‘progressive realisation’ to justify the 
exclusion of permanent residents and refugees, Khosa did not consider progressive realisation 
per se as the determining factor. Instead, this case was decided based on the ties permanent 
residents have to South Africa. Indeed, the majority judgment simply assumed that temporary 
residents do not have meaningful ties of allegiance or commitment to their country of 
                                                          
577 Khosa supra note 571 at paras 58-9. 
578 Ibid. 
579 OP cit note 241. South Africa signed the ICESCR in 1994 but has not ratified it yet. However, given that the 
socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution were modelled on those of the ICESCR, comments and 
analysis of the rights in the ICESCR are valuable to South African courts; See De Waal  & Currie op cit note 65 
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residence.580 In a way then, this case suggests that asylum seekers and undocumented 
migrants are not eligible for social grants. The applicants for permanent residence may have 
been successful in this case but the Court has demonstrated that non-citizens can be excluded 
even if the right, in this case social assistance, is extended to everyone in the Constitution.581  
Although Khosa can be criticised for placing too much emphasis on affinity to South 
Africa and hence suggesting that temporary refugees might not be eligible for social grants, 
this case bodes well for refugees in a protracted situation simply because they will be able to 
demonstrate their ties to South Africa and prove that they have made South Africa their 
home.  
 The Social Assistance Act has since been amended and the benefits thereof have been 
extended to permanent residence and refugees.582 
 
5.3. By Measuring the Level of Attachment to the Host State 
 
In Union of Refugee Women,583 the applicants challenged their exclusion from working in the 
private security industry based on their refugee status. Here, the Constitutional Court adopted 
a more restrictive approach than that found in Watchenuka and Khosa. The Court restricted 
                                                          
580 L Williams ‘Issues and Challenges in Addressing Poverty and Legal Rights: A Comparative United 
States/South African Analysis (2005) 21 South African Journal of Human Rights 436. 
581 Khosa supra note 571. 
582 Lawyers for Human Rights ‘Social Relief is Made Available for Vulnerable Refugees’, available at 
http://www.lhr.org.za/news/2012/social-relief-made-available-vulnerable-refugees, accessed on 4 February 
2017. 
583 The Union of Refugee Women and Others v The Director of the Private Security Industry Regulatory 
Authority and Others 2007 (4) BCLR 339 (CC). 
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the right to work in the security industry to citizens and permanent residents and held that this 
restriction did not violate the right of refugees to equality and non-discrimination.  
The majority judgments’ focus was on the State’s power to make distinctions on the basis 
of citizenship or immigration, unlike the minority judgment which framed its inquiry in terms 
of South Africa’s international commitment to refugees and the material disadvantage caused 
by their exclusion. The majority held that discrimination cannot impair the dignity of the 
refugee in a significant or substantial manner because the applicants could apply for an 
exemption and show good cause why they should be considered eligible for a job in the 
private security industry. The applicants were also not barred from seeking jobs in another 
industry. Union of Refugee Women is thus an illustration of how refugees are excluded from 




It is clear from the foregoing analysis that a balance needs to be found between a State’s right 
to sovereignty and its inherent duty to provide for its citizens on the one hand, and the 
universality of human rights as found in international human rights law, refugee law, and the 
South African Constitution, which challenges the exclusion of non-citizens arising from 
territorial boundaries on the other hand. Khosa and Watchenuka demonstrated that the rights 
of the citizen are penetrable and can be extended to non-citizens. Watchenuka appealed to the 
common humanity in human beings and the right not to be humiliated to achieve this whilst 
Khosa relied on the level of attachment to the host State. Union of Refugee Women took a 




     It is, therefore, not enough to conclude that all the obstacles can be overcome by non-
nationals with the use of the universal rights to dignity and equality for the full recognition of 
their humanity. These cases serve to highlight the tension between the universality of the 
rights to dignity and equality. Despite the fact that the Constitution guarantees most of the 
rights recognised in the Bill of Rights to ‘everyone’ or every child and the noble statements 
the Constitutional Court has made about human dignity and equality, the South African 
Courts have not consistently upheld these provisions in concrete cases concerning refugees.  
     This lack of application of the universality of human rights is not always apparent when 
refugees enter a territory for safety. However, when the emergency situation is over, refugees 
find themselves in protracted situations, because the tension between the rights to dignity and 
to equality for refugee and the citizen becomes more apparent. Even where the courts have 
relied on human dignity to traverse the tension between human rights and citizens’ rights, it 
has not been able to demonstrate that it can in all cases overcome the divide between the 
abstract rights of all human beings and the concrete rights of the citizen.584  
Although the highest Courts in South Africa have been called upon to vindicate the rights 
of refugees, this thesis will demonstrate that refugees still struggle to live in the country with 
dignity.585 
 
 6. SOUTH AFRICA AS AN EXAMPLE OF URBAN REFUGEES IN A 
PROTRACTED SITUATION 
 
The position of long-term refugees in South Africa requires special attention and ought to be 
a matter of considerable concern for the UNHCR and the South African government. Of the 
                                                          
584 Botha op cit note 62. 
585 See chapter six for a detail discussion. 
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121 000 recognised refugees in South Africa,586 most of these are from Somalia and Congo. 
These refugees have been the targets of xenophobia for a number of years in South Africa 
and it has become clear that it is their ‘otherness’ that makes them targets. These refugees 
have been living in South Africa for five years or more after their initial displacement and are 
finding themselves in seemingly unending exile. This is precisely the type of situation that 
the UNHCR refers to as a protracted refugee situation.587 Somalis, in particular, have been 
living in South Africa as refugees since 1994 and are unable to return to Somalia where 
conflict and persecution persist. These refugees cannot go home because of the continuing 
nature of the conflict in their countries and none of the available rights of solution seem 
appropriate or attainable. Voluntary repatriation is clearly not a solution where the violence in 
the country is on-going, the UNHCR’s resettlement programme is not large enough to 
accommodate this entire class of refugees, and the third solution of permanent residence has 





This chapter has traced the evolution of refugee law in South Africa by outlining its progress 
from its narrow race-based framework to placing human rights at the centre. It has 
demonstrated that the current legislative context is inclusive of everyone seeking asylum, 
unlike during Apartheid when it was race-based.  It has also provided a general overview of 
the legislative framework within which refugees in South Africa are given protection and 
                                                          
586 UNHCR ‘The UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks’ (2015), available at 




care. It is evident that the current refugee laws in South Africa provide a generous measure of 
rights and that it compares favourably with international refugee and human rights law.       
Whilst South African refugee law and policy recognises the temporary nature of 
refugeehood, it has not adequately contemplated the problem of a protracted refugee 
situation. Commendably, South Africa has adopted an urban policy as opposed to a camp-
based one. However, it will be shown in chapter five that the South African government has 
not properly conceptualised the urban refugee policy and the outbreaks of xenophobic 
violence are in part attributable to this oversight. This chapter has also analysed the 
provisions of the Constitution including the provisions on human dignity and equality. The 
existing jurisprudence interpreting these provisions generally recognises the tension between 
the universality of human rights and their application to refugees and the States’ duty to 





















1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The previous chapter established that refugee law in South Africa is informed by its 
constitutional values and commitment to international human rights law. As a result, South 
Africa has adopted a refugee policy that allows refugees to live amongst the local community 
in an urban environment rather than in refugee camps. This chapter examines South Africa’s 
application of local integration as a durable solution for refugees in a protracted situation. 
How local integration is conceptualised and how is it implemented in practice? 
In chapters three and four, it was argued that the formal recognition of the rights of 
refugees in international and domestic law is not enough to ensure that they enjoy these rights 
in practice. This chapter examines the limitations of local integration as a durable solution to 
refugees in protracted situations in South Africa by focussing on the obstacles encountered by 
refugees in obtaining documentation and the challenges they face in accessing basic services.         
 
2. LOCAL INTEGRATION AS A RESPONSE TO PROTRACTED 
REFUGEE SITUATIONS  
 
Local Integration is suggested by the UNHCR as a solution for refugees in protracted refugee 
situations in an urban environment.588 Chapter three established the three components of the 
                                                          
588 See A Fielden ‘Local Integration: An Under Reported Solution to Protracted Refugee Situations’ New Issues 
in Refugee Research (2008) UNHCR Research Paper No 158; A Jamal ‘Minimum Standards and Essential 
Needs in a Protracted Refugee Situation: A Review of the UNHCR Programme in Kakuma, Kenya’ Evaluation 
and Policy Analysis Unit, UNHCR, Geneva (2000); K Jacobsen ‘The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration for 
Refugees in Developing Countries’ op cit note 37 at 1.  
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local integration initiative. In the legal process, refugees are granted a progressively wide 
range of rights by the host State, commensurate with those enjoyed by its citizens; the 
economic process allows the refugees to become self-reliant and to contribute to the host 
State and in the socio-cultural process, refugees are accommodated by the local communities, 
which allows refugees to actively contribute to the social life of the country of asylum.589 
      The broad range of rights promised by the Refugees Act and the Constitution, and the fact 
that refugees are not confined to refugee camps, is an indication that the potential for local 
integration exists.590 The rights granted to refugees in South Africa should facilitate the legal 
integration of refugees.  
     Rights allow refugees to settle amongst the host population and have the potential to make 
refugees economically independent, thus enabling them to live meaningfully without 
international or government assistance. The provision of rights is clearly the first step toward 
the self-reliance of refugees. Once self-reliant, the quality of life of refugees would naturally 
improve, enabling them to make a positive contribution to the economy. As Crisp has stated:  
 
The notion of ‘self-reliance pending return’ has advantages for all of the stakeholders in a 
protracted refugee situation. It would improve the quality of life for refugees, giving them a new 
degree of dignity and security. It would enable refugees to make a contribution to the economy of 
                                                          
589 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ‘Global Consultations on International Protection/Third 
Track: Local Integration’, 25 April 2002, EC/GC/02/6, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3d6266e17.html, accessed 9 December 2016. 
590 See Refugees Act; L B Landau ‘Protection and Dignity in Johannesburg: Shortcomings of South Africa’s 
Urban Refugee Policy’ (2006) 19 Journal of Refugee Studies at 308; See also L B Landau & M Du Ponchel 
‘Laws, Policies, or Social Position? Capabilities and the Determinants of Effective Protection in Four African 
Cities’ (2011) 24 (1) Journal of Refugee Studies at 17-18; T Greyling ‘The Expected Well-Being of Urban 
Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Johannesburg’ (2016) 19 (2) South African Journal of Economic and 
Management Sciences at 232-248.  
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the host country and thereby make their presence a boon, rather than a burden, the local 
population.591 
 
Furthermore, for refugees to be able to integrate and live meaningful lives in South Africa, 
assurance of their physical safety is of paramount importance. The right to physical safety is 
clearly guaranteed by the Constitution.592  
The socio-cultural process, generally, hints at a positive interaction with the local 
communities. It allows refugees to contribute actively to the social life of the country of 
asylum.593 The concept of social integration is, however, a contested one, with some scholars 
simply referring to it as the manner in which refugees relate to the social environment,594 
whereas others, such as Valtonen,595 argue that social integration can take place between 
groups even when the groups maintain their separate identities. Kuhlman agrees with Harrell-
bond’s596 definition that integration is simply the co-existence between two groups and 
sharing of the resources.597  
                                                          
591 J Crisp ‘No Solutions in Sight: The Problems of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa’ (2002) Working 
Paper No 68 at 22. 
592 See section 12. 
593 UNHCR Urban Policy supra note 480 at paras 14-17. 
594 M Bulcha Flight and Integration: Causes of Mass Exodus from Ethiopia and Problems of Integration in the 
Sudan (1988) Uppsala [Sweden]: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. 
595 K Valtonen ‘Resettlement of Middle Eastern Refugees in Finland: The Elusiveness of Integration’ (1988) 11 
(1) Journal of Refugee Studies at 40.  
596 B Harrell-Bond Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees (1986) Oxford University Press: Oxford.  
597 T Kuhlman ‘The Economic Integration of Refugees in Developing Countries: A Research Model’, available 
at http://degree.ubvu.vu.nl/RePEc/vua/wpaper/pdf/19900035.pdf, accessed 5 November 2016. 
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For the successful integration of refugees, all three aspects of local integration (legal, 
economic, and social) must be met and the host State must accept its responsibility.598 
Jacobsen, in her study on local integration, argued that refugees are de facto integrated when 
they are not in physical danger; are able to sustain livelihoods through employment; and are 
socially integrated in the host State to the extent that there is no distinction between refugees 
and hosts.599  
South Africa is thus well-placed for the successful local integration of refugees. The 
question, however, is whether local integration can be considered a durable solution if it does 
not change the legal status from ‘refugee’ to that of a member of the host State. None of the 
available scholarship or the UNHCR Conclusions equates local integration with permanent 
residence or citizenship.600 Local integration is clearly a less durable form of residence than 
permanent residence. It is conceded, however, that local integration is more durable than the 
status of a newly arrived refugee because of the rights acquired over time by the refugee. The 
refugee cannot, upon entry into an asylum State, be said to be locally integrated.601  
This chapter will investigate whether local integration can be considered a solution for 
refugees in protracted situations in South Africa. It is trite that refugee status must provide 
protection from immediate harm and ensure in the very least minimal protection by the host 
government of not being returned to the place of harm.602 This chapter will, moreover, 
investigate whether the rights-based refugee status in South Africa, which grants a lot more 
than protection from immediate harm, guarantees access to and the enjoyment of these rights, 
                                                          
598 UNHCR Local Integration op cit note 586. 
599 K Jacobsen op cit note 37 at 1. 
600 Jacobsen op cit note 37; See also Hathaway op cit note 36. 
601 Ibid. 
602 Refugees Act at section 2. 
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and whether assimilation or local integration, as intended, can be considered to be adequate 
for refugees who live in this state of refugeehood in perpetuity.  
 
3. LOCAL INTEGRATION UNDER THE REFUGEES ACT 
 
Section 27 of the Refugees Act provides the legal basis for the integration of refugees in 
South Africa and hence paves the way to ending refugee status. It provides: 
 
A refugee - 
(a) is entitled to a formal written recognition of refugee status in the prescribed form; 
(b) enjoys full legal protection, which includes the rights set out in Chapter 2 of the Constitution 
and the right to remain in the Republic in accordance with the provisions of this Act; 
(c) is entitled to apply for an immigration permit in terms of the Aliens Control Act, 1991, after 
five years' continuous residence in the Republic from the date on which he or she was granted 
asylum, if the Standing Committee certifies that he or she will remain a refugee indefinitely; 
(d) is entitled to an identity document referred to in section 30; 
(e) is entitled to a South African travel document on application as contemplated in section 31; 
(f) is entitled to seek employment; and 
(g) is entitled to the same basic health services and basic primary education which the inhabitants 
of the Republic receive from time to time. 
 
This section clearly recognises that refugees have a bundle of rights and entitlements that 
should allow them to meaningfully sojourn in South Africa. It also recognises that refugee 
status can change to the more durable immigration status of permanent residence. The 
purpose of this section was clearly set out in the 1997 Green Paper on International 
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Migration603 as being to allow refugees the right to sojourn meaningfully in South Africa and 
to acquire skills to empower themselves so that they can return to their countries of origin 
with dignity.604 
Section 27 (b) of the Refugees Act very importantly states that refugees are entitled to the 
rights contained in the Constitution, save for those designated for citizens only, such as, the 
right to political participation. Moreover, sub-sections (f) and (g) deem the right to have 
access to education, healthcare, and employment to be so particularly important for the 
integration of refugees that they are re-codified in this section, even though they are already 
recognised in the Constitution.605    
Significantly, sub-sections (a), (d) and (e) of section 27 recognise the necessity of formal 
recognition of refugee status and the need for refugees to be granted identity and travel 
documentation to enable them to live in South Africa and travel abroad and return.606 The 
formal identity documentation of refugees is of paramount importance because any foreigner 
who is unable to identify himself as being lawfully present in South Africa may be subjected 
to detention and other inconveniences. The Immigration Act allows for the deportation, 
detention and arrests of such persons. Indeed, such persons are moreover not allowed to work 
or seek any services in South Africa and those assisting them are liable to criminal 
prosecution.607 Without formal and written recognition, refugees are in exactly the same 
position as those who cannot prove their lawful stay. In Kiliko, the High Court described the 
prejudices and inconveniences that a foreigner, who cannot prove that he or she is legally in 
the country, faces:  
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… he or she is subject to apprehension, detention and deportation in terms of sections 32, 33 and 
34 of the Immigration Act. He or she may furthermore not be employed by anyone (s 38), may not 
be provided with training or instruction by any learning institution (s 39) and is, save for necessary 
humanitarian assistance, severely restricted as regards a wide range of activities that human beings 
ordinarily participate in, and all persons are prohibited from aiding, abetting, assisting, enabling or 
in any manner helping him or her (s 42), under pain of criminal prosecution.608 
 
This case underlines the significance of formal documentation to the legal integration of 
refugees. Sub-sections (a), (d) and (e) of section 27 therefore play a vital role in the 
integration of refugees.  
Section 27(c) of the Refugees Act provides that, after a period of five years, a refugee may 
apply for permanent residence under the Immigration Act.609 In the same way that the UN 
Refugee Convention provides for naturalisation as a means of ending refugee status, South 
Africa offers permanent residence should return of the refugee to the country of origin not be 
possible within a reasonable time.  
The granting of permanent residence to a refugee is not, however, automatic: the refugee 
has to make an application and the adjudicator must make a decision based on the merits of 
the application and the factors set out in the Immigration Act. Amongst other things, the 
refugee must prove that he or she will remain a refugee ‘indefinitely’ and the Standing 
                                                          
608 Kiliko supra note 505.  
609 The Refugee is directed to make this application for permanent residence in terms of the Immigration Act, 
replacing the Aliens Controls Act. Section 27 (a) of the Immigration Act states that: The Director-General may, 
subject to any prescribed requirements, issue a permanent residence permit to a foreigner of good and sound 
character who (d) is a refugee referred to in section 27(c) of the Refugees Act 1998 (Act No 130 of 1998), 
subject to any prescribed requirement. 
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Committee of Refugee Affairs must certify that the refugee will indeed remain a refugee 
indefinitely.   
South Africa offers a bifurcated approach to naturalisation whereby permanent residence 
must be sought first before naturalisation. While permanent residence is not the same as 
naturalisation, continuous stay as a permanent resident can in turn lead to naturalisation in 
terms of the Citizenship Act.610  
From this analysis, it can be argued that South African refugee law is strong at the level of 
guaranteeing formal integration. The law formally guarantees refugees a wide range of rights 
as has been shown above and in chapter four. In the following sections, this chapter considers 
whether this formal recognition of rights provides sufficient protection to refugees in a 
protracted situation.  
 
4. BARRIERS TO LOCAL INTEGRATION AS A DURABLE 
SOLUTION  
 
From the foregoing analysis of section 27, it can be concluded that local integration is an 
intended form of welcoming refugees to South Africa by the South African government.611 
However, multiple barriers exist to the integration of refugees into South African society. 
Some are quite obvious, such as xenophobia and social exclusion, while others are less 
obvious, such as the barriers to their economic integration.612 Many other obstacles have also 
been identified that stem directly from the Refugees Act itself. Numerous examples of South 
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Africa’s failure to implement the Refugees Act as well as the narrow interpretation of the 
terms used in the Refugees Act have also been identified as obstacles.  
  
4.1. Lack of Policy 
 
Although South African refugee legislation provides local integration to refugees there is no 
comprehensive policy to facilitate the legal, social, and economic integration of refugees. It 
could be argued that there is no need for a separate policy on socio-economic integration 
because it is implicit in the numerous rights offered by the Refugees Act and the South 
African Constitution. However, as has been shown in chapter three, mere formal guarantee of 
rights is insufficient for refugees to become fully integrated and for them to enjoy their rights 
in practice. Indeed, the lived experience of refugees, described later in this chapter, proves 
that such an assumption is wrong.613 
     The preamble to the Immigration Act states that ‘civil society should be educated on the 
rights of foreigners and refugees in South Africa’614 and that xenophobia should be 
‘prevented and countered’.615 However, the government has taken inadequate steps to ensure 
that these goals are achieved.   
     South Africa’s adoption of a non-encampment policy means that refugees live amongst 
the local population and it has become evident that their presence has not been fully 
explained to the South African public. Government officials, as well as the South African 
public, need more information about the presence of refugees and how to engage them in all 
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sectors of the South African society; whether in schools or the labour markets or healthcare 
and even in the justice system. The need for policies to explain the rights of refugees and 
their presence amongst the local population is essential to help create a welcoming society.616 
It is evident that many South Africans are unaware of the extent of the socio-economic rights 
afforded to refugees.617 For example, refugees regularly note that prospective employers are 
unaware of their rights and of exploitation in the workplace and their inability to integrate 
economically, even though they have the right to seek employment.618  
The South African government needs to do more to demonstrate to South Africans that 
welcoming refugees is not only an international obligation but also a duty that stems from 
belonging to a common humanity.619 
    As stated above, according to the Immigration Act South Africa is also obligated to 
counter and prevent xenophobia. South Africa has thus far been reactive in this regard, for 
example, by establishing an anti-xenophobia desk and xenophobia task team after the fact.620 
The UNHCR’s Urban Policy also urges the host State to foster good relations between 
refugees and citizens.     
 
                                                          
616 UNHCR Urban Policy op cit note 480 at (f). 
617 I Palmary ‘Refugees, Safety and Xenophobia in South African Cities: The Role of  Local Government 
Research Report’ written for the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, available at 
http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/foreigners/refugeessafteyand.pdf, accessed on 12 February 2017. 
618 D Dass K Ramjathan & F Khan ‘The Socio-Economic Rights of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in South 
Africa’ in F Khan & T Schreier op cit note 8 at 224. 
619 As done by the judiciary, see previous chapter, section 5.  
620 ‘National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance 
2016 – 2021’, available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/NAP-Draft-2015-12-14.pdf, accessed on 
14 February 2017.  
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4.2. Terminology: Asylum Seekers vs Refugees 
 
The terminology used by the Refugees Act in its description of refugees as ‘asylum seekers’ 
is a huge obstacle to the protection of refugees in South Africa.621 This is not a distinction 
made in international refugee law. It is obvious that a person fulfils the criteria of a refugee 
prior to formal recognition by a State.622 Without formal recognition as a refugee, refugees 
are denied various rights offered by legislation.  
The UNHCR has recognised the prejudice that refugees face if they are labelled as 
temporary asylum seekers until the State determines their status. It has therefore said that a 
person is a refugee as soon as he or she fulfils the criteria and that the host State merely 
declares him or her to be one. Paragraph 28 of the Handbook states that: 
 
A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he or she fulfils the 
criteria contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his 
refugee status is formally determined. Recognition of his status does not therefore make him a 
refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is 
recognised because he is a refugee.623 
 
                                                          
621 Refugees Act at section 1 defines an ‘asylum seeker’ as a person who is seeking recognition as a refugee in 
the Republic. 
622 UNHCR Handbook op cit note 44 at para 28. 
623 UNHCR ‘Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf, 
accessed on 22 February 2017. 
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The term ‘asylum seeker’ is also increasingly being used in a pejorative sense.624 Feller, 
the former Assistant High Commissioner for Protection at UNHCR, wrote in 2005 that 
‘refugees are not migrants … it is dangerous, and detrimental to refugee protection, to 
confuse the two groups, terminologically or otherwise’.625 She made this statement in 
response to allegations that all refugees must at first be received as migrants, which is 
precisely the reason why the term ‘asylum seeker’ was introduced.  
South Africa has included the term ‘asylum seekers’ in its legislation. In the Refugees Act, 
an asylum seeker is simply identified as a person seeking asylum.626 It is a very specific 
temporary legal status, and with this legal status are associated certain minimal rights, 
privileges and obligations. Most importantly, the Refugees Act does not afford asylum 
seekers the rights under section 27 of the Refugees Act – those rights are specifically 
reserved for recognised refugees.  
This means that the Refugees Act deliberately sought to limit the rights of asylum seekers. 
Without an integration policy, and the fact that the Refugees Act differentiates between 
asylum seekers and refugees in terms of the rights they are entitled to, means that asylum 
seekers face more obstacles to be integrated. Thus, for as long as the refugees’ status is not 
determined, the refugee remains an asylum seeker and is therefore denied the rights under 
section 27 of the Refugees Act.627 Most prejudicial in the South African context is that 
refugees remain with this temporary status for a very long time.628 
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4.3. ‘Cumbersome Bureaucracy’  
 
Some of the greatest obstacles to the enjoyment of rights by refugees include delays in 
processing asylum applications and procedural problems related to refugee recognition. 
Hathaway has argued that ‘South Africa has developed a multi-layered, bureaucratically 
cumbersome system for refugee assessment’.629 This system presents numerous problems for 
refugees to obtain recognition documentation and, hence, to access the rights the Constitution 
and Refugees Act promises.  
From the very beginning, a lot is required of the vulnerable and often traumatised newly 
arrived refugee applicants. The individual applications must be made in person and the new 
applicants are required to complete a nine-page application form in English.630 Many 
refugees fail to complete these forms without the help of interpreters, who are in short 
supply,631 despite the Refugees Act stating that interpreters must be made available by the 
Department of Home Affairs (DHA).632 As a result, refugees are often unable to submit a 
comprehensive claim at this initial encounter with the refugee reception officer.633 
Furthermore, refugees encounter inexperienced refugee status determination officers634 that 
often espouse an incorrect interpretation of the law635 and focus on irrelevant information. A 
                                                          
629 Hathaway op cit note 36. 
630 Refugee Act Regulations op cit note 180 at BI-1590 form.  
631 Amit op cit note 165.  
632 Refugees Act at section 38.  
633 Ibid at section 8 (2).  
634 Ibid at section 8. 
635 R Amit ‘All Roads Lead to Rejection: Persistent Bias and Incapacity in South African Refugee Status 
Determination (2012) African Centre for Migration and Society. 
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combination of these factors is responsible for the large number of rejections of status at the 
first instance.636 Of the 60 642 asylum applications processed by the DHA in 2015, only 2499 
were granted refugee status.637 This was the case even though a large number of refugees who 
sought asylum were from Somalia, the Eastern DRC and Eritrea, countries which are still 
involved in a conflict. The DHA maintained that all the rejected asylum seekers were 
economic migrants.638    
These decisions can only be overturned on appeal or review by the Refugee Appeal Board 
and the Standing Committee established in terms of terms of the Refugees Act. The next step 
in seeking a remedy is through a long and expensive review process in the High Court.639 
Highly prejudicial is the fact that refugees remain on these temporary asylum permits whilst 
the lengthy adjudication process is underway. The DHA in its 2016 parliamentary briefing 
noted that a total of 1 082  669 asylum applications in its backlog had been rejected over a 
period of 10 years by the refugee status determination officers and still needed to be assessed 
by the Standing Committee of Refugee Affairs and the Refugee Appeal Board.640 
In addition, all the other services at the DHA, such as birth registration, the renewal of 
documentation, the replacement of lost or expired documents, the joining of families, require 
                                                          
636 Asylum statistics: Department Home Affairs briefing; Immigration Amendment Bill 2016 deliberations. In 
the 2015 calendar year, there had been 2 499 applications approved in terms of section 24(3)(a) of the Refugees 
Act, thus being recognised as genuine refugees. However, 14 093 applications were rejected as unfounded in 
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908 fraudulent or 33 078 manifestly unfounded applications, available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-
meeting/22163/, accessed 3 February 2017. 
637 Ibid. 
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639 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) Juta Co and Ltd: Cape Town (Lower courts in 
South Africa have no jurisdiction to hear judicial review applications). 
640 Asylum Statistics op cit note 637. 
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direct engagement with the DHA. The bureaucratic system of the Refugees Act negatively 
affects the lives of refugees. Refugees find it physically and emotionally draining to queue all 
day and at times all night to access services.641 These documents must be renewed in person 
at the office of initial application. Not only is this request costly, it also severely affects the 
daily lives of asylum seekers. School-going children are forced to miss at least four days of 
schooling per year, their parents struggle to find jobs because employers are reluctant to hire 
people whose legal status in South Africa is of limited duration. The psychological and 
emotional impact of the uncertainty of their status cannot be downplayed.642 
Several studies have shown that the DHA has been unable to implement the Refugees Act 
fairly and abide by its Regulations.643 Most detrimental amongst these failures for refugees is 
the DHA’s inability to abide by the timelines set in the Regulations for the adjudication of 
their refugee status. Even though the Regulations to the Refugees Act sets a time period of 
180 days for the entire adjudication process to be completed, this timeline is seldom complied 
with.644 For instance, the study conducted by Amit demonstrated that in some cases it has 
taken 10 years to complete the refugee determination process instead of six months.645 
Various studies have identified at least three reasons for the DHA’s failure to abide by the 
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stipulated timelines and failure to implement the Refugees Act: lack of capacity (with severe 
understaffing at all levels but in particular the adjudicating bodies of the Refugee Appeal 




Xenophobia is easily identified as evidence that refugees are failing to integrate into South 
African society. Official responses by government to the xenophobic attacks on refugees in 
South Africa in 2015 were puzzling to say the least. First, the government denied that there 
was a crisis, and then blamed criminal elements, and the victims.648 However, the South 
African649 perpetrators of the xenophobic violence claimed that the impetus for violence was 
their own.650 These were not random acts of criminality or spontaneous protests, but targeted 
violence at refugee owned small businesses. About 90 foreign owned businesses in Soweto, 
Gauteng were attacked.651 These businesses were owned by foreigners of various African 
                                                          
646 Kiliko supra note 505 at para 29: ‘It is, at least, implicit in the nature of the remedial steps already 
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capacity on the part of his department to have taken steps efficiently to handle the volume of applications for 
asylum.’ 
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nationalities, but most by Somali nationals. This is the social climate that refugees face in 
South Africa.  
Xenophobia is experienced by refugees at the hands of private individuals, public officials, 
and ordinary members of the South African public, the economically deprived, the 
uneducated and the economically powerful. Perpetrators of xenophobia can be found across 
the entire spectrum of South African society, which makes it difficult for refugees to integrate 
into South African society. The situation has not been helped by conflicting statements made 
by prominent government officials. For example, Minister Lindiwe Zulu boldly recently said: 
 
Foreign business owners in South African townships cannot expect to co-exist peacefully with 
local business owners unless they share their trade secrets. Foreigners need to understand that they 
are here as a courtesy and our priority are to the people of this country first and foremost. They 
cannot barricade themselves in and not share their practices with local business owners.652  
 
The Minister made this comment in spite of the fact that the Constitution guarantees 
everyone the right to freedom and security of person, which includes the right to be free from 
all forms of violence from either public or private actors.653 The right to security of person is 
not a conditional right as Minister Zulu states. Her remarks imply condonation of violence 
and criminality, which is inconsistent with our Constitution. 
                                                          
652 ‘Minister Lindiwe Zulu to Foreigners’, Radio 702, 28 January 2015, available at 
http://www.702.co.za/articles/1505/zulu-foreign-business-owners-must-share, accessed on 14 July 2016.  
653 Section 12.  
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On the other hand, Minister of Home Affairs Naledi Pandor said that654 the use of force or 
threats of violence to resolve grievances in South Africa were unacceptable: 
 
Anti-immigrant violence is inseparable from the evil of racism. The insidious nature of rising 
levels of ethnicism in our society is another cause for concern. We need to re-commit to the non-
racialism we believed in during the days of our struggle against apartheid. We need to teach our 
young people to recognise bias, intolerance, and racism and arm them with the skills to combat 
these forms of discrimination.655 
 
According to her, more is needed to raise public awareness about the value of diversity and 
the advantages of living with people from different cultures and that South Africa will not 
shirk form its responsibilities under our refugee law or international conventions.656 
Refugees experience xenophobia in various forms in South Africa, from the mere name-
calling, such as makwerekere (a derogatory term directed specifically at black foreigners) to 
the actual physical violence resulting in death. Within this spectrum are various forms of 
harm that refugees experience, such as economic exploitation, social exclusion, and 
institutionalized prejudices that hamper their integration into the local communities and stop 
them from living a meaningful existence in the country.  
The failure to implement the Refugees Act has been described as institutionalised 
xenophobia657 and the lack of political will to assist refugees.658 Refugees relate that at every 
                                                          
654 ‘Africans Should Stand Together – Pandor’, News 24, 20 June 2013, available at 
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level of interaction with the DHA they are treated poorly by officials, who often make 
arbitrary and unlawful decisions in the face of clear policy and legislation.659 The DHA 
officials arbitrarily deny refugees access to the asylum system, refuse extensions of permits 
and are generally slow and inefficient,660 act maliciously and with impunity against 
foreigners. This behaviour is designed to keep the foreigner out (‘gatekeeping’), rather than 
to welcome them by creating a fair and transparent process.  
Refugees have reported bad experiences in their interaction with police as well, such as 
brutal attacks by the police,661 or the police standing by while third parties loot and destroy 
shops owned by foreign nationals.662 Refugees also experience discrimination from 
employers and landlords and the public generally.  
Various barriers to health care have been noted by refugees and this has led to a 
psychological fear of the public health care system with refugees resorting to avoiding it. A 
2011 SAMP study found that xenophobia by medical personnel existed and manifested itself 
in various ways,663 such as the requirement that refugee patients produce documentation and 
proof of residence status before being given treatment. The refusal by health care 
professionals to communicate in English or allow translators was documented, as well as 
xenophobic insults and verbal abuse. This study also noted that non-South African patients 
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660 Case on file with author. 
661 Case on file with author. 
662 Said and Others v Minister of Safety and Security (EC13/08) (unreported). 
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were required to wait until all South African patients were assisted. Crush664 and 
Tawadzero665 relate further examples of the manner in which refugees have been excluded 
from the public health care system.  
These experiences prove that simply guaranteeing rights on paper does not guarantee the 
enjoyment of these rights in practice. Despite being resident in South Africa for a protracted 
period of time, refugees are considered ‘other’ because of their refugee status. Ending refugee 
status can help to change this situation. 
Klaaren has argued that the issue of xenophobia can be used to explore the ‘development 
of themes of citizenship’ in South Africa.666 According to him, one view sees violence as the 
‘natural result of apartheid deprivations and its refusal to share the spoils with respect to 
those from outside the borders’. The second view is more ‘empirically informed’, and sees 
xenophobic violence as a constitutive struggle over the current meaning of South African 
citizenship’.667 It raises the question of whether citizenship is viewed  as exclusive 
membership in a community, that is,  membership in a political republic or membership in a 
cultural bloc, or  whether it is conceived of as ‘constitutional citizenship’, that is, that lawful 
residence entitles one to the universal human rights culture.668 
As long as refugees are seen as the ‘other’ and cannot claim a legitimate right to stay, they 
will remain prone to xenophobia, they will struggle to integrate, and they will continue to 
face various kinds of prejudice and marginalisation. 
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5. PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES IN PROTRACTED SITUATIONS 
 
According to the UNHCR, the rights necessary for the local integration of refugees are the 
rights to freedom of movement, access to education and the labour market, access to public 
relief and assistance including health facilities, to acquire and dispose of property, to travel, 
to identity documents and to family unity.669 Refugees have been guaranteed all of these 
rights in South Africa as shown in chapter four.670 This section considers, in particular, the 
obstacles encountered by refugees in obtaining documentation and, as a result, the challenges 
they face in accessing basic services. 
     In South Africa, the refugee document entitles the holder to a variety of rights and 
benefits. Most importantly, it entitles the holder to sojourn legally in the country. However, 
refugees are struggling to access these documents and, when they have obtained these 
documents, the documents themselves serve to alienate them even further.  
 
5.1. The Right of Access to Documents 
 
The refugees’ struggle to access documents in South Africa can be demonstrated through a 
plethora of cases undertaken against the DHA, the government department responsible for the 
issuance of these documents.  
                                                          
669 UNHCR Urban policy op cit note 480.  
670 See chapter four of this thesis. 
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     In Kiliko671 and Tafira,672 the High Court in the Western Cape and Gauteng, respectively, 
held that the DHA did not adequately capacitate the Refugee Reception Offices, hence denied 
access for refugees to asylum, leaving them undocumented and vulnerable to arrest and 
deportation.673 In Kiliko, one of the first cases dealing with the right to documentation, the 
Court explained the significance of the right to documentation appropriately thus stating;   
 
Until an asylum seeker obtains an asylum-seeker permit in terms of s 22 of the Refugees Act, he or 
she remains an illegal foreigner and, as such, subject to the restrictions, limitations and inroads 
enumerated in the preceding paragraph, which, self-evidently, impact deleteriously upon or 
threaten to so impact upon, at least, his or her human dignity and the freedom and security of his or 
her person.674 
 
In Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Somali Association of South Africa, Eastern 
Cape, the DHA’s decision to close the Port Elizabeth Refugee Reception Office to new 
asylum applicants, because the DHA intended to reduce the presence of refugees in the major 
metropolitan areas and move them to the borders was challenged.675 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that the office should be reopened. However, the DHA has not yet reopened that 
office. The Refugee Reception Offices in Cape Town and Johannesburg have also been 
closed to new applicants. Consequently, refugees can only make new asylum application in 
                                                          
671 Kiliko supra note 505. 
672 Tafira supra note 644. 
673 Kiliko supra note 505. 
674 Kiliko supra note 505 at para 7.  
675 Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Somali Association of South Africa Eastern Cape (SASA EC) and 
Another (831/2013) [2015] ZASCA 35; 2015 (3) SA 545 (SCA); Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town and Others v 
Minister of Home Affairs and Others (11681/12) [2013] ZAWCHC 49, Minister of Home Affairs and Others v 
Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town and Others (735/12, 360/13) [2013] ZASCA 134; 2013 (6) SA 421 (SCA).  
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Durban, Pretoria and Musina, thus restricting access to the asylum system. The Durban and 
Pretoria Reception Offices have indicated that they have been unable to cope with the 
numbers of applicants since the closure of the three reception office.676 
After the closure of the three refugee reception offices, Abdulaahi,677 launched in Cape 
Town, tackled the introduction of the practice by the DHA that forces refugees to return to 
the refugee reception office of initial application for the renewal of their asylum 
documentation. For various reasons related to their family, employment or safety, many 
refugees have made their homes elsewhere in South Africa and are finding it difficult to 
travel with their entire families four times a year to the original office to renew their 
documents. Refugees and asylum seekers who do not have the means to travel long distances 
to the office of original application find themselves with expired permits and face arrest and 
deportation. The High Court in the Western Cape held that the applicants can access services 
at the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office but limited the right to access services only to 
the applicants listed in this case. 
This necessitated the launching of Nbaya, which also dealt with the issue of forcing 
refugees to return to the office of initial application for services.678 This issue was raised in 
several cases previously with exactly the same outcome; that refugees irrespective of office 
of application were allowed to have access to services at the Cape Town Refugee Reception 
                                                          
676 L Sello ‘SA Asylum Seekers, Refugees’ Policy on Focus’, available at http://www.enca.com/south-africa/sa-
asylum-seekers-refugees%E2%80%99-policy-%E2%80%93focus, accessed on 1 March 2017; See also 
http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/extended-hours-refugee-reception-offices, accessed on 2 March 2017. 
677 Abdulaahi and Others v The Director General of Home Affairs and Others Case 7705/2013. This case had 1 
223 applicants. 
678 Nbaya and Others v Director General of Home Affairs 6534 /15 (unreported). This case started with 450 
applicants and a further 2500 applicants joined later. 
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Office.679 This practice by the DHA has clearly affected the refugees’ right to choose their 
place of stay in South Africa, thereby curbing their freedom of movement. It has also meant 
that refugees in these categories have only managed to remain documented as a result of legal 
intervention. 
In Bukasa, the issue of expired permits was addressed. Refugees were forced to pay 
administrative fines or face arrest for expired permits.680 These fines were often issued 
unlawfully as the permit expiry was due to no fault of the person concerned (e.g. someone 
may be injured and hospitalised, or someone who attended on the expiration date may have 
been told by a DHA official to come on a later date for renewal).  Some refugees opted to 
admit guilt and paid the fine because the prejudice of remaining with expired permits was too 
great. This admission of guilt created a further barrier to asylum seekers and refugees who 
later applied for permanent residence or had to travel and found to their chagrin that their 
criminal record precludes both. These fines were set at R2 000 per person, and those who 
were unable to pay were arrested and left undocumented. Bukasa was launched by the UCT 
Refugee Rights Clinic and resulted in a settlement with the DHA to stop the unlawful and 
issuance of fines in cases where the refugees and asylum seekers had just cause for an expired 
permit.681  
Asylum seeker permits are issued for short periods of three month by the DHA. The 
backlog at the various stages of the status determination process at the DHA has led to the 
multiple extensions of documents; a practice the asylum seekers have no control over. 
                                                          
679 See eg Hirsi and Others v Minister of Home Affairs (WCHC 16863/08); Thomasso and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others (WCHC 10598/09); Ahmed Abdi Aden and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Another (WCHC 9179/11); Abdulaahi and others v Director General of Home Affairs and Others 7705/15 
(unreported); Nbaya and Others v Director General of Home Affairs 6534 /15 (unreported). 
680 Bukasa v Minister of Home Affairs 22197 /10 Western Cape High Court (unreported). 
681 Refugees Act at section 37. 
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However, in 2013, the DHA introduced a requirement that asylum permits would be extended 
no more than twelve times. This practice was introduced even though asylum permit 
extensions are done at the behest of the DHA. This arbitrary practice left many asylum 
seekers with expired documents and formed the basis of Bahamboula.682 After the case was 
launched by the UCT Refugee Rights Clinic, the 316 applicants were documented and the 
practice withdrawn.  
In Mwamba,683 the practice of the DHA to leave refugees undocumented whilst the DHA 
conducted investigations into irregularities picked up on its computer system (with regard to 
finger printing, identity photographs, duplication of files or other administrative errors) was 
challenged. Once again, large numbers of refugees were left undocumented and only legal 
intervention led to the abandonment of the practice.  
These cases demonstrate that despite having the legal right to documentation, refugees are 
failing to access these documents due in large part to various ad hoc administrative practices 
at the DHA.  
 
5.2. The Right to Enabling Documents  
 
In addition to the difficulties refugees face in accessing documentation, it must be noted that 
the identity documents that are issued to refugees are markedly different from those issued to 
South African citizens or permanent residents.684 The purpose may of this differentiation may 
                                                          
682 Bahamboula and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (1476/14) [2014] ZAWCHC 69; 2014 (9) 
BCLR 1021 (WCC). 
683 Mwamba and others v The Department of Home Affairs and Others Case No 14820/15, (unreported). 
684 Refugees Act at section 22 (temporary asylum document); section 24 (refugee status document); section 27 
(travel and identity document), section 23 (immigration document). 
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be that the government can impose order on society: the government can plan for the benefit 
of the holders or the identification of refugees to distinguish between who is the holder of 
rights and who is not.685 On the other hand, it may serve as a form of control so that 
government can deport asylum seekers whenever it feels necessary to do so. 
The issue of the documentation of refugees in South Africa has been described by Amit et 
al in terms of the ‘street-level organisational approach’, which emphasises how 
administrative practices, including those relating to documentation, shape politics and create 
policy.686 The essence of the street-level organisational approach is the recognition that 
administrative practices may determine who gets access to organisational benefits and who is 
excluded.687 These practices are often hidden from public view, and thus tend to be less 
transparent than legislative processes that are conducted in the open.688 Thus, organisational 
practices are central to understanding, access to benefits and, its antithesis, exclusion. 
Importantly, the street-level approach does not assume that administrative exclusion, the 
denial of benefits to those who are eligible, is necessarily the product of intentions.689 Instead, 
it highlights how administrative exclusion often occurs as a result of the practices, intentional 
                                                          
685 R Amit & N Krigler ‘Making migrants ‘il-legible’: The Policies and Practices of Documentation in Post-
Apartheid South Africa’ (2014), available at http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?pid=S0259-
01902014000100012&script=sci_arttext&tlng=pt, accessed on 21 July 2016. 
686 Ibid. 
687 Ibid. 
688 E Z Brodkin & G Marston (eds) Work and the Welfare State: Street-Level Organizations and Workfare 
Politics (2013) Georgetown University Press: Washington, DC. Brodkin captures the core elements of street-
level approaches as follows: ‘... organizations do more than apply the law. They also engage in informal and 
discretionary practices that effectively make the law, essentially constituting an extra-legal mode of determining 
who gets what and how.  
689 Amit & Kriegler op cit note 686. 
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or not, employed by those who interpret and apply eligibility criteria as they adjudicate 
claims for benefits.690  
The various forms of documentation lend themselves to administrative practices that could 
easily lead to the exclusion of refugees from benefits. The specific document that refugees 
receive, for example, has restricted access to the two rights most necessary for the refugee to 
become self-reliant: the right to work and the right to education. The refugee status permit is 
issued in terms of Section 24 (3) (a) of the Refugees Act.691 This document is issued with no 
regard to the refugees’ right to work.692 Refugees struggle to access employment because 
refugee status documents are usually valid for a limited period, mostly two years for 
recognised refugees (section 24) and three months for asylum seekers.693 The limited duration 
clearly impacts negatively on the right to work because it prejudices refugees and asylum 
seekers from permanent employment.  
Even when the refugee documents are accepted by employers, various issues such as 
access to banking694 or access to the unemployment insurance or provident funds arises.695 
Similarly, the refugee documentation has impacted on the refugees’ education. The short 
duration of refugee and asylum seeker status makes it difficult for them to obtain admission 
                                                          
690 Ibid. 
691 Refugees Act at section s24 (3) (a). 
692 Residence permits issued generally indicate the right to work attached to it. 
693 De La Hunt op cit note 641.  
694 Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa v ABSA Bank Limited SGNC Case No 34220/2010 
(unreported). 
695 F Khan & T Schreier op cit note 618 at 233. 
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or continue their studies at universities.696 This shows that refugee documentation itself 
negatively impacts on the social and economic integration of refugees.   
Even the education of refugee children is threatened, despite the fact that all children have 
the constitutional right to basic education. Refugee children who fail to obtain documentation 
or keep them renewed are at risk of arrest. Recently, for example, a Gauteng school issued a 
letter to all parents of foreign children stating: ‘If any foreign child arrives here on Monday 
we will phone the police to come and collect your child and you can collect your child at the 
police station. These are direct instructions from the Department of Home Affairs.’697  
Documentation and registration of refugees may be an important component of local 
integration, but for as long as the documents issued to refugees are not enabling documents it 
considerably weakens the concept of local integration as a solution for refugees in a 
protracted situation.  
 
5.3. Failure to Enjoy Other Rights  
 
One crucial way that the rights-based approach can help refugees in a protracted refugee 
situation is by assisting refugees become self-reliant. South Africa evidently allows a refugee 
whose claim for asylum has been successfully adjudicated to seek and take up employment. 
Section 27(f) of the Refugees Act states that ‘a refugee is entitled to seek employment’.698 
                                                          
696 R Browne ‘The Right to Education for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in South Africa’ LLM Thesis, 
University of Cape Town (2013) at 39.  
697 N Goba ‘Outrage over School Letter Threatening to Bar Pupils with Foreign Parents’, available at 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2017/02/24/Outrage-over-school-letter-threatening-to-bar-pupils-with-foreign-
parents, accessed on 17 February 2017. 
698 Refugees Act at section 27 provides further entitlements to refugees, such as the right to an identity 
document and a travel document.  
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Apart from the issues with regard to documentation, refugees ‘face language difficulties, 
educational differences, certification requirements, cultural barriers and xenophobic and 
racist barriers to work’.699 In South Africa, due to the above social barriers many refugees 
find themselves channelled into low-paying and insecure jobs. Assistance to overcome such 
barriers therefore needs to be better organised and on a much bigger scale than is currently 
taking place, whether by the UNHCR or the South African government.700 
     Refugees also have the legal right to basic education which includes access to the public 
schooling system and the right to access school programs, such as feeding schemes and 
school fee exemptions. While in the past some schools did not grant children of refugees fee 
exemptions if they were unable to pay, such discrimination has lessened in the main urban 
areas due to advocacy by NGOs.701 Nonetheless, a significant proportion of refugee children 
are not in school and refugee parents do not know about the fee exemption. 702  
    It is taken for granted that one’s level of economic growth is linked to one’s quality of 
education and training. Refugees in South Africa are struggling to access tertiary education. 
Many of the refugees would have qualified for financial assistance from the government but 
for their refugee status. Few university scholarships are offered to refugees by UNHCR in 
South Africa.703        
                                                          
699 D Dass et al op cit note 618 at 233. 
700 By UNHCR partners and other NGO’s such as Scalabrini and ARESTA. However, these programmes are so 
limited and on such a small-scale that they provide very little impact. 
701 M Makhema ‘Social Protection for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Southern Africa Development 
Community’ (2009)  SP Discussion Paper No 0906. 
702 Ibid. 
703 UNHCR – DAFI Scholarships, available at www.unhcr.org/dafi-scholarships.html, accessed on 12 February 
2017. The UNHCR’s higher education scholarship programme, best known by its acronym DAFI, plays an 
integral role in enabling refugees worldwide to access higher education. 
180 
 
     Refugees do have access to basic health care in South Africa through the public health 
care system of clinics and hospitals. However, they face many challenges within the health 
care system, especially by frontline administrative staff as a result of their documentation. 
Since their documentation gives no indication of their right to health care, refugees are often 
excluded or are forced to pay. Scholars such as Schneider704 and Gulliford705 have argued that 
access is an instrumental and intermediate goal of health care systems. Refugees are denied 
health care services in order to save resources for nationals according to Rosencrantz706 and 
Schwartz.707 For example, a Somali girl was denied a kidney transplant purely on the basis of 
her refugee status.708  
      In South Africa, since refugees are not camp-based, one of the most pressing initial needs 
for newly arrived refugees is finding accommodation. Even though South Africa has 
identified refugees as a vulnerable group, there is no special right with regard to housing for 
refugees. In fact, the National Housing Code explicitly excludes migrants from government 
housing subsidies.709 When compared to international law, the right to have access to housing 
                                                          
704 H Schneider et al ‘Health Systems and Access to Antiretroviral Drugs for HIV in Southern Africa: Service 
Delivery and Human Resources Challenges’ (2006) 14 Reproductive Health Matters at 12-23. 
705 M Gulliford et al ‘What does Access to Healthcare Mean?’ (2002) Health Serv Res Policy at 186-8. 
706 B Rosencranz (2013) in G Zihindula et al ‘Access to Health Care Services by Refugees in South Africa: A 
Review of Literature’ (2015) 16 Southern Africa Journal of Demography at 7-35. 
707 Schwarz (2001) in G Zihindula ibid. 
708 Case on file with author. 
709 J Greenberg & T Polzer ‘Migrant Access to Housing in South African cities’ (2008) Forced Migration 
Studies Programme University of Wits; Hathaway op cit note 93 at 481 ‘In countries including Austria, Canada, 




under the South African Constitution is more robustly protected than under the ICESCR.710 
The Constitutional Court in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom held: 
 
It recognises that housing entails more than just bricks and mortar. It requires available land, 
appropriate services such as the provision of water and removal of the sewage and the financing of 
all these, including the building of the house itself. For a person to have access to adequate 
housing all of these conditions must be met: there must be land, there must be services, there must 
be a dwelling … The State must create the conditions for access to adequate housing for people at 
all economic levels of our society.711 
 
Refugees in South Africa are effectively denied housing assistance by the government 
because they are specifically excluded from the National Housing Code.712 
The right to freedom of movement is central to facilitating the social and economic 
integration of refugees. This right is recognised by the Constitution.713 There are, however, 
indications that though the right exists in law, the recent actions and statements of the DHA 
will lead to a severe restriction of this right in the foreseeable future. The DHA’s recent 
decision to relocate all Refugee Reception Offices to the northern land borders of the 
country714 and the decision to deny services to refugees and asylum seekers, except at the 
                                                          
710 Article 11 states: ‘The States party to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate housing …’ 
711 2000 (11) BCLR 1169(CC) at para 35. 
712 National Housing Code (2000, revised in 2009). 
713 See section 21(1). 
714 Scalabrini supra note 676, which involved the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office. 
182 
 
Refugee Reception Office where they were first issued with their asylum permits,715 are stark 
examples of the government’s curbing of the right to freedom of movement.  
Legislation716 also allows for the issuance of a travel document by the HDA to refugees 
permitting them to travel outside the country. In spite of refugees being able to access travel 
documents in South Africa, it does not necessarily ensure their freedom of movement. This is 
the case because most countries of the North do not extend visas to refugees. Refugees in 
protracted situations are thus effectively denied the right to travel from South Africa. The fact 
that local integration does not culminate in membership of the South African community 
means that the movement of refugees in a protracted situation within and outside of South 
Africa is unduly restricted.  
The Refugees Act does not have a specific provision on the right to family unity, but this 
right is impliedly recognised through various other sections in the Act. For example, South 
Africa affords derivative status to the dependants,717 which automatically includes immediate 
members of family. Respect for the family as a unit is evident in this section. Similarly, the 
right to family is implied in the Constitution under section 28 which enshrines the child’s 
right to family care. Lastly, in Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs,718 the Constitutional 
Court held that the right to dignity must be interpreted to afford protection to the institutions 
of marriage and the family.  
                                                          
715 Abdulaahi supra note 678. 
716 Refugees Act at section 27. 
717 Refugees Act at section 1 (ix) “dependant”, in relation to an asylum seeker or a refugee, includes the spouse, 
any unmarried dependent child or any destitute, aged or infirm member of the family of such asylum seeker or 
refugee. 
718 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
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Many practices of the DHA described earlier in this chapter constitute a violation of these 
rights.719 It can therefore be concluded from this discussion that the rights afforded to 
refugees have not been implemented in a manner that takes into account their changing 
needs. The longer the refugee is in a host country, the greater the need for more permanent 
forms of housing, higher education, travel, or healthcare. It is also common that the principal 
refugee applicant is joined by families at a later time.720 These have not been factored into 
South Africa’s grant of rights to refugees. Many refugees in protracted situations are 
therefore increasingly feeling alienated in South Africa. Although they clearly have rights, 
the longer they stay in South Africa the more they fail to integrate and live meaningful lives. 
Refugees are unable to escape from poverty because they live in conditions of insecurity, and 
because they are unable to fully realise their basic rights.   
 
6. THE INADEQUACY OF LOCAL INTEGRATION AS A DURABLE 
SOLUTION FOR REFUGEES IN A PROTRACTED SITUATION 
 
Although refugees have been granted a range of rights in South Africa, as was shown in 
chapter four, this chapter demonstrates how in practice refugees face challenges to accessing 
and enjoying those rights. The lack of a clear and comprehensive policy has clearly hampered 
their integration.           
One of the reasons why local integration is not an effective durable solution for refugees in 
protracted refugee situations lies in the fact that it does not change the status of a refugee and, 
as a result, the refugee is not regarded as a member of the local community. Although a 
                                                          
719 Scalabrini Centre v Minister of Home Affairs (WCC) Case No 5242/16 (ongoing). 
720 Jastram op cit note 358. 
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protracted refugee situation has arisen in South Africa, it has not yet been acknowledged as a 
problem by the UNHCR or the South African government.  
Not only have South African law makers not considered and, therefore not included, 
solutions for long-term refugees into South African law, refugees themselves also have not 
been able to highlight the urgency of their situation in the urban environment, because they 
have not found a legal avenue to express the human rights consequences faced by them in 
South Africa.   
 This thesis argues that membership of a political community is crucial to the effective 
protection of one’s dignity. The marginalisation, prejudices and discrimination refugees in 
South Africa face can be seen as a direct consequence of their alienation from South African 
society. Kidd-White states that dignity allows one to communicate something that the 
language of human rights cannot, and that it therefore has an extraordinary role to play in 
legal considerations.721 Many have suggested that it is difficult to understand how the concept 
of dignity should inform the practice of human rights adjudication.722 There is a growing 
school of thought that a person’s emotions can be used to shape decision-making in spite of 
the well-known tools of rationality and reasonableness.723 According to this view, 
adjudicators can have a better sense of the way human dignity is violated if the evidentiary 
record in a rights case evokes horror or anger over the treatment of the claimant.724 
Furthermore, Kidd-White claims that emotion can permit and communicate certain dexterity 
with concepts that may otherwise appear to be abstract.725  
                                                          
721 E Kidd-White ‘Till the Human Voices Wake Us: The Role of Emotions in the Adjudication of Dignity 




725 Kidd-White op cit note 721. 
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 Khaitan is of the same view and describes the concept of dignity in human rights law as an 
expressive norm.726 Khaitan argues that ‘whether an act disrespects someone’s dignity 
depends on the meanings that act expresses’.727 Does the legislation demean, degrade, or 
humiliate the person under its authority? The right to dignity takes seriously the expression of 
disrespect, insult or humiliation to a person or object. The emotions expressed or articulated 
by the person is one way of establishing whether the person feels disrespected, insulted or 
humiliated by the act. Dignity is about worth and respect and the right to dignity is in part 
whether this worth is recognised by the State.728 The emotion expressed by the victim thus 
helps to orientate the adjudicator, because if the victim feels insulted, humiliated or 
disrespected by the laws, only then can the adjudicator assess whether the law protects the 
dignity of the person. Kidd-White, furthermore, states that we can expect emotions like 
indignation, empathy, and pity to draw out the content of human dignity. Many of these are 
painful emotions that respond to evidence of human rights abuse.729 Emotions can, therefore, 
help the judges understand what the legal concept of human dignity was supposed to protect.    
 Similarly, if the emotions of the long-term refugees are understood, then it will be known 
what the legal concept of dignity was supposed to protect. One way for the plight of refugees 
in protracted situations to be realised is if an avenue can be found for them to demonstrate the 
negative effect thereof on their dignity. This chapter has shown that in spite of the generous 
laws for refugees in South Africa, refugees have remained outsiders. The extent to which 
refugees in protracted situations in South Africa  ‘feel insulted, humiliated and not respected 
                                                          
726 T Khaitan ‘Dignity as an Expressive Norm: Neither Vacuous nor Panacea’ (2012) 32(1) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies.  
727 Ibid. 
728 Ibid. 
729 Kidd-White op cit note 726. 
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by the laws’730 is yet to be clearly established. It is however obvious from the above 




Refugees in South Africa are not enjoying the generous rights granted to them and struggling 
to integrate largely because the wider South African society has been unable to accept or 
understand that refugees can have the same entitlements as South Africans. The South 
African government, according to the UNHCR’s Urban Policy, has an obligation to foster 
relations between refugees and South Africans for the successful social integration of 
refugees. This has not happened. For example, South African employers, or health care 
professionals or educators and various other administrators, have not been familiarised with 
the rights or the legitimate presence of refugees in South Africa. South Africa has not 
developed clear social and economic policies to facilitate their integration.  
 Because of South Africa’s failure to implement the Refugees Act and its inability to abide 
by the set timelines, refugees have remained with temporary documentation for a long time. 
The 2009 Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations has recognised that a refugee who has 
been in the country for more than five years since the initial displacement without a durable 
solution in sight is in a protracted situation. Many refugees in South Africa are in such a 
situation.  
 The chapter has also demonstrated that in spite of the formal recognition of the rights of 
refugees, refuge status actually hampers the full integration of refugees. Other obstacles to 
integration include lack of clear policy to facilitate integration, administrative inefficiencies 
in the processing of documents and inconsistent government practices toward refugees. 
                                                          
730 Khaitan op cit note 726. 
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Significantly, local integration cannot be considered a durable solution as long as it does not 
end the status of the refugee. The next chapter discusses solutions that are geared toward 



























1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The preceding chapter has considered local integration as a form of durable solution to 
protracted refugee status in South Africa. It has established that South Africa has so far 
understood local integration narrowly as the formal guarantee of the rights of refugees. 
Without a clear policy to facilitate the realisation of the rights of refugees, refugees are 
expected to find their place in South African society on their own. Understood in this way, 
local integration does not end refugee status, does not ensure that refugees enjoy their rights 
in practice, and is therefore not a durable solution for the refugee in a protracted situation.  
     It is argued that only an end to refugee status can be considered a durable solution for a 
refugee in a protracted refugee situation. This chapter argues that while there are legal 
pathways to ending refugee status in South Africa by permanent residency and thereafter 
naturalisation, refugees encounter so many challenges when applying for a durable stay in 
South Africa that these pathways are effectively unavailable. The chapter analyses the 
complex legal basis (straddling three legislative Acts) upon which a refugee can apply for 
permanent residence and naturalisation or citizenship in South Africa.  
 
2. THE BIFURCATED APPROACH TO ENDING REFUGEE STATUS 
 
As noted above, there are two legal pathways to ending refugee status in South Africa. 
However, these pathways are bound up with a complicated process regulated by three 
different legislative Acts. Firstly, refugees are required to seek permission to apply for 
permanent residence in terms of the Refugees Act,731 a process called ‘certification’. 
                                                          
731 Refugees Act at section 27. 
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Thereafter, refugees may apply for permanent residence in terms of the Immigration Act.732 
Finally, refugees may apply for naturalisation in terms of the Citizenship Act.733 Each step is 
activated by an application and requires the previous step to be satisfactorily completed. 
These steps are discussed as a backdrop to a detailed discussion of the two pathways 
themselves. 
 
2.1. Certification under the Refugees Act  
 
Section 27 of the Refugees Act is pivotal to the refugees’ well-being in South Africa. As 
shown in chapter five, this section confirms the rights that refugees have. More importantly 
for purposes of this thesis, section 27 also provides for permanent residence. It states: 
 
A refugee is entitled to apply for an immigration permit in terms of the Aliens Control Act, 
1991,734 after five years’ continuous residence in the Republic from the date on which he or she 
was granted asylum, if the Standing Committee certifies that he or she will remain a refugee 
indefinitely. (emphasis added) 
 
The positive feature about this provision is that it provides for a legal pathway to ending 
refugee status exists. However, this pathway is a qualified entitlement, allowing refugees to 
apply for an immigration permit. Refugees are, furthermore, asked to step outside of the 
Refugees Act, which is protection-orientated, and make the application in terms of the 
                                                          
732 Act 13 of 2002. 
733 Act 88 of 1995. 
734 The Aliens Control Act has been replaced by the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. 
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Immigration Act, which is generally control-orientated.735 Refugees must also make this 
application to the Standing Committee of Refugee Affairs, which is an independent body 
created by the Refugees Act.736   
Another problematic aspect of section 27(c) is that it only entitles the refugee to apply for 
an immigration status five years after formal recognition as a refugee and not from the time 
the refugee entered South Africa. Chapter five discussed the many difficulties faced by 
refugees in accessing asylum and highlighted the fact that many refugees live in South Africa 
for a very long time (in some cases up to 10 years) as temporary asylum seekers before they 
are officially recognised as refugees by the DHA.737 The eligibility for a durable immigration 
status after five years of continuous status as a recognised refugee is therefore in direct 
contradiction to the 2009 UNCHR Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations which takes 
into account the time of initial displacement. 738     
Most importantly, the entitlement to an immigration status is only activated if the Standing 
Committee certifies that the refugee will remain a refugee ‘indefinitely’. This certification 
process is the key to ending refugee status in South Africa. There is, however, limited 
direction for the Standing Committee and refugee applicants on how this application or 
adjudication is to be made. In particular, there are no guidelines on how indefinite refugee 
status is to be interpreted.  
According to the Regulations made pursuant to section 38 of the Refugees Act (Refugee 
Regulations),739 certification does not only occur when an application for permanent 
residence is made. It can also occur in the normal course of the application and renewal of 
                                                          
735 Williams op cit note 447. 
736 Refugees Act at section 9. 
737 See the previous chapter for a detailed discussion hereof at section 5.3. 
738 UNHCR 2009a op cit note 21, preamble.  
739 GC 21075 GNR 366 of 6 April 2000. 
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refugee status.740 Refugees are granted asylum in terms of section 24 the Refugees Act and 
provided with documentation valid for a period of two years.741 The refugee is directed to 
apply for renewal of the refugee status within 90 days before its expiry.742 In terms of 
regulation 15(4), whenever a refugee applies for renewal of refugee status, the Standing 
Committee must consider whether he or she is subject to withdrawal of the refugee status, or 
whether he or she will remain a refugee indefinitely.  
Regulation 15 (4) states: 
 
1. If the Standing Committee determines that the individual will remain a refugee for the 
foreseeable future, the Standing Committee will certify that the individual will remain a refugee 
indefinitely, and the individual may apply for an immigration permit pursuant to section 27(c) 
of the Act.  
2. If the Standing Committee determines that grounds for withdrawal of refugee status apply 
pursuant to section 36 of the Act, the Standing Committee will issue a notice of intent to 
withdraw refugee status pursuant to sub-regulation 17(2).  
3. If the Standing Committee fails to find that the individual will remain a refugee in the 
foreseeable future and that no grounds for withdrawal of refugee status apply, the Refugee 
Status Determination Officer will renew the refugee identity document, valid for period of 2 
years.  
 
This regulation is of the utmost importance. It empowers the Standing Committee to 
declare that a person will remain a refugee indefinitely and to withdraw refugee status if the 
circumstances which gave rise to the need for protection no longer exist and no other 
                                                          
740 Regulation 15 (4). 
741 The practice has been for periods of four years for Somali residents since 2010. 
742 Regulation 15(d). 
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circumstances justify continued protection.743 The Standing Committee may then withdraw 
refugee status in terms of section 36 of the Refugees Act.744 However, if no grounds for 
withdrawal exist, even if the Standing Committee fails to find that the applicant will remain a 
refugee in the foreseeable future, the Refugee Status Determination Officer must renew the 
refugee status document for a further two years. This shows that refugee status is not 
permanent in nature: it may be withdrawn or converted into permanent residence.  
Although regulation 15(4)(3) provides for the renewal of refugee status, it does not 
indicate how many times this may be done. This means that refugee status can be renewed 
indefinitely, creating the possibility for the emergence of a protracted refugee situation. This 
was clearly not the intention of the legislature, considering that the Refugee Act made 
specific provision for pathways to ending refugee status in South Africa.  
 
2.2.  The Standing Committee’s Powers 
As noted earlier, the body tasked with making the determination whether a refugee will 
remain a refugee ‘indefinitely’ is the Standing Committee.745 Additional functions of the 
                                                          
743 Section 5(1) (e) states; he or she can no longer continue to refuse to avail himself or herself of the protection 
of the country of his or her nationality because the circumstances in connection with which he or she has been 
recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist and no other circumstances have arisen which justify his or her 
continued recognition as a refugee. 
744  Section 36 Withdrawal of refugee status (1) If a person has been recognised as a refugee erroneously on an 
application which contains any materially incorrect or false information, or was so recognised due to fraud, 
forgery, a false or misleading representation of a material or substantial nature in relation to the application or if 
such person ceases to qualify for refugee status in terms of section 5 - 
(a) the Standing Committee must inform such person of its intention of withdrawing his or her 
classification as refugee and the reasons therefore; 
745 Refugees Act at section 9 (1). 
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Standing Committee are to assist the Status Determination Officers to interpret the law, 
review manifestly unfounded decision made by the Refugee Status Determination Officers, 
and withdraw refugee status once granted.746 The Standing Committee has discretion to 
decide whether the refugee has met the necessary requirements and is eligible to apply for 
permanent residence. It is, however, trite that no administrator has an unfettered discretion.747 
There are a number of ways in which the exercise of discretion is limited. Administrators 
have a duty not to fetter their discretion, to gather information, evaluate the evidence, act 
reasonably and fairly without bias, observe the rules of procedural fairness, and provide 
reasons.748 In addition, administrators are bound by evidentiary rules, which if not adhered to, 
might render the decision unlawful or unfair. It is also important for the administrator to 
demonstrate an understanding of refugee law, such as the forward-looking test when 
determining refugee status,749 the applicable standard of proof when determining whether 
someone will remain a refugee, as well as the shared burden of proof when determining 
whether the change in the country of origin is a durable and lasting.750 A proper application 
of the principle of good faith751 is required when implementing the relevant legislation for it 
to have to have the intended meaning.  
 
 
                                                          
746 Ibid at section 36. 
747 See Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (CCT35/99) [2000] ZACC 8; 
2000 (3) SA 936; 2000 (8) BCLR 837. 
748 Hoexter op cit note 639. 
749 Ibid. 




2.2.1. Indefinite Refugee Status 
 
According to the Refugees Act, the refugee may apply for an immigration permit if the 
Standing Committee certifies that they ‘will remain a refugee indefinitely’.752 However, the 
application form for certification, which is formulated in accordance with the Regulations, 
states that the applicant must set out the reasons why he or she ‘will not be able to return to 
his or her country in the foreseeable future’. Moreover, regulation 15(4) states that ‘[i]f the 
Standing Committee determines that the individual will remain a refugee for the foreseeable 
future, the Standing Committee will certify that the individual will remain a refugee 
indefinitely’. The Refugee Regulations suggests that the terms ‘indefinite’ and ‘foreseeable 
future’ are interchangeable.753  
It is unclear whether proving indefinite refugee status means proving that the reasons that 
gave rise to refugee status are likely to subsist indefinitely or for the foreseeable future. By 
using the term ‘foreseeable future’, the Regulations appear to acknowledge that it is unlikely 
for a refugee to prove that the reasons that gave rise to the refugee status are likely to subsist 
indefinitely. It is trite in South African law that an Act of Parliament is superior to 
regulations. However, regulations that are consistent with their parent Act cannot be ignored 
without reasons. In the absence of specific guidelines, the Refugee Regulations must thus be 
interpreted in a manner that reflects the purpose of the Refugees Act; that is, they must be 
interpreted to ensure the protection – rather than the control – of refugees.754 In light of the 
                                                          
752 The Application Form is known as the BI-1754.  
753 Oxford English Dictionary (2010) Oxford University Press confirms that indefinitely could be defined as 
‘endlessly, continually, forever, ad infinitum’, whereas ‘foreseeable future’ means that part of the future that can 
be envisioned whilst the current circumstances remain intact. 
754 1997 Green Paper op cit note 440. 
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fact that there are no guidelines for the Standing Committee to make this determination, the 
well-known principles of statutory interpretation could be used. The starting point for 
statutory interpretation is that an administrator must interpret the word in its ordinary 
meaning as long as it does not contradict the clear intention of the legislature. Further 
presumptions caution against adopting an interpretation that renders an Act superfluous, 
futile, or nugatory or an interpretation that is ‘harsh, unjust and unreasonable’.755  
If a refugee is expected to make his or her case based on the circumstances in the country 
of origin, this could mean proving that the current government will remain in power 
indefinitely; where the civil war has ended, that it will not flare up again; or where there is 
peace, that the peace will not last. All of these claims are difficult to prove. Proving the risk 
of harm faced by the refugee – whether from the State or non-State actors – is also difficult. 
These are, thus, particularly harsh and unreasonable requirements that the applicant is 
expected to meet. 
These harsh requirements could render certification impossible and section 27 of the Act 
superfluous. It must be presumed that the Act was enacted to ensure that the certification 
process was fair, accessible and just and to facilitate access by refugees to a suitable 
immigration permit.  
 
2.2.2. Predicting a Lasting and Durable Change in the Country of Origin   
 
The Standing Committee is obliged to determine whether it will be safe for the refugee to 
return to their country of origin before granting certification. This determination raises 
various issues. Whether the Standing Committee opts to apply the term ‘indefinitely’ when 
making the determination to grant certification, or whether it considers the phrase 
                                                          
755 Botha op cit note 62 at 67. 
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‘foreseeable future’, as found in the Regulations, the Standing Committee will have to make a 
prediction into the future. It will have to predict that conditions have improved or will 
improve to the extent that refugees will be safe upon return. The Standing Committee will 
essentially be making a forward-looking assessment of the risk, thus conjecturing into the 
future. Both these issues – whether change is lasting and durable and whether it is fair to 
speculate and thus apply a forward-looking test – have been commented upon by the 
UNHCR,756 refugee law scholars757 and the courts.758 
A guide on the prediction of lasting and durable change can be drawn from the UNHCR’s 
experience with cessation.759 The UNHCR will only invoke cessation if the peace in the 
country of origin is durable and lasting. There are three requirements for the invocation of the 
ceased circumstances clause or cessation clause.760 The first is that there must be lasting 
peace. The second is that the peace must be enduring. The third is that the peace must result 
in the eradication of a well-founded fear of persecution as well as the restoration of 
protection.761  To crystalise the cessation clause, fundamental change in the country of origin 
must be of such a ‘profound and enduring nature that refugees from that country no longer 
require protection from a foreign country’.762 Fundamental change refers to complete political 
                                                          
756 Khan & Schreier op cit note 7 at 41. 
757 Goodwin-Gill op cit note 284. 
758 INS v Cordoza-Fonseca 480 US 421 (1987) 453; Van Garderen NO v Refugee Appeal Board Case No 
30720/2006, 19 June 2007 (unreported); Fang v Refugee Appeal Board 2007 (2) SA 447 (T). 
759 UN Refugee Convention at Article 1C. 
760 UNHCR The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on Their Application, 26 April 1999 (hereinafter “UNHCR 






change. Depending on the grounds for flight, significant reforms such as elections, 
declarations of amnesties and the repeal of oppressive laws may serve as evidence of 
fundamental change.763 Most importantly, the home government must be able to demonstrate 
that it can take care of its citizens and that it can guarantee their safety. Evidence of 
movement in a peaceful or rights-based direction is not sufficient: the basic reforms must be 
in place.764 No all political reforms warrant cessation unless they are causally connected to 
the risk upon which refugee status was recognised.765 
It is also important that fundamental change is tested against the individual applicant’s 
personal circumstances. The Canadian case of Arguello v Canada766 held that ‘when one says 
change in circumstances is an important consideration, one is not speaking of any change. 
The decision-maker must not be content in simply noting that changes have taken place, but 
must assess the impact of those changes on the person concerned.’ The durability of the 
reform must be tested and the duration over which the reform is tested will inevitably be 
longer where the country has just emerged from conflict. Furthermore, Hathaway asserts that 
‘formal evidence of change’ must be tested against the reality on the ground.767  
                                                          
763 Ibid. 
764 See UK House of Lords Hoxha judgement/ R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Hoxha, 
[2002] EWCA Civ (CA 2002) (as well as Canadian case of Nkosi v Canada which made a ‘hesitant and 
equivocal finding that certain limited changes in circumstances in Zaire occurred’ refugee status granted).  
765 UNHCR ceased circumstances guidelines at para. 10 ‘fundamental changes are considered effective only if 
they remove the basis of the fear of persecution; therefore, such changes must be assessed in light of the 
particular cause of the fear, so as to ensure that that the situation which warranted the grant of refugee status has 
ceased to exist.  
766 Arguello-Garcia v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993) 21 Immigration Law Reports 
(2d) 285 (FCTD). 
767 Ibid.  
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The supposed reform in the country of origin must be linked to the core concern of the 
refugee definition: can refugees avail themselves to the protection of their home State?  Such 
protection must be effective and viable, having regard to the general human rights situation in 
the country of origin.768  
 
2.2.3. Applying the Forward Looking Test  
 
Many countries, including the United States and Canada, do not only employ the forward-
looking test when refugees apply for refugee status or when they apply for permanent 
residence. They simply consider the situation at the time of application. The speculative test 
is not considered realistic and the discretion afforded to administrators in such cases is 
considered to be too wide to ensure fairness and justice.769 Even though South Africa has 
provided for past persecution in its Refugees Act,770 the forward-looking test is generally 
employed for refugee status determination in South Africa.771 This test has somehow been 
introduced at the certification stage, which essentially means that the Standing Committee is 
expected to conduct an investigation into the future.772 The manner in which refugee law has 
                                                          
768 Hathaway op cit note 36 at 927.  
769 See US Immigration Regulations, 8 CFR. § 208.13(b)(l)(iii)(a) 
(2005); Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, chapter 27, SC 2001, § 108(4) (Can.). 
770 Ibid at section 5(1) e. 
771 Van Garderen NO v Refugee Appeal Board and Fang v Refugee Appeal Board and Others 2007 (2) SA 447 
(T). 
772 G Goodwin-Gill The Refugee in International Law (2007) 3 ed Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
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dealt with the speculative test is by reconsidering the accepted standard of proof on a 
‘balance of probabilities’ which is generally used in ordinary civil proceedings.773  
 The standard of proof for establishing refugee status has been set lower than on a balance 
of probabilities. It is internationally accepted that the standard of proof is on reasonable 
possibility, but that even this standard is too onerous for refugees.774 As Goodwin-Gill has 
argued: ‘… a decision on the well-foundedness of the fear is essentially an essay in 
hypothesis, an attempt to prophesy what might happen to the applicant in the near future, if 
he returned to his country of origin. Particular care, therefore, needs to be exercised in 
applying the correct standard of proof’.775 As further explained by Goodwin-Gill, in civil 
cases, the typical issue is whether a legally close relevant relation exists between past causes 
and past effects. The applicant for refugee status is adducing a future speculative risk as the 
basis for a claim to protection, a degree of lesser likelihood than that of a balance of 
probabilities is required.776 South Africa has accepted this lesser standard of proof in 
determining whether it is safe for a refugee to return home.777 Expecting the refugee to 
                                                          
773 Goodwin-Gill ibid; UNHCR Note on Standard and Burden of Proof, 16 December 1998, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3338.html, accessed on 5 May 2016. Already in 1987 the United States 
Supreme Court in INS v Cordoza –Fonseca supra note 759 rejected the traditional balance of probabilities 
standard in favour of a more generous reasonable possibility test. The Court held that: ‘There is simply no room 
in the United States definition for concluding that because an applicant has a ten percent (10%) chance of being 
shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no well-founded fear’ of the event happening … [A ] 
moderate interpretation of the well-founded fear standard would indicate that so long as an objective situation is 
established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is 
enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility.’ 
774 UNHCR ibid. 
775 Goodwin-Gill op cit note 773. 
776 Goodwin-Gill op cit note 773. 
777 Van Garderen & Fang supra note 759. 
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establish whether he will remain a refugee indefinitely similarly demands that the refugee 
speculates into the future, not just into the foreseeable future according to the Standing 
Committee. Hence it is submitted that a lesser standard of proof should be the applicable 
standard. 
Even though the burden of proof in a civil matter is generally on the applicant, refugee law 
has recognised the prejudice to vulnerable refugees and that this burden should be shared 
between examiner and refugee.778 While decision-makers are allowed to conduct their own 
investigations to assist them with discharging their evidential burden,779 the information 
gathered must be shared with the affected refugees. It is trite in administrative law that when 
an administrator uses information not considered by the applicant, the applicant must be 
given an opportunity to respond to it.780 In AOL v Minister of Home Affairs,781 the Court 
considered the question whether the Refugee Appeal Board was obliged to bring to the 
attention of the appellant prejudicial information and afford them an opportunity to deal with 
this information before making a formal decision. Referred to Kotze v Minister of Health,782 
the Court came to the conclusion that the applicant was denied a fair hearing, arguing that 
‘the applicant should have been granted the opportunity to deal with the information, which 
did not form part of his application, and which was later taken into account’.783 This decision 
is consistent with section 6 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA), which 
                                                          
778 UNHCR Handbook at para 196. 
779 UNHCR Handbook at para 196.  
780 Kotze v Minister of Health 1996 (3) BCLR 417 (T).   
781 AOL v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (2) SA 8 (D). 
782 Kotze supra note 781. 
783 AOL supra note 782 at 13. 
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provide any person adversely affected by administrative action has the right to know what 
evidence is being relied upon to reach a decision against him or her.784  
Yet, it is the practice of the Standing Committee to use reports on conditions in countries 
without giving the applicants an opportunity to respond. Information must be shared and the 
applicant must be given an opportunity to respond to it or adduce his or her own information 
to contradict it.785  
     From the above discussion, it is apparent that a harsh or literal interpretation of the 
legislative provision that entitles a refugee to apply for a durable immigration permit can 
effectively block the refugees’ path thereto resulting in a protracted refugee situation. The 
case brought by Somalis discussed below highlights some of these difficulties. 
 
2.3. The Somali Case as Evidence of Problems with Certification 
 
The Somali Association of South Africa and Others v the Chairperson of the Standing 
Committee for Refugee Affairs786 highlights the difficulties refugees face in accessing 
permanent residence, even though there is a clear legal pathway to ending refugee status in 
the Refugees Act. This case deals with refugees who have made applications for certification. 
Although judgement is yet to be delivered, the founding documents of this case reveal the 
Standing Committee’s approach to certification.  
As stated earlier in this thesis,787 Somali nationals have sought refuge in South Africa 
since the early 1990s. Consequently, a large number of Somalis have been in South Africa for 
                                                          
784 See Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
785 See case study at section 6 of this chapter.  
786 High Court, Western Cape Division, Cape Town, Case No 18655/14 (ongoing). 
787 See chapter one, section 2. 
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five years or longer; they have also not been able to return to Somalia because of the 
persistence of conflict there.788 Many of them have remained here as refugees. It could 
therefore be said that they are in a protracted refugee situation as defined in the UNHCR 
Conclusions on Protracted Refugee Situations.789 They cannot return to Somalia and South 
Africa has refused them a more durable form of residence than refugee status. At the same 
time, the resettlement efforts by the UNHCR only serve a very small number of refugees in 
South Africa.790  
According to its founding affidavit, about 35 Somali refugees made their applications for 
certification between October 2010 and June 2012. They all received feedback in 2014, 
stating that their applications had been rejected because they were unable to prove that they 
would remain refugees indefinitely due to changed circumstances in Somalia.  
In addition to these 35 Somali refugees, a further 132 Somali refugees have also had their 
certification applications rejected on exactly the same basis. Both groups approached the 
UCT Refugee Law Clinic for legal assistance. Similar experiences by Somalis have been 
reported at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Law Clinic,791 the Legal Resources 
Centre,792 the Wits Law Clinic and Lawyers for Human Rights.793 
The response to the applicants’ case shows that the Standing Committee has adopted a 
literal approach to the interpretation of the provision that refugees must prove that they will 
remain refugees indefinitely before certification can be granted for purposes of permanent 
                                                          
788 See chapter one. 
789 See chapter two of this thesis at 2009 UNHCR Protracted refugee situation Conclusion. 
790 This has been confirmed by UNHCR South Africa office. Also the recent Trump executive order has banned 
refugees from Somalia entering the U.S. 
791 NMMU Law Clinic, available at http://cla.nmmu.ac.za. 
792 Legal Resources Centre, available at http://lrc.org.za/lcrarchive/. 
793 Lawyers for Human Rights, available at http://www.lhr.org.za/. 
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residence.794 In its answering affidavit, the Standing Committee maintains that the literal 
meaning of the word ‘indefinitely’ must be used. In support of its stand, it makes reference to 
a rule of statutory interpretation,795 which states that: 
  
… in the first instance you take what the word means in the popular sense and ordinary parlance, 
words use in an enactment should be understood in their everyday meaning unless that word is in 
conflict with the intention of the law giver as it appears from the statute read as a whole and from 
other material circumstance. 
 
The Standing Committee also used as authority for its approach the case of Vansa v 
Vanadium SA Ltd v Registrar of Deeds,796 which interpreted the word ‘indefinite’ as meaning 
without ‘limitation as to time’. The Committee adopted this meaning without considering the 
context in which the word was used and interpreted in that case. A further authority used by 
the Standing Committee is Treadwell and Another v Roberts,797 where the Court considered 
the meaning of the expression ‘for an indefinite period’ and held that ‘indefinite’ in itself 
means ‘not defined’. The Standing Committee also made reference to the dictionary meaning 
of ‘indefinitely’. Using these sources, the Standing Committee came to the conclusion that all 
of the applicants were unable to prove that they would remain refugees indefinitely and 
therefore refused to grant them certification, effectively blocking their permanent residence 
applications.   
                                                          
794 Answering Affidavit at paras 15-18. 
795 E A Kellway Principle of Legal Interpretation, Statutes, Contracts and Wills (1995) Butterworths: Oxford at 
69. 
796 (1996) 1 All SA 433 (T).  
797 1913 WLD 54. 
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As has been argued above, it is impossible for anyone to prove that they will remain a 
refugee indefinitely. The literal approach adopted by the Standing Committee has had the 
effect of making permanent residence unavailable to refugees.798 Also noteworthy is the fact 
that this interpretation is inconsistent with the term ‘foreseeable future’ used in the 
Regulations and on the application form for certification, which very clearly states that the 
applicant must set out the reasons why he or she ‘will not be able to return to his or her 
country in the foreseeable future’.  
It is also clear from the letters of rejection that the Standing Committee came to the 
conclusion that the applicants would not remain refugees by looking at the conditions in the 
country of origin only. The Standing Committee also justified its decision rejecting the 
certifications by saying that significant change had occurred in Somalia indicating that the 
current conflict was reaching an end.799 Arguing that certification was inherently a forward-
looking process, it said that the conditions of the country of origin had to be taken into 
account.800 The Committee made this decision partly because refugees cannot prove that they 
will remain refugees indefinitely.  
Furthermore, the Committee appears to have relied on evidence that supported its view 
that conditions had changed so much in Somalia that it was safe for refugees to return home. 
There is no indication that the Standing Committee considered the information supplied by 
the applicants that showed violence in Somalia had continued to occur and it was likely to 
continue into the foreseeable future. The Standing Committee also only considered 
                                                          
798 See Botha op cit note 373 for the full discussion on the application of statutory interpretation principles. 
799 Answering Affidavit at paras 50-59. 
800 Answering Affidavit at para 17. 
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information about improvements in Somalia at the national level and ignored the specific 
areas where the refugees fled from.801  
     Even though they were not granted certification, the Standing Committee nevertheless 
instructed the Refugee Status Determination Officers to renew their status as refugees for a 
further four years. None of the rejected applicants had their status withdrawn by the Standing 
Committee.  In fact, since their application for certification, some applicants have had their 
status renewed and, consequently, their refugee status will only expire in 2020. We thus have 
the extraordinary situation where some Somali refugees have lived in South Africa as 
refugees for more than 20 years with seemingly no end in sight to their refugeehood. The 
renewal of their refugee status is precisely the action that results in a protracted refugee 
situation. 
     In this case, even though the Standing Committee rejected the applicant’s contention that 
they would remain refugees indefinitely, it appears that they accepted the applicants’ 
contention that they would remain refugees in the foreseeable future. It is curious that since 
the determination that the situation in Somalia had improved was made, the government has 
made no effort to repatriate Somali refugees. Instead, the government has continued to renew 
their refugee status. If it continues to renew their status without providing them with the 
opportunity to apply for permanent residence, the Standing Committee can be criticised of 
applying the law in bad faith.  
 
3. PERMANENT RESIDENCE AS A DURABLE SOLUTION 
 
This thesis has demonstrated the extent to which living with refugee status in South Africa is 
an insecure way of life. This insecurity, it has been established, stems largely from the type of 
                                                          
801 Answering Affidavit at paras 50 – 59. 
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short-term documentation that refugees are issued. Far too many services are withheld for the 
refugee because of their status. Refugees struggle to enjoy the rights guaranteed to them by 
the Constitution and the Refugees Act: they may work and study, but they cannot be 
registered in the legal, medical, educational industries or professions.802 They struggle to 
open bank accounts,803 access pension funds, get home loans, get a driver’s licence, and to 
find jobs, because refugee status documents are issued for short periods of time.804 Permanent 
residence, on the other hand, provides a more secure legal status. 
Apart from guaranteeing secure legal status, permanent residence allows refugees to 
become part of a national community. Refugees may want to retain their nationality for 
various reasons, but this does not mean that they do not want to be part of a world 
community. Permanent residence gives refugees that sense of belonging craved by refugees 
in protracted situations. For refugees who do not want to change their nationality, permanent 
residence is a good middle ground solution. 
       The Courts too have identified permanent residents as a class of foreigners with more 
rights than refugees.805 Furthermore, in contrast to local integration, which in reality can 
mean indefinite refugee status, permanent residence signifies an end to refugee status. In 
South Africa, permanent residence is made available to refugees through its Immigration 
Act,806 but as explained above, the application straddles both the Refugees Act, where 
                                                          
802 A Bhamjee & J Klaaren ‘Legal Problems Facing Refugees in Johannesburg’ in Landau (ed) Forced Migrants 
in the New Johannesburg: Towards a Local Government Response (2004) Johannesburg: Forced Migration 
Studies Programme, 54–60.  
803 See section 5.4 of chapter five. 
804 Ibid. 
805 Khosa supra note 571; Union of Refugee Women supra note 584, discussed in chapter five. 
806 Immigration Act. 
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prescribed requirements must be met (the cumbersome certification process as discussed 
above) before the completion of the application in terms of the Immigration Act.  
        
3.1. Definition and Legal Basis 
 
Permanent residency refers to a person’s visa status. The person is allowed to reside 
indefinitely within a country of which he or she is not a citizen. Most importantly, permanent 
residence allows a foreigner to reside permanently in a host country without giving up his or 
her nationality. This secure legal status allows for greater integration into the host community 
than local integration. According to section 25(1) of the Immigration Act, a holder of a 
permanent residence permit ‘has all the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of a citizen 
save for those rights, privileges, duties and obligations which a law or the Constitution 
explicitly ascribes to citizenship’.807 
Permanent residence is distinct from citizenship, but it is also distinct from refugee status. 
This difference is evident in South Africa because permanent residence is a legal residency 
status that a refugee can apply for, five years after being granted refugee status.808 By 
comparison, in the United States, refugees may apply for permanent residency after one year 
of admission to refugee status.809 Unlike in South Africa, it is compulsory in the United 
                                                          
807 Ibid. 
808 See explanation of section 27 of the Immigration Act below. 
809 M Gebremeskel ‘Applying for Permanent Residence as a Refugee’, available at http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/applying-permanent-residence-refugee.html, accessed on 23 February 2017; See Also US 
Department of Homeland Security at  
https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-through-refugee-or-asylee-status accessed on 5 September 2016 
209 
 
States for refugees to apply for permanent residence after the one year. This rule guarantees 
an end to refugee status.810   
    Under the South African Immigration Act, a refugee can make an application for 
permanent residence in terms of section 27 as opposed to section 26 of the Immigration 
Act.811 Section 27(d) provides that ‘The director-general may issue a permanent residence 
permit to a foreigner of good and sound character who is a refugee referred to in section 27(c) 
of the Refugees Act subject to any prescribed requirements’. 
Unlike in the United States, neither the Immigration Act nor the Refugees Act compels the 
refugee to make this application for permanent residence, even after the required lapse of five 
years since the grant of refugee status. The DHA is also not required to inform refugees of the 
availability of permanent residence as an option to end their refugee status. Refugees may 
thus be unaware of this right and continue to live with refugee status in perpetuity in South 
Africa. 
                                                          
810 Ibid. 
811 Section 26 of the Immigration Act -  Direct residence  
Subject to section 25, the Director-General may issue a permanent residence permit to a foreigner who— 
(a)        has been the holder of a work permit, including one issued under a corporate permit, in terms of 
this Act for five years and  has proven to the satisfaction of the Director-General that he or she  has 
received an offer for permanent employment; 
(b)        has been  the spouse of a citizen or permanent resident for five years and the Director-General is 
satisfied that a good faith spousal relationship exists:  Provided that such permit shall lapse if at any time 
within two years from the issuing of that permit the good faith spousal relationship no longer subsists, save 
for the case of death; 
(c)        is a child under the age of 21 of a citizen or permanent  resident, provided that such permit shall 
lapse if such foreigner does not submit an application for its confirmation within two years of his or her 
having turned 21 years of age;  or  
(d)        is a child of a citizen. 
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According to regulation 24(11) of the Immigration Regulations,812 the requirements 
contemplated in section 27(d) of the Act are:  
 
(a) the submission of the certification contemplated in section 27(c) of the Refugees Act, 1998 
(Act No. 130 of 1998); 
(b) where applicable, the submission of affidavits with regard to aliases used by the applicant and 
family members; and 
(c) the submission of the documentation contemplated in regulation 22(3)(b), (f), (g), (h) and (i): 
Provided that in the case of documents issued by the country from which he or she fled not being 
available, a sworn affidavit shall be submitted. 
 
All refugee applicants for permanent residence must therefore satisfy the DHA that they 
have been granted certification by the Standing Committee on the basis that they will remain 
refugees indefinitely and that they have been continuously present in South Africa for a 
period of five years after being granted refugee status. In addition, the applicants must submit 
their own birth certificates and those of their dependents, proof of spousal relationships, 
medical and radiological reports, and police clearance certificates.  
It may not always be possible for refugees to provide all these documents because of the 
manner in which they are forced to flee and because their refugee status makes it difficult for 
them to approach their governments for such documents. Understandably, the Regulations 
require an affidavit in place of the prescribed documents where the documents cannot be 
obtained.  
Generally, permanent residence applicants have to demonstrate that they are of good 
character and a police clearance certificate issued by their own government is taken as 
evidence of this. The certificate normally asserts that the bearer has not been convicted of any 
                                                          
812 Immigration Act 13 of 2002, Immigration Regulations 2014. 
211 
 
criminal offence or engaged any undesirable behaviour. An exception has been made for 
refugees who cannot be expected to approach their governments for such a reference of good 
character. Refugees must instead source such confirmation of good character from the South 
African police, who will only issue such a certificate if there is no criminal record in South 
Africa.813  
While this exception is welcome, it has been found to be particularly prejudicial to asylum 
seekers and refugees who have been forced to admit guilt and pay administrative fines for 
expired permits.814 Permits expire most often because asylum seekers and refugees are unable 
to access the Refugee Reception Offices due to maladministration at these offices or due to 
lack of funds to travel to offices, located far away from their place of residence, four to five 
times a year in the case of asylum seekers.815 These technical difficulties in accessing the 
Refugee Reception Offices have criminalised refugees and compromised their good 
character.  
    Another major obstacle for permanent residence applications appears to be the waiting 
periods, which is no less than two years. This problem is not unique to refugees who apply 
for permanent residence: it applies to all permanent resident applicants.816 In Eisenberg,817 
the Western Cape High Court held that waiting for 19 months for a visa and permit to be 
finalised is unlawful, unjust and procedurally unfair. Applicants have a right to have their 
applications finalised speedily. Furthermore, even though refugees have also been exempted 
                                                          
813 See https://www.saps.gov.za/services/applying_clearence_certificate.php, accessed on 17 February 2017. 
814 Bukasa v Minister of Home Affairs Case No 22197/10, Western Cape High Court (unreported). 
815See chapter five. 




from paying the fees for the application; they still have to pay the private company (VFS – 
Global) an enormous administrative fee for handling the application.818  
From this discussion, it can be concluded that South Africa considered the particular 
position of refugees and made an effort to lower the requirements for an application 
permanent residency by refugees, such as reducing fees for application, and obtaining a 
police clearance in South Africa, rather than from the country of origin. It is submitted, 
however, that South Africa did not sufficiently consider the vulnerabilities of refugees when 
legislating for the requirements for applications for permanent residency by refugees.        
Whilst on the face of it appears that South Africa has made it easier for refugees to apply 
for residency, as directed by Article 34 of the UN Refugee Convention, South Africa has 
made it more cumbersome by expecting refugees to meet additional requirements to those 
other foreigners have to meet. For example, the refugee has to undergo the burdensome 
certification process while other foreigners do not have to. Furthermore, while other 
foreigners can make their applications for permanent residence on the basis of their 
permanent employment in South Africa, this option is not available to refugees. As has 
already been pointed out, the fact that refugee documents are valid for a short period of time 
operates as a hindrance for refugees to find permanent employment which would enable them 
to apply for permanent residence. Furthermore, information about their personal 
circumstances in South Africa, such as their contribution, or loyalty, to South Africa or their 
self-sufficient status is not considered at the certification stage. Overall, the system does not 
favour the application of refugees for permanent residence: refugees must first overcome the 
hurdle of proving that they will remain a refugee indefinitely and, once they have overcome 
                                                          
818 VFS Fees at a glance, available at www.vfsglobal.com/zsp/southafrica/visa_fees_at_glance.html accessed on 
8 September 2016. 
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that hurdle, they have to fulfill the eligibility and procedural requirements of the permanent 
residency.  
 
3.2. Permanent Residence as a Solution to Refugeehood 
 
Even though permanent residence is not expressly addressed by the UN Refugee Convention, 
many countries have included it directly in their refugee legislation and have made it 
available to refugees after varying periods of time.819 According to Hathaway, traditionally 
countries of the North have regularly converted refugee status into permanent residence even 
though this is technically not required by the UN Refugee Convention. Countries of the North 
provide permanent residence automatically because of the ‘interest convergence’, but this is 
changing in recent times as some of these countries have introduced temporary protection as 
an alternative to refugee protection under the UN Refugee Convention.820 Hathaway is a 
proponent of temporary protection; he does not believe permanent residence should 
automatically extend to refugees.821 He has, however, identified particulary vulnerable 
refugees such as unaccompanied minors and tortured victims who should be granted 
immediate permanent residence.822 He has also identified five years as a reasonable time after 
which refugees should be considered for permanent residence if they are unable to return to 
                                                          
819 J Hathaway & R A Neve ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized 
and Solution-Oriented Protection’ (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal at 115 – 119 (Even though 
international law presently requires no more than the provision of rights-regarding temporary protection, 
Northern states, in law or in practice, have historically afforded refugees permanent status). 
820 Ibid.  
821 Ibid. 
822 C Eyber & J Hathaway ‘Refugee Protection in South Africa: A Conversation’, available at 
www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/migrationdocuments/interviews/inter1.htm, accessed 23 December 2016.  
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their country of origin.823 This solution-orientated approach can assist in stemming the ever-
growing protracted refugee situation in South Africa.   
Permanent residence is a legal status that is distinct from refugee status, but it is also 
distinct from naturalisation or citizenship. In South Africa, it is a prerequisite for 
naturalisation in South Africa. A number of other countries have adopted the bifurcated 
approach to naturalisation.824 Many countries have demonstrated reluctance to immediately 
allow for naturalisation and have introduced the secure legal status of permanent residence; it 
can, therefore, be seen as a viable alternative to naturalisation.   
Permanent residence, in many ways, is the best solution for refugees in protracted 
situations. Refugees can become part of a national community, enjoy a range of rights that 
will allow them to live in dignity, and have secure legal status. For various reasons refugees 
may silmutaneously want to retain their nationality and to be part of the world community, 
being allowed freedom to move not only internally but also across borders. Permanent 
residence gives refugees that sense of belonging craved by refugees in protracted situations. 
 




Once a refugee has been afforded permanent residence in South Africa, they can apply for 
naturalisation. As was shown in chapter three, naturalisation is regarded by Article 34 of UN 
Refugee Convention as a durable solution to protracted refugee situations. In addition, South 
                                                          
823 Ibid.  
824 Hathaway & Neve op cit note 820 at 837. 
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Africa has ratified the OAU Refugee Convention, whose Article II.1825 states that States 
should use their best endeavours to ‘secure the settlement’ of refugees who are unable to 
return home.   
South Africa’s post-Apartheid refugee policy clearly envisaged the naturalisation of 
refugees.826 The 1998 White Paper stated: 
 
While reiterating that voluntary repatriation is the best solution for refugee problems, the task team 
are mindful that there are refugees for whom going home may not be a viable solution in the 
foreseeable future. Therefore, a refugee, having been recognised as a refugee and granted asylum 
may, after a period of five years, make an application for naturalisation. In making such an 
application the same criteria will apply to refugees as to permanent residents.827 
 
As noted in chapter four, the White Paper did not adopt a bifurcated approach consisting of 
permanent residence as the first step, and naturalisation as the second step. Even the draft 
1998 Refugees Bill828 explicitly provided for naturalisation, without requiring that the refugee 
apply for permanent residence first. It was the Refugees Act that introduced the bifurcated 
approach. As argued earlier, this approach is severely cumbersome. 
It is clear from various studies that refugees want some kind of stability in legal status and 
that they do not want to be treated as second-class persons in perpetuity. In some countries, 
                                                          
825 Article II.1 provides: ‘Member States of the OAU shall use their best endeavours consistent with their 
respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who, for well-founded 
reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality.’ 
826 The Draft Refugees White Paper incorporating the Draft Refugees Bill (1998) Government Gazette Vol 396 
18 June 1998 No 18988, available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/18988_0.pdf, accessed on 21 
September 2016. 
827 Ibid. 
828 1998 Bill op cit note 827 at section 26. 
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naturalisation is the only means by which this can happen. In others, like South Africa, 
refugees can apply for permanent residence status as well.             
 
4.2. The Meaning of Naturalisation   
 
Naturalisation has a distinct legal meaning. In Nottebohm, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) said: ‘According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the 
opinion of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a 
genuine connection of existence, interest and sentiments, together with the existence of 
reciprocal rights and duties.’829  
 The terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ are used interchangeably today,830 but not during 
Apartheid. According to Manby: 
 
In African countries under colonial rule or South Africa under apartheid, only those of European 
descent had both nationality and full citizenship rights. Similarly, it used to be common for women 
to have nationality of a state but not full citizenship, because they did not have the right to vote. 
Today, human rights law principles of non-discrimination require that all those who are nationals 
of a state enjoy the same rights.831  
 
No doubt citizenship symbolises the strongest bond between the State and the holder.832 
Nationality provides the holder with rights, such as the right to diplomatic protection when 
                                                          
829 Op cit note 364. 
830 The terms are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
831 B Manby Citizenship laws in Africa, A Comparative Study (2016) 3 ed Open Society Foundations: New York 
at ix in note 3. 
832 Ibid 832. 
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outside the country, the right to hold political office and vote. These rights are normally not 
available to non-citizens. 
 
4.3. Legal Basis and Process for Naturalisation for Refugees 
 
Naturalisation is a possibility after five years of continuous residence as a permanent 
resident.833 This means that a refugee who obtains permanent residence and lives in South 
Africa continuously for the duration of at least five years can apply for naturalisation. There 
is thus a legal pathway to naturalisation for refugees in South Africa by means of the 
immigration and citizenship laws. Although these provisions give expression to Article 34 of 
the UN Refugee Convention, many challenges make it difficult for refugees to obtain 
naturalisation.  
Refugees may acquire nationality in South Africa, but only upon application. Furthermore, 
consideration of the application is discretionary as the responsible Minister may reject it if he 
or she feels that the applicant is not of good moral character, does not speak any official 
South African language well enough, or other reasons.834 South African citizenship policy 
thus appears to be assimilationist in nature.  
Section 5(a) of the Citizenship Amendment Act 17 of 2010835 provides: 
 
The minister may, upon application in the prescribed manner, grant a certificate of naturalization 
as a South Africa citizen to any foreigner who satisfies the Minister that; 
(b) he or she has been admitted to the Republic for permanent residence therein; and 
                                                          
833 Section 5 of the Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. 
834 Citizenship Act. 
835 South African Citizenship Amendment Act 17 of 2010. 
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(c) he or she is ordinarily resident in the Republic and that he or she has been so resident for a 
continuous period of not less than five years immediately preceding the date of his or her 
application and that he or she has, in addition, been resident in the Republic for a further period 
of not less than four years during the eight years immediately preceding the date of his or her 
application. 
 
These provisions mean that a refugee is eligible for naturalisation in South Africa if he or 
she has been physically and continuously present in South Africa for no less than 10 years. 
This means that the minimum period of qualification for naturalisation exceeds that stipulated 
by the UNHCR for refugees in protracted situations by more than double.836  
     South Africa makes no distinction between refugees and other foreigners as far as the 
application for naturalisation is concerned, although the UN Refugee Convention expects it to 
do so.837 The Council of Europe Explanatory report838 contains some examples of favourable 
conditions, which include a length of required residence, less stringent language 
requirements, a simpler procedure, and the lowering of fees. Some European Union States 
have translated the spirit of these provisions into their national laws by reducing waiting 
periods and fees or removing the requirements for the renunciation of the citizenship of the 
host country. A further good practice among European States is that the period spent as an 
asylum seeker is taken into consideration when calculating the waiting period required for 
refugees to submit an application for citizenship. 
By contrast, section 5 suggests that the period between entry into South Africa and 
obtaining refugee status is not taken into account. This is inconsistent with the duty that 
                                                          
836 See chapter two. 
837 UN Refugee Convention at Article 34 requests for the process to be expedited and for, amongst others, the 
fees to be lowered. 
838 Council of Europe Explanatory Report Strasbourg 16 X 1980. 
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South Africa has in international law to assist refugees to meet the requirements for 
naturalisation.839   
Citizenship and permanent residency require refugees to give up their refugee status. This 
is so because in South Africa, no immigrant can hold more than one legal status.840 However, 
by the time refugees apply for naturalisation, they are no longer considered to be refugees but 
permanent residents. It may therefore be asked whether refugees who have been granted 
permanent residence need or want this additional guarantee of naturalisation. It cannot be 
disputed that permanent residence ends refugee status and hence can be used to avert 
protracted refugee situations. Refugees clearly have a choice. Once they acquire permanent 
residence, they are not compelled to apply for naturalisation. However, there is a strong 
possibility that those with permanent residence may become stateless. Naturalisation is an 
appropriate solution for these. For example, refugee children born in South Africa may be 
denied the nationality of their parents. Naturalisation is therefore strongly recommended in 
cases where refugees or permanent residents are in danger of becoming stateless. 
 
4.4. Refugee Children Born in South Africa 
 
Children of refugees born in South Africa are arguably the worst affected by their refugee 
status. South Africa does not grant citizenship based on birth.841 Jus soli, which describes a 
system of law that grants nationality on the basis of birth on the territory, does not apply in 
South Africa. Thus, any refugee child born in South Africa does not automatically become a 
                                                          
839 See chapter three, section 5. 
840 Immigration Act. 
841 R Elphick ‘A State of Statelessness’, available at http://www.lhr.org.za/news/2015/state-statelessness, 
accessed on 2 March 2017. 
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citizen, but is simply the child of a recognised refugee or permanent resident. Citizenship by 
status or blood, also known as jus sanguinis, which South Africa recognizes, is highly 
prejudicial for refugee children born in South Africa. These children start their life and 
continue to live in inequality until they attain the age of 18 years and prove continuous 
residence in South Africa.  
Section 4 of the 2010 Citizenship Amendment Act842 provides: 
 
(1) Any person who –  
(a) Immediately prior to the date of the commencement of the South African Citizenship 
Amendment Act, 2010, was a South African citizen by naturalisation; or 
(b) In terms of this Act is granted a certificate of naturalisation as a South African citizen in 
terms of section 5, … 
(3) A child born in the Republic of parents who are not South African citizens or   who have not 
been admitted into the Republic for permanent residence, qualifies to apply for South African 
citizenship upon becoming a major if – 
(a) he or she has lived in the Republic from the date of his or her birth to the date of becoming a 
major; and  
(b) his or birth has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Births and Deaths 
Registration Act, 1992.843  
 
As these provisions make clear, children born to a refugee in South Africa can become 
citizens through naturalization or by birth and continuous residence in the country after 
attaining the age of 18. To qualify for the latter option, the child’s birth must be registered in 
                                                          
842 Act No 17 of 2010 amending the Citizenship Act No 88 of 1995. Section 1 (vi) places the age of majority at 
18 years.  
843 Act 51 of 1992. 
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accordance with the Birth and Death Registration Act.844 Although birth registration is a 
requirement for everybody, the birth of refugee children was not previously automatically 
entered into the National Population Register. It is therefore unclear whether this requirement 
will be interpreted as being peremptory or merely directory.  
The requirement that the child lives in South Africa until the child the age of 18 is 
regrettable, as it sets up an 18-year minimum requirement, which is too long. In cases of 
children born in South Africa to refugee parents who have not been admitted to permanent 
residence but have reached the age of 18, naturalisation is the only viable option to ending 
their refugee status and preventing statelessness.  
 
4.5. Naturalisation for Refugees: A Contentious Issue  
 
Naturalisation is increasingly becoming a contentious issue as more and more western States 
are concerned about maintaining and securing national borders. Not only has one of the 
responses been to implement more restrictive asylum regimes that prevent ‘bogus’ applicants 
and grant refuge only to the deserving,845 governments are also either adopting systems that 
include additional tests for refugees or by delinking citizenship for refugee status.846 The 
United Kingdom, for example, has adopted a policy whereby applicants for citizenship 
undergo an English language and English life test and observe citizenship ceremonies.847  
                                                          
844 Ibid. 
845 E Stewart & G Mulvey 'Seeking Safety Beyond Refuge: The Impact of Immigration and Citizenship Policy 
upon Refugees in the UK' (2014) 40 (7) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies at 1023-1039. 
846 Ibid. 
847 Stewart op cit note 846 at 1024. 
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Refugees have, unfortunately, become tied into broader debates on general migration and 
race relations policies, and are generally portrayed as a threat to national security.848 
Regrettably, this has led to the move from granting permanent refugee status to granting 
refugee status for a limited period. This system takes away the basis on which refugees build 
their lives – certainty of their status.  
 
4.6. Recent Reforms 
 
South Africa, in common with some countries, is looking at delinking refugee status from 
citizenship.849 Recent efforts to reform South African refugee policy suggest a shift to a more 
restrictive approach to naturalisation for refugees. The 2016 Green Paper seeks to de-link 
refugee status from residency and naturalisation. It states that ‘there should be no automatic 
progression or right to permanent residency or citizenship in law or in practice; and the 
granting of permanent residency and citizenship should be delinked’.850 It further states: 
 
Steps should be taken to ensure due weight is given to the value of the status of permanent 
residence and of citizenship, including the level of approval necessary. The process for awarding 
citizenship should ensure that rights and responsibilities are explained, understood; and ensure that 
the conditions attached to them are accepted by those to whom the status is conferred.851 
 
                                                          
848 Ibid at 1026. 
849 The 2016 Green Paper op cit note 473, chapter 4, at 39-42. 
850 Ibid. 
851 2016 Green Paper op cit note 473. 
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With this approach, citizenship is clearly seen as a prestigious status.852 Its function is 
mainly to control access to the nation and refugees are excluded.  The 2016 Green Paper also 
states that the granting of citizenship should be considered exceptional. A list of those who 
have applied for citizenship through naturalisation would be approved by the responsible 
Minister and published periodically.853  
The 2016 Green Paper854 views its approach to residency or naturalisation as being 
‘mechanical and compliance-based’, and not tailored to achieve specific strategic goals such 
as building the nation. It states: ‘… it is a misconception that immigrants have a 
constitutional right to progress toward residency or citizenship status. A sovereign State has 
the prerogative to determine who enters its territory and to enact laws accordingly’.855 In 
short, the Green Paper represents a greater assertion of sovereignty over naturalisation than 
has been done since 1993. However, South Africa cannot ignore its international obligations 
to refugees.856 The Green Paper is clearly inconsistent with international law which urges 




Even though there is legal pathway to ending refugee status in South Africa, refugees have 
been in the country as refugees for a long duration. This thesis argues that there should be an 
                                                          
852 P S Masumbe ‘The Process of Naturalisation of Refugees under International and South African Law and its 
Implications for Human Rights’ PHD Thesis, Nelson Mandela School of law, University of Fort Hare, South 
Africa (2015).  
853 2016 Green Paper op cit note 473. 
854 Ibid. 
855 Ibid. 
856 Hathaway op cit note 36. 
224 
 
end to refugee status. However, the available avenues of ending refugee status in South 
Africa are largely inaccessible because of the complex manner in which they are regulated 
and administered. The administrative body responsible for facilitating access to permanent 
residence and naturalisation has interpreted the law in such a harsh manner that it has made 
these pathways superfluous. This chapter argues that if the law in South Africa is correctly 









In Chronic Exile: An Untenable Situation 







1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This thesis set out to analyse the phenomenon of protracted refugee situations and its 
implications for the rights of refugees. The primary concern was to find out whether such a 
phenomenon was envisaged in international law and its consequences anticipated. More 
importantly, the thesis set out to investigate whether a protracted refugee situation exists in 
South Africa and whether South Africa has taken concrete steps to address it.  
These questions are worth exploring. In some African countries857 and other parts of the 
world,858 armed conflicts have gone on for considerable periods of time, displacing many 
people who have remained refugees for more than a decade. These refugees are found in 
South Africa and other African countries. On a broader level, the world is currently 
witnessing an unprecedented increase of refugees into Europe, which some commentators 
have described as Europe’s greatest migration crisis since World War II.859  
Much of the scholarly attention has been directed at the current European refugee 
situation, neglecting refugees in protracted situations. These refugees deserve consideration 
from States and the UNHCR so that durable solutions can be found and implemented for their 
benefit.  
 
                                                          
857 P Dorrie ‘The Wars Ravaging Africa in 2016, available at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-wars-
ravaging-africa-2016-14993, accessed on 12 March 2017. 
858 See http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/05/10-conflicts-to-watch-in-2017/, accessed on 12 March 2017. 
859 M Urban ‘Europe Is Facing the Biggest Refugee Crisis since WWII’, available at 
www.huffingtonpost.com/miguel-urban/the-balkans-refugees-_b_8103868.html, accessed on 1 March 2017; see 
also https://news.vice.com/.../the-year-europe-buckled-under-the-biggest-refugee-crisis-sin, accessed on 1 
March 2017; See also www.businessinsider.com/r-migrant-tragedies-on-land-and-sea-claim-hundreds-of-liv, 




2. THE NATURE OF ‘PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS’ 
 
Both the UN Refugee Convention and the OAU Convention do not expressly refer to the 
term ‘protracted refugee situation’.  However, the UNHCR has since 2001 considered it to be 
a serious legal problem and made several attempts to define it and find ways of addressing it. 
What motivated the UNHCR to study this concept was the discovery that some refugees 
remained with this status for a long time, and as such, their needs changed radically, 
suggesting that this class of refugees needed unique ways of addressing their needs.  
After several attempts, the UNHCR came up with a comprehensive definition of 
‘protracted refugee situations’ in 2009. According to this definition, this term denotes 
‘situations where refugees have been in exile for five years or more after their initial 
displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions’.860 As 
was shown in chapter two, this definition represents a marked improvement on the previous 
definitions. Firstly, it does not make any specific reference to the minimum number of 
refugees that must have lived in a host state for more than five years. It also does not make 
any assumptions about the geopolitical territory where such situations can be found. 
Consequently, it does not matter, for purposes of deciding whether a particular group of 
refugees are in a protracted refugee situation, to ask how many refugees are involved and 
where their host state is. The salient elements of this definition are: that the refugee has been 
in exile for more than five years after the initial displacement and that there are no immediate 
prospects for the implementation of durable solutions. 
                                                          
860 The 2009 UNHCR ExCom Conclusion op cit note 21. 
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As was shown in chapter two, the phenomenon of refugees in protected situations is not 
new. Examples of refugees who have lived with this status for a long time include Palestinian 
refugees, post-colonial African refugees and Sahrawi refugees. 
Also shown in chapter two, protracted refugee situations are caused directly and indirectly. 
Direct causes include persistent conflict in the countries of origin and the refusal by refugees 
to return home due to compelling reasons such as fear that the refugee will be subjected to 
persecution despite the fact that there has been fundamental change in the country of origin. 
Indirect causes include the reluctance by host states to provide alternative solutions to ending 
refugee status such as permanent residence, naturalisation or resettlement in a third country. 
        
3. PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
According to UNHCR, South Africa is host to 112 000 refugees.861 The largest proportion of 
these refugees is from Somalia and the DRC. Somalian refugees have fled from their country 
to South Africa since 1994. Other refugees that ended up in South Africa from the mid-1990s 
are Burundian, Congolese and Rwandan refugees. Some of these refugees have been in South 
Africa for more than 20 years and remain refugees to date.  
The direct cause of this protracted situation is that internal conflict in Somalia and part of 
the DRC has continued to take place. Burundi has also been mired in political repression 
which prevents its citizens from returning home. Although Rwanda is stable, ethnicity and 
political repression have acted as a disincentive for Rwandan refugees to return. The indirect 
cause of this situation has been the failure of South Africa to implement its ‘assimilation and 
naturalisation’ laws for refugees. 
                                                          
861 See http://www.un.org.za/unhcr-branded-material-engages-south-africa-and-its-youth-on-xenophobia/, 
accessed on 13 March 2017. 
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This is a situation that should no longer be ignored by the UNHCR and the South African 
government. While elsewhere the UNHCR has recognised Congolese, Somali and Burundian 
refugees as refugees in protracted situations,862 in South Africa, the UNHCR has not raised 
the issue of protracted refugee situations at all. Neither has the UNHCR developed a 
comprehensive plan to assist these refugees in South Africa. 
 
4. THE NEED FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS – PROTRACTED 
REFUGEE SITUATIONS ARE AN AFFRONT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 
 
Prolonged exile as a refugee is an abnormal condition. Although international law envisaged 
refugee status as a temporary condition, in practice it has been proven that refugees can 
remain refugees indefinitely and for long periods of time.  
The phenomenon of protracted refugee status is an affront to human dignity. The fact that 
international law recognises various rights of refugees does not mean that refugees do enjoy 
these rights in practice. As was argued in chapter three, belonging to a national political 
community is critical to protecting the dignity and rights of refugees. Refugees in protracted 
situations lack this aspect of human dignity. They lack membership to the host political 
community and that of the country of origin. In some cases, refugees, especially children 
born in the host state, are rendered stateless. The uncertainty that surrounds the validity of 
their status as refugees (offered for short periods of time) and threats of withdrawal of their 
status adversely affect them psychologically.863  
                                                          
862 Crisp op cit note 152. 
863 See Somali Association supra note 676. 
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In South Africa, in particular, refugees are failing to enjoy the basic human rights 
accorded to them by international refugee law, the Refugees Act and the Constitution.864 
South Africa’s constant policy changes have added to the refugees’ uncertainty. Refugees 
also experience high levels of insecurity as a result of their ‘otherness’. Xenophobic 
tendencies toward refugees have added to their feelings of exclusion.865  
As shown in chapter 3, international law provides several bases for ending refugee status. 
The first is repatriation. However, as has been argued in chapter three, repatriation is 
unavailable where the country of origin remains unsafe and insecure – in short, if the reasons 
of the initial flight remain. The second option is assimilation, now more commonly known as 
local integration. The problem with this solution is that it has been interpreted narrowly such 
that it excludes permanent residence, which is a more durable solution than local integration. 
Unlike local integration, which does not end refugee status, permanent residence does and 
hence protects the dignity of the refugee more robustly. The third solution is naturalisation. 
This solution is the most suitable for refugees who do not want to relinquish their nationality. 
Like permanent residence, naturalisation provides the refugee full membership of the host 
state’s political community. International law places two key obligations on states with 
regard to naturalisation: firstly, to facilitate the naturalisation of refugees and, secondly, to 
reduce the costs and burden of naturalisation. For states that claim that they cannot afford to 
naturalise or assimilate all refugees in protracted situations, they have a duty in international 
law to explore burden sharing with other states so that all or some of the refugees are 
resettled in a third state. 
 
5. DURABLE SOLUTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
                                                          
864 Constitution op cit note 511. 




The thesis has shown that South African refugee law and policy has undergone radical 
transformation since the mid-1990s. Unlike in the past, South African law and policy is 
anchored in human rights. The Constitution enshrines a wide range of rights to which 
everyone including refugees is entitled. In Watchenuka,866 the Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that asylum seekers are a vulnerable group of people that fall on the ‘lowest rungs of the 
immigration ladder’. Like everybody else, they are entitled to be treated with dignity and to 
all rights that the Constitution guarantees to everyone. In Khosa,867 the Constitutional Court 
held that permanent residents are entitled to apply for social grants. Since refugees in 
protracted situations share similarities with immigrants who have permanent residence, that 
is, being in South Africa longer than five years, Khosa could be interpreted to mean that 
refugees in protracted situations are also entitled to apply for social grants. The Refugees Act 
specifically states that these constitutional rights, except the few rights that are reserved for 
citizens, can be claimed by refugees.  
In keeping with this human rights-based approach, South Africa has an urban refugee 
policy, which means that refugees are not housed in refugee camps but live in urban areas 
side by side with local people.  
Despite this noble constitutional framework for refugees, South Africa has not developed 
and implemented a clear and comprehensive social policy on the integration of refugees. 
Since the emphasis has been on formal integration, refugees have largely been left to their 
own devices as far as their integration, survival and protection is concerned. This oversight 
partly explains the difficulties that refugees encounter in the communities they live, including 
                                                          
866 Watchenuka supra note 67. 
867 Khosa supra note 571. 
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discriminatory treatment by the police and DHA officials, and recurrent episodes of 
xenophobic violence. 
Although South Africa is a host to a considerable number of refugees in protracted 
situation, the government and the UNHCR have not yet acknowledged this fact. The harm 
suffered by this group of refugees and their special needs in South Africa have not been fully 
understood by the South African government and the UNHCR. It is therefore not surprising 
that South Africa refugee policy does not fully address this issue.  
In principle, South African refugee law recognises the temporary nature of refugeehood, 
and has recognised two pathways to ending refugee status: permanent residence and 
naturalisation. However, the manner in which these pathways have been formulated is 
complicated. As shown in chapter six, these pathways have been prescribed following the 
bifurcated approach such that permanent residence precedes naturalisation. These options are 
regulated by three separate Acts – the Refugee Act (general refugee law which refers to the 
two other Acts), the Immigration Act (permanent residence) and Citizenship Act 
(naturalisation) – and thus are conceived outside the specific legal framework of refugee law, 
which is protection oriented. In conceiving of permanent residence and naturalization outside 
the protective framework of refugee law, South Africa has acted in accordance with its 
mindset that refugee status should not open a ‘back-door’ to durable immigration status. Even 
after accepting that refugee status can lead to a durable immigration status and legislating to 
that effect that in some instances refugee status can lead to permanent residence, South 
Africa’s reluctance to grant a durable immigration status has become apparent in its 
implementation of the law.  
This thesis has demonstrated that refugees in South Africa are failing to access the two 
durable solutions recognised by its domestic laws. Consequently, many refugees have held 
that status for more than five years after being recognised as refugees with no durable 
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solution in sight. For one thing, the law stipulating eligibility for permanent residence and 
naturalisation is inconsistent with international law partly because it states that a refugee can 
apply for this durable solution five years after being granted refugee status. As for 
naturalisation, an additional minimum of five years is required. According to the UNHCR, a 
protracted refugee situation arises five years after displacement and refugees in this situation 
deserve durable solutions that are geared towards ending their refugee status.  
One of the greatest stumbling blocks to access to permanent residence and naturalisation is 
the certification process that precedes the application for permanent residence. The Somali 
Association of South Africa and Others v Chairperson of the Standing Committee for Refugee 
Affairs,868 discussed in chapter six, shows that about 167 Somali refugees have lived in South 
Africa for more than five years, with some as long as 10 or 20 years. All these refugees were 
denied certification on the putative ground that they will not continue to be refugees 
indefinitely or for the foreseeable future. Surprisingly, some of these refugees have had their 
status renewed for a further four years since their certifications were denied. The certification 
process is opaque and has not issue guidelines on the interpretation of the words ‘being a 
refugee indefinitely’ or ‘forseeable future’. The certification process has been described as a 
cumbersome process, which asks refugees to make predictions about the future based on 
information they may not be able to gather, given their vulnerable situation and lack of the 
resources and knowhow to collect relevant evidence. 
Even though some refugees may have been granted permanent residence, the continued 
rejection of others, without withdrawing their refugee status, means that they continue to live 
as refugees in South Africa. The practice of rejecting applications for a durable stay has led 
many refugees to join the ranks of refugees in a protracted situation. In South Africa, these 
refugees may not be visible, like in refugee camps, but they are present.  
                                                          






In view of these findings, the following recommendations can be made.  
 
6.1. Formal Recognition of a Protracted Refugee Situation in South Africa  
 
First and foremost, South Africa and the UNHCR must formally recognise that refugees have 
been in South Africa for a very long time and that some of these refugees are failing to access 
a durable solution.  This thesis has demonstrated that such refugees cannot be repatriated 
because of the on-going violence in their countries of origin, the resettlement programme has 
assisted only a handful of refugees in South Africa, and the reluctance by the DHA’s 
Standing Committee to certify that these refugees are likely to remain refugees indefinitely.  
 Since South Africa has accepted the 2009 UNHCR Executive Committee’s Conclusion on 
Protracted Refugee Situations, it has a duty to acknowledge that some of the refugees in 
South Africa are in a protracted situation, and that such situation is harmful to the affected 
refugees and requires a remedy. The South African government should develop a policy on 
refugees that have lived in South Africa for five years or longer with no durable solution in 
sight. This requires more than a mere acknowledgement of the situation; it requires an 
undertaking to act in the interest of this group. 
6.2. The Role of the UNHCR  
 
It is also incumbent on the UNHCR to embark on a programme to identify such refugees in 
South Africa and to take appropriate steps to ensure their protection. As this thesis has 
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shown, South Africa has failed to adequately protect refugees in a protracted situation present 
on its territory. The UNHCR has to play a role in finding a suitable solution for such 
refugees.  
 The first important step is for the UNHCR to identify the refugees in this situation. 
Although the fact that refugees in South Africa are urban-based makes it difficult to trace 
them and that the South African government has not kept or disclosed statistics about 
refugees in a protracted situation, the UNHCR can, with the assistance of its partners, 
compile such data. Many refugees seek services from the UNHCR’s partners869 and the 
UNHCR directly at its Pretoria office. All refugees in South Africa are issued with reference 
numbers which reflect the year of their application for status. This information can be used by 
the UNHCR to determine the extent of the problem of refugees living in prolonged exile in 
South Africa. 
In addition to identifying such refugees, the UNHCR can use its good offices to engage 
the South African government on the prejudices suffered by such refugees and on 
implementing its domestic local legislation. The UNHCR can also offer support to legal 
partners, who can by means of litigation, unlock the bottlenecks to permanent residence and 
naturalisation. The UNHCR can also assist refugees by legally empowering them.  
Furthermore, the UNHCR can appeal to other countries to share this burden and facilitate 
the resettlement of refugees. To find durable solutions, the UNHCR needs to move away 
from the care and maintenance approach.  
 
6.3. Legal and Policy Reform 
                                                          
869 UCT Refugee Law Clinic; Lawyers for Human Rights; NMMU Law Clinic; Cape Town Refugee Centre; 
Jesuit Refugee Service. 
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It has already been established that while there is a legal pathway for refugees to end their 
refugee status in South Africa, refugees have faced many challenges to accessing that 
pathway. Some of these challenges lie in the law itself and hence require amendment for 
them to be resolved.  
As the thesis has shown, international law expects states that host long-stay refugees to 
facilitate their naturalisation and to reduce the burden of applying for naturalisation. To 
comply with these obligations, South Africa needs to simplify the procedures and 
requirements of applying for permanent residence and naturalisation. More importantly, 
given their vulnerability, refugees must not be subjected to requirements that are more 
stringent than those prescribed for other immigrants. For example, the duration of asylum 
status ought to be included in the computation of the minimum five years that refugees must 
satisfy before they can apply for permanent residence or naturalisation. Crucially, South 
Africa needs to develop clear guidelines for the Standing Committee of Refugee Affairs with 
regard to the requirements for certification, such as  what is meant by the terms ‘indefinite 
refugee status’ and ‘being a refugee for the foreseeable future’, and how many times refugee 
status can be renewed.  
 
6.4. Burden-Sharing and International Solidarity / Resettlement 
 
If South Africa finds that granting refugees in protracted situations durable solutions is too 
burdensome, it should in good faith acknowledge this and seek assistance from other States. 
Having ratified the OAU Refugee Convention, South Africa is entitled to invoke the concept 





6.5. Legal Empowerment of Refugees in Protracted Situations  
 
Refugees in South Africa do not only have a moral claim to end their refugee status, they also 
have a legal claim.870 A durable stay (permanent residence or naturalisation) may be difficult 
to access in South Africa, but it is a claim founded on the law nevertheless. Refugees need to 
be legally empowered to gain access to this right.  
Enabling refugees to use the law and legal mechanisms to protect and advance their rights 
and acquire greater control over their lives could have important implications for their well-
being.871 Admittedly, the effectiveness of legal claims will depend on the strength of the 
governance system in a country. However, this should not be an issue in South Africa where 
the judiciary has been able to vindicate many rights of refugees.872  
The courts can play an important role in limiting the power of the host State and providing 
an opportunity for refugees to be heard. The legal empowerment of refugees is not an 
unfamiliar tool to be used by the UNHCR; the UNHCR has many legal partners in South 
Africa.873 Legal empowerment is a tool that South Africans generally are familiar with.874 
                                                          
870A L Purkey ‘A Dignified Approach: Legal Empowerment and Justice for Human Rights Violations in 
Protracted Refugee Situations’ (2013) 27 International Journal Of Refugee Studies at 261: The normative force 
gives the law power that can be transferred: an individual with a legal claim has a more practical power to 
control her destiny than one who merely has a moral claim; See also Donnelly, ‘The law has a particular 
normative force that is different and in many ways superior to that of other types of claims and that will often 
trump claims based on tradition, social utility or mere preference.  
871 The ‘normative force’ of the law is based substantially on the principle that everyone is equal before the law 
and subject to the law whether citizen or refugee. 
872 See various cases discussed in chapter five. 
873 Partners op cit note 870. 
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The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has also commissioned a study on the 
links between poverty and the law, which has highlighted the need of legal empowerment of 
vulnerable groups.875  
Many vulnerable populations in South Africa struggle to access the courts. Refugees face 
additional obstacles. A major aspect of the legal empowerment of refugees is legal assistance 
to navigate the complex process of seeking permanent residence.  
To ensure the effective administration of justice, refugees must be aware of their rights 
and the applicable laws. Education and training is therefore a central feature of legal 
empowerment. Empowering refugees with knowledge about their rights is not sufficient: 
refugees must, in addition, be able to enforce those rights.  This requires access to specialised 
legal services. 
Of course, there are limits on the effectiveness of judicial remedies, such as the disregard 
of court orders, narrow interpretation of the law by some courts, discriminatory treatment, 
and lack of access to legal aid. However, human rights advocates in South Africa have 
generally been able to help their clients navigate around these obstacles. The legal 





                                                                                                                                                                                    
874 For example,  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (5) SA 703 and 
Grootboom supra note 712, and cases by Equal Education, Lawyers for Human Rights, as well as the UCT 
Refugee Rights Clinic cited in chapter five.  
875 UNDP Report ‘Making the Law Work for Everyone’, available at                       
www.undp.org/.../aplaws/.../legal...legal.../making_the_law_work_II.pdf, accessed 20 January 2017. 
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7. SOUTH AFRICANS MUST PRACTICE UBUNTU 
 
For refugees to live meaningful lives in South Africa, South Africans must act in accordance 
with the spirit of Ubuntu. The fact that refugees are failing to integrate demonstrates a clear 
reluctance to welcome refugees into South African society formally and informally. Ubuntu, 
which signifies inclusivity rather than marginalisation, is implicit in fundamental values that 
underlie our Constitution.  
With regard to refugees, South Africans can practice Ubuntu by saying ‘no to 
xenophobia’, by interpreting the law fairly and justly, by showing respect to all migrants, and 
by recognising refugees as a vulnerable group. 
In Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority,876  
Sachs J emphasised the legal obligations owed to refugees in South Africa. Referring 
approvingly to the dictum in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers,877 saying that 
ubuntu suffuses South Africa’s constitutional democracy and that people in the Republic are 
not islands unto themselves. Although this statement was made in the context of eviction, 
Sachs J held that it ought to apply with equal vigour ‘to our relationship with the rest of the 
continent’.878 This was in line with ‘the concept of human interdependence and burden-
sharing in relation to catastrophe’, which Sachs J held is ‘is associated with the spirit of 
ubuntu-botho’.879 
South African Courts have acknowledged the vulnerability of refugees generally, but not 
the distinct disadvantages faced by refugees in a protracted situation. Both the South African 
                                                          
876 Supra note 584.  
877 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 




government and the UNHCR need to recognise the harmful effects of the existing protracted 
refugee situation in the country, especially its impact on the human dignity of the affected 
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